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ABSTRACT 
Charles Jeffery: The. Sac! a] Demacrat1 c Movement iD. Steyr. 
Allstrja. 1927-1934. 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor 
Loughborough University of Technology, September 
of Philosophy, 
1989. 
The social and economic background to politics in Steyr was 
highly unusual. The town was a working class, social democratic 
stronghold isolated within an agrarian, conservative region. 
Moreover, its economy was 
unstable automobile works, 
dominated by one single, highly 
the S"teyr-1I'erke. This thesis is 
concerned with the ways in which this unusual background 
donlinated and defined the nature and development of the local 
social democratic movement between 1927 and 1934. It argues that 
this background conditioned the emergence o,f a distinctive, 
insular social democratic ethos which encapsulated a llloderate, 
reforl1l1st approach to politics based not on ideological 
considerations, but 011 practical local experience. Between 1927 
and 1929, the Steyr-Werke undertook a lllassive expansion of 
production and employlllent which triggered a local econolllic boom. 
The boom in the local economy supported and promoted the social 
delllocratic ethos. Conversely, the sudden shutdown of automobile 
production late in 1929 plullged the local economy into 
depression and underl1l1ned the rationale of the social democratic 
ethos, which became anachronistic and' inoonsistent with the new 
local economic background. However, the unwieldiness of the 
Social Democratic Party structure and the rigidly bureaucratic 
mentali ty of the party leadership precluded effective response 
to the new local conditions. The inability to respond stilllulated 
the development of an opposition faction within the movement 
which rejected the authority and poliCies of the established 
party leadership, and which mobilised in support of a radically 
different, quasi-communist political strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The historiography of Austrian social democracy has largely 
been dominated by a traditional, neo-historicist approach which 
examines the history of the movement from "above", in terms of 
the ideology, organisation and leading personalities of the 
Social Democratic Party at the national level (1). However, in 
the last fifteen years or so, building on developments in Vest 
German historiography (2), the study of Austrian social 
democracy has increasingly revolved around the concept of a 
"historical social science", an approach which draws upon the 
methods of the social sciences to build up a history of the 
movement based not just on the documentation of events at the 
political centre, but also on the socio-economic context within 
which the movement developed (3). This new approach has tended 
to focus on the grass roots of politics, on the everyday life 
and experiences of the working class in general and of the 
members of the social democratic movement in particular. In 
other words, it represents an attempt to approach the history of 
the movement from "below". The first part of this introduction 
explores some of the characteristics of these two approaches and 
sets out the relationship of this study to them. This is 
followed by a discussion of the methodological considerations 
which provide the framework for analysis. The introduction then 
concludes with a synopsis of the themes and hypotheses raised 
and proposed in the study. 
Some works have attempted to assess the history of the SDAP 
from its foundation in 1869 to its demise in 1934 purely in 
terms of central ideological and organisational factors. The 
standard, classic work in this field is Norbert Leser's Zwischen 
Refprmismus l1.nl1 Bplschewismus (4). Leser places great emphasis 
on the fixation with party unity which dominated the SDAP from 
its foundation in 1889. After the First World War this produced, 
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he argues, an obsession with finding a "middle way" of 
compromise between the two poles of reformism and bolshevism in 
the international spectrum of the Left. The obsession with the 
middle way narrowed the party's freedom of maneouvre and 
ultimately condemned it to a fatal immobilism. This was 
reinforced by the unwieldiness and unresponsiveness of the 
SDAP's mass party organisation, and was lent theoretical 
justification in Otto Bauer's increasingly deterministic 
ideological analysis. Ultimately it led to the party's defeat 
and dissolution at the hands of the Dollfu~ regime. 
Leser's work has had a pervasive influence over subsequent 
studies of the SDAP. Melanie Sully, for example, has attempted 
to extend the concept of the "middle way" by seeking to 
establish a continuum of ideological compromise and innovation 
between more extreme al ternati ves (" the eternal quest for the 
third way") from the foundation of the SDAP right through to the 
Socialist Party in the era of Bruno Kreisky (5). Anson Rabinbach 
has developed the theme of Bauer' s determi nism, and proposed 
that this formed one dimension of a dualist social democratic 
strategy 
passive, 
historical 
for power. The 
neo-Kautskyan 
inevitability 
SDAP combined Bauer's essentially 
determinism, which asserted the 
of a gradual evolution into 
parliamentary power, with a unique, active commitment to 
developing the cultural values and intellectual competence 
necessary for the exercise of socialist power. It therefore cast 
itself both in the obj ecti vist role of "inheritor" party, and in 
an active, anticipatory role, which emphasised the subjective 
dimension and was based in the municipal socialism of "Red 
Vienna" and the party's long-standing comlni tment to the 
cultivation of Bildung and Kultur among its membership (6). 
Peter Kulemann on the other hand has focussed his attention on 
the nature of the social democratic party organisation. He 
assumes that the Austrian working class had an inherent 
revolutionary potential, which was demonstrated on several 
occasions between 1918 and 1934, but was always held back by the 
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SDAP. This he attributes to the conservatism of a bureaucratic 
party leadership whose personal interests were tied to the 
existence of the party organisation; in no circumstances would 
the leadership endanger the existence of the party - and 
therefore prejudice its personal interests - by supporting the 
revolutionary outbursts of the masses (7). 
While such studies have without a doubt advanced our 
knowledge and understanding of the history of Austrian social 
democracy, they have significant drawbacks. Foremost among these 
is that they concentrate on "high" pol1 tics. Pol1 tical 
processes, and influences are perceived as flowing downwards 
from the top level of politics, and fail to take fully into 
account the political influence exerted from below by the rank 
and file of the party. Even though Kulemann, for example, refers 
to the "revolutionary energies" of the working class masses (8), 
he does little to elucidate the concerns and aims of the rank 
and file workers, and, in any case, argues that their "energies" 
were always reined in and brought under control by the party 
leadership (9); the rank and file was always subject to the 
omnipresent influence of the leadership. Thus, to adapt a 
characterisation of such "history from above" by Richard Evans, 
the social democratic movement is presented as a puppet theatre, 
with Otto Bauer and the party executive pulling the strings, and 
the party activists and ordinary members dancing jerkily across 
the stage of history towards the final curtain of the Austrian 
ci vil war (10). 
A second problem inherent in the histories from "above" by 
Leser, Kulemann et al is that they display the tendency to 
equate social democracy in Austria with the ideological impulses 
and organisational developments which originated in Vienna (11). 
This is understandable and to some extent even justifiable. 
Vienna was the most important 
city in Austria. It was also 
industrial centre and the largest 
the seat of the 
the home of around 60% of· the SDAP membership 
party executive, 
(12) and, above 
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all, a showcase for social democratic muil1cipal politics. "Red 
Vienna", with its progressive taxation system, its "welfare 
state" and imposing housing programmes has, qui te 
understandably, become one of the major focal points of research 
into Austrian social democracy (13). However, the manifold 
importance of Vienna to the study of Austrian social democracy 
has led to a situation where the 40r. of the party membership 
located outside Vienna has been, until very recently, largely 
ignored. The result is a "blanket" depiction of the movement 
which fails to take into account the diversity of its regional 
and local components and' thus endows it with spuriously 
monolithic and homogenous qualities . 
. The problems and drawbacks associated with "history from 
above" were a major stimulant in the development of neW 
approaches in the study of· the social democratic movement in 
Austria. These were intimately associated with the academic 
activities of the Ludwig-Bgltzmann-Institllt !.iiJ:. Geschlcbte ~ 
Arbeiterbewegllng, founded at the University of Linz in 1968, and 
sought to place far greater emphasis on social and economic 
factors in labour movement history (14). The aim was to approach 
the past from the point of interface between political history 
and social and economic history (15). It was first represented, 
somewhat experimentally, in 1974 in Hans Hautmann and Rudolf 
Kropf's study of the Austrian labour movement between 1830 and 
1945, which sought, in a chronological format, to derive the 
social and economic origins of its ideology and politics (16). 
However, through examining the development of the national 
labour movement over such a long period of time, this study 
inevitably succumbed to the same problems of overgeneralisation 
which were inherent in more traditionally oriented works. 
The approach used by Hautmann and Kropf was employed much 
more fruitfully in the regional studies by Helmut Konrad and 
Karin-Karia Schmid1echner, which examine the social and economic 
background to the evolving political consciousness of the 
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nineteenth century working class in Upper Austria and Styria 
respectively (17). A central concern of both Konrad and 
Schmidlechner is to illuminate the Alltag, the conditions of 
everyday life of the worker, and to establish a causal link 
between these and the development of political consciousness and 
organisation. There is a danger, as Konrad elsewhere notes (18), 
that the adoption of the Alltag as a focal point of research can 
all too easily result in a descriptive account of the trivial 
details of daily life which neglects the political context to 
become a "history with the politics left out" (19). However, he 
and Schmidlechner have largely avoided this problem by 
maintaining a constant and rigorous focus on the political 
implications of everyday experience. Their studies underline the 
fact that the various regions of Austria had differing social 
and economic backgrounds, that different workers thus 
experienced different AlltaS" which influenced the development 
of disparate forms of political consciousness and organisation. 
This thesis seeks to build on the methodological innovations 
which have added new dimensions to the study of Austrian social 
democracy since the 1960' s. It is intended as an attempt ot 
counteract the tendency to view the history of the movement from 
"above", to concentrate on the ideas and personalities of a 
group of national political leaders based in and oriented 
towards the peculiar circumstances of Vienna. As noted above, 
this type of approach too easily results in a "blanket" 
depiction of the history of social democracy which fails to take 
into account the full diversity of a movement whose organisation 
and membership was 'spread across ~en socially, economically. and 
politically heterogenous LiiDder. This study, like those of 
Xonrad and Schmidlechner, seeks to take account of and highlight 
part of this diversity. It seeks to illuminate the factors which 
helped. to condition the forms of political behaviour and 
activity particular to the social democratic movement in one 
town, Steyr, which was one of the :major centres of social 
democratic strength outside Vienna, but which has not yet 
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received adequate historical attention. 
The thesis is conceived as a socto-po1itical study, a study 
based upon the premise that the nature of politics is intimately 
bound to the particular social context within which those 
politics were conducted. It seeks to meet the demand laid down 
by Helene lIaimann to give full consideration to "the complicated 
socio-economic and social-psychological context within which the 
labour organisations developed" (20). However, the focus is not 
placed, as lIaimann goes on to prescribe (21), on a narroW 
examination of the social democratic Alltag in Steyr. As noted 
above, such an enterprise can all too easily become a "history 
wi th the politics left out". The focus is placed more broadly on 
the social and economic structures which formed the basic local 
framework within which the social democratic movement operated, 
and in particular on the ways in which these structures 
conditioned the nature and development of social democratic 
politics in the town. This is not to suggest that the study is 
of an exclusively structuralist-determinist nature; indeed, the 
role of independent human agency is crucial to the latter parts 
of the thesis, in particular the final chapter. However, the 
underlying philosophy of the study is that the potential of 
human agency in Steyr was very much circumscribed by the 
structural characteristics of local economy and SOCiety. 
The explanatory framework developed to carry out this 
socio-political investigation can be termed the local milieu. 
The concept of a "local milieu" refers to the attributes of a 
particular political "habitat" in their significance as 
determinants of the nature of political acti vi ty within that 
"habitat". In his important essay on the theoretical 
considerations involved in regional/local stUdies in labour 
history, Helmut Konrad indicates the two essential aspects which 
comprise a "local milieu". Firstly, he notes the "decisive 
importance" which should be accorded to "the internal conditions 
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of the region in the emergence of the cultural and pOlitical 
behavioural forms of the working class" (22). 
that regional labour histories, most of 
He goes on to add 
which focus on 
industrial areas, must, without fail, take the structure of the 
(usually non-industrial) hinterland into consideration, since 
"the working class and its political organisations do not 
develop in a vacuum, but rather establish their field of 
activity within an environment, whose character largely 
co-determines the possibilities and types of activity 
undertaken" (23). Thus, adopting the dual focus of attention 
suggested by Konrad, the local milieu is an analytical concept 
which encompasses both the internal socio-economic 
characteristics of the locality and the socio-economic structure 
of the surrounding area in their combined significance as 
co-determinants of the nature of local politics. 
The relevance of the concept of the local milieu is not 
intended to be specific to the study of social democracy in 
Steyr. The concept could equally be applied to the politics of 
any other locality. This does not imply however that steyr was 
chosen for this study for its presumed typicality among Austrian 
towns and their local milieux; indeed, it is doubtful whether 
there can be such a thing as a "typical" town (24). Rather, it 
was selected because of the blatant lack of any sense of 
symmetry within its local milieu. Steyr constituted in many 
respects an extraordinary setting for politics. It was an 
isolated, highly industrialised, urban enclave, dominated 
socially by the manual working class and poU tically by the 
social democratic movement, situated in the midst of an 
overwhelmingly agrarian, catholic-conservative region. 
Furthermore, the town's internal economic structure was 
dominated by one single works, the Steyr-Werke (25), an 
automobile factory which experienced massive fluctuations in its 
economic performance: the local economy enjoyed boon conditions 
between 1927 and 1929, followed by a period of deep depression 
until 1934. This incidentally accounts for the time period 
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chosen for this study. The period of boom and its implications 
for the social democratic movement provide a fascinating 
contrast with the subsequent period of economic decline. 
It is evident that in several important respects steyr was 
an extreme case, and, as David Crew suggests, "the extreme case 
can often be extremely revealing" (26). The local milieu in 
Steyr exemplified, in a highly exaggerated form, the broader 
circumstances which confronted Austrian social democracy as a 
whole: the deep, hostile social and political cleft between the 
Austrian Lager and the unpredictability and fragility of the 
Austrian economy. It represented an extreme encapsulation of the 
opportunities and problems which faced the social democratic 
movement nationwide. It is thus the purpose of this study to 
investigate the "products" of these extreme and exaggerated 
circumstances, to assess what kind of social democratic movement 
emerged within this unique and exemplary local milieu, and, 
ultinately, to offer in this way new insights into the nature of 
Austrian social democracy. 
This implies something of the wider relevance and value of 
the local study as a genre of academic enquiry. This study is 
not intended to be a form of scholarly parochialism, a narrow 
case study of social democracy with no implications which extend 
beyond the locality under examination. Nor is it intended just 
as an illustrative microcosm of national "high" politics, which 
might imply that the mathematical sum of all conceivable local 
studies could somehow automatically "equal" the national history 
of the social democratic movement (27). The relationship between 
local and national history is perceived .in this study as one of 
mutuality and complementarity: the local study inevitably 
confirms much of the existing orthodoxy represented in national 
studies of the social democratic movement, but it also 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of pal! tical experience within 
the nation, thus also qualifying and adding to our knowledge of 
the.history of the movement. "It is a question of asking how and 
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. 
in what ways the experience of the local community fits into the 
national experience and how, in what ways, and to what extent 
local areas participated in, contributed to, were affected by, 
and reacted to the large-scale social, economic and political 
transfonnations" (28) encountered in inter-war Austria as a 
whole. This study is thus envisaged as a contribution certainly 
to a more differentiated and, it is hoped, to a better balanced 
and more accurate account of the history of the social 
democratic movement in Austria. 
In regard to the application of a socio-political 
methodology to the local/regional history of social democracy in 
the First Republic, this study is largely breaking new ground. 
Al though Konrad and Schmidlechner have done much to illuminate 
the social contexts, or milieux, which formed the background to 
the initial emergence of the Upper Austrian and Styrian labour 
movements in Habsburg Austria (see above), little has yet been 
done to extend the focus of socio-poli tical enquiry into the 
twentieth century. While local/regional histories of social 
democracy in the First Republic are not uncommon, the majority 
of these tend to be purely organisational studies whose remit 
does not extend to a systematic examination of the political 
implications of the socio-economic milieux which dominated the 
regions concerned (29). The exceptions to this rule are 
Vorarlberg, where Werner Dreier has briefly analysed the 
implications of the peculiarities of the Vorarlberg social and 
industrial structures for the development of the regional social 
democratic movement (30), Styria, and the setting for this 
study, the town of Steyr. 
Inter-war social democracy in Styria has been the focus of 
research by both Robert Hinteregger and the Ji11 Lewis. 
Hinteregger attempts to explain the intensity of social 
democratic resistance in Styria in the Civil War of 1934 in 
terms of a dichotomous social model, based around the conflicts 
of interest of "proletariat" and "bourgeoisie". He finds that 
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these were especially pronounced in Styria and thus greatly 
increased the potential for social conflict in the region.(31). 
His work is useful in that he drags the emphasis away from the 
political centre, from the diverting, but not always especially 
informative spectacles of controversies surrounding "Red" Vienna 
and rhetorical parliamentary altercations between Left and 
Right, to demonstrate that social conflict in inter-war Austria 
had far more deep-seated and prosaic roots. 
Lewis, on the other hand, restricts her attention to the 
social democratic trade unions, primarily in the industrial 
valleys of Upper Styria (32), She is concerned to explain the 
"failure of Styrian labour", 
trade unions in the region 
the particular weakness of the 
and their capitulation to the 
aggressively anti-unionist Alpine iron and steel conglomerate. 
This weakness was, she argues, inherent in the structure of the 
region's industry: Upper Styrian industry was geographically 
dispersed, making united union action difficult; it required a 
low skill level which made individual workers - especially 
unwanted union activists dispensable; and the industry 
produced basic, unfinished products highly susceptible to 
fluctuations in demand, resulting in regular periods of high 
unemployment which debilitated union strength. By analysing the 
broader context, or milieu, within which the Styrian unions were 
forced to operate, Lewis is able to throw critical insights into 
the reasons for the weakness of social democracy in one of the 
major industrial areas in Austria and thus, by implication, its 
weakness in Austria as a whole. 
The local and regional studies by Lewis, Hinteregger and 
Dreier serve to emphasise the heterogenous nature of social 
democracy in Austria and thus help to present a more subtle and 
accurate account of the movement than the homogenous, 
Vienna-based picture which has traditionally been predoninant. 
Such too is the aim of this study, which is fortunate enough in 
this respect to be able to build on the foundations laid by 
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Josef Stockinger in his recent doctoral' thesis on the labour 
movement in Steyr (33). Stockinger's thesis is conceived as a 
"soCial-historically oriented regional study", whose purpose is 
the comparison of of the "processes of development of the 
(organised) labour movement" in Steyr and in selected villages 
in the area surrounding the town (34). Stockinger's aims are 
bold: while concentrating on the social democratic labour 
movement, he also seeks to examine all other forms of working 
class organisation - communist, christian social, He1 mwehr and 
national socialist in the light of the basic economic 
background of his intra-regional comparison, while also 
considering basic problems of daily life in the area. The thesis 
unfortunately fails to fulfil these aims. Ihe breadth of its 
focus is probably over-ambitious, with the result that its 
construction and argumentation lack coherence and central 
unifying themes, while the analytical impetus of the study is 
all too readily lost in a well-documented but dry, narrative 
account. Stockinger's work does however contain a wealth of 
factual evidence and invaluable information on relevant source 
materials. These provided an initial orientation for this study, 
to whose thematic content the discussion now turns. 
As established above, it is the central underlying 
assumption of this study that the character and development of 
social democratic politics was strongly conditioned by the 
extraordinary nature of the local milieu in Steyr. The essence 
of the study can be encapsulated in four basic propositions: 
Firstly that the peculiarities of the local milieu in Steyr 
conditioned the emergence of a highly unusual social 
democratic ethos which encapsulated a distinctive, 
fundamentally non-ideological approach to politics. 
Secondly that conditions in the local milieu up to the end 
of 1929 gave the social democratic ethos a certain logic and 
internal consistency. However, the local milieu was 
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redefined by developments in 1929.-1930, such that the social 
democratic ethos became outdated and anachronistic, and 
inconsistent with the new local conditions. 
Thirdly that the structure of the Social Democratic Party in 
Steyr and the mentality of its leadership inhibited 
effective response and adaptation to the new conditions in 
the local milieu after 1929. 
Fourthly, that the inadaptability of the local party and the 
inconsistency of the social democratic ethos with local 
conditions after 1929 led to the rejection of that ethos by 
parts of the movement and the silmultaneous elaboration of a 
new and fundamentally different political approach. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is concerned to 
outline the major themes which are addressed throughout the 
study and which serve as means to illuminate and investigate the 
propositions set out above. Of fundamental importance in the 
arguments developed in the study is the isolation of Steyr 
within a socially and politically alien and opposed region. It 
is a central premise of the stUdy that this isolation served to 
an exaggerated extent to encapsulate; and localise the context 
for politics in the town. As a result, the social democratic 
movement was conditioned almost eXClusively by local factors; 
conversely it was at most only peripherally conditioned by and 
preoccupied wi th the factors which are assumed to have 
determined the nature of Austrian social democracy in the 
generalised national context. The social democrats in Steyr were 
thus imbued by a strong local consciousness which distinguished 
them very clearly from social democrats elsewhere. This 
localised consciousness formed the basis of the social 
democratio ethos. 
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Ethos is taken here to refer to the values, attitudes and 
mentalities.which were derived by the social democrats in Steyr 
from local, day-to-day experience. It is argued in this study 
that this ethos underlay and defined their political behaviour. 
Conversely it is argued that in no sense was their political 
behaviour motivated and inspired by ideological considerations. 
The term "ideology" connotes a more or less coherent, codified 
system of ideas about politics and society which provides some 
kind of political orientation for its adherents. The social 
democrats in Steyr had made no attempt to elaborate any such 
system of ideas. They had not developed their own nor assumed 
anyone else's considered, theoretical conception or critique of 
Austrian society upon which to base their politics; their 
politics was conditioned above all else by their ethos, based in 
practical local experience. 
This study argues that the social democratic ethos in Steyr 
emerged from the local consciousness and experience of 
isolation. Isolation fostered an insular and inward-directed 
mentality among the social democrats which was reflected in the 
concern to seal Steyr off (even more than it already was) from 
the "outside world", and to build the town up (even more) as a 
local bastion of social democracy. The means by which the social 
democrats sought to deflect "outside" influence and to 
consolidate the stronghold was the extension and diffusion of 
social democratic organisational influence within the town. The 
social democratic ethos in Steyr thus incorporated a marked 
predisposition to emphasise the value of organisation. 
The stress placed on the virtues of organisation was 
reflected for example in the commitment to locate, as far as 
possible, all activities undertaken by social democrats within 
an explicitly social democratic context (see Chapter Five). A 
broad "sub-culture" of organisations and activities was built up 
ranging from the extra-school education/indoctrination of 
children to the burial of the dead, from abstinence to zither 
playing - which 
democrats from 
sought 
the 
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to demarcate and insulate the social 
influence of the capitalist and 
catholic-clericalist cultural values which dominated in Austria 
(and, more pertinently in view of the narrow, localised 
consciousness which predominated in Steyr, in the region which-
surrounded the town). Organisation was however not just employed 
to contain "outside" influence, but also to extend and cement 
social de:mocratic influence over politics and society within 
Steyr. The social democrats 
other political movements 
aspired to a co:mplete hege:mony over 
in the town. The instru:ment of 
domination was what might be ter:med a "network" or "machine" 
which was founded on the privileges, powers and patronage of the 
social democratic metalworkers' trade union 
(!etallarbeiteryerband, or KAV) , whose significance is exa:mined 
in Chapter Two, and the complementary powers and patronage of 
the social democratic town hall. Chapter Three analyses how the 
organisational influence of trade union and municipal 
administration was able, through this network, to reach into and 
permeate areas of daily life not normally open to overt 
political manipulation (e.g. the employment prospects of the 
local labour force or the quality of "law and order" upheld by 
the local police). In this way, the social democrats were able 
to dominate local politics and society far :more extensively than 
formal indicators of power, e.g. electoral statistics (see 
Table i), might suggest. 
The social democratic ethos in Steyr thus placed great 
emphasis on the expansion and consolidation of 
influence. A major contention of this study 
organisational 
is that this 
preoccupation with organisational expansion represents an ideal 
test case for the verification of Robert Michels' theories on 
the structural characteristics of labour movement organisation 
and the political attributes these characteristics tend to 
produce (35). Michels suggested that any expanding organisation 
is bound to develop an excessive, cumbersome bureaucracy 
presided over by a narrow oligarchy with an all-consuming 
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passion for the consolidation and conservation of the 
organisation. The overriding rationale of the social democratic 
movement in Steyr was organisational expansion; it is thus 
argued that the movement was especially susceptible to the 
syndrome Michels discussed. Indeed it is proposed in Chapter 
Four that the structure of the Social Democratic Party in Steyr 
and the nature of the party leadership conformed very closely to 
the Michels model. The organisational preoccupation central to 
the local ethos was thus reinforced by the organisational 
conservatism inherent in oligarchical rule to produce a tendency 
among the party leadership to value the size and well-being of 
the social democratic organisational apparatus as the major 
criteria of political life. It is further suggested in Chapters 
Four and Five that the activist members of both the Social 
Democratic Party and the 
affiliated to it were also 
myriad ·cultural" organisations 
dominated by a similar fetish for 
organisation. In consequence, organisation in Steyr became less 
and less a means with which to realise political aims and more 
and more an end in itself. This extreme organisational fixation 
had profound implications both for the tactical flexiblli ty of 
the social democrats· (see below> and for the nature of their 
political strategy. 
The social democratic strategy in Steyr was unequivocally 
moderate and reformist. In Chapter Six, it is shown that the 
social democrats combined a deep commitment to the processes of 
parliamentary democracy, as enshrined in the republican 
constitution, with the aim of reforming certain limited aspects 
of the existing social and economic order. As suggested above, 
this study contends that the social democratic movement was 
dominated by an insular, localised mentality which lacked any 
kind of systematic conception of the nature of Austrian state 
and society as a whole. The reformist strategy of the social 
democrats was therefore based very firmly in practical 
experience at the local level rather than in any considered 
ideological prescription for action. It is argued for example in 
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Chapter Six that the social democrats derived a positive 
comndtment. to the existing order of Austrian state and society 
from the preoccupation with organisation which was central to 
theie ethos. The emphasis placed on organisation effectively 
meant that they had made a considerable investment in the 
existing order of society. They therefore had no revolutionary 
or anti-system aimsj they accepted the basic parameters of the 
capitalist socio-economic system and the political system of 
parliamentary democracy. 
It is further suggested that the social democrats' 
preoccupation with organisation also provided the rationale for 
their strategy for power within the parliamentary system. This 
was based on the premise that a sustained recruitment of new 
members to the party organisation would bring the SDAP ever 
nearer to the all-important level of 51% support among the 
electorate, which would, it was thought, guarantee power in the 
state. Consequently, a premium was placed on the sheer size of 
the organisationj the larger the organisation, the nearer were 
the social democrats, by implication, to the exercise of state 
power. The social democratic ethos and the organisational 
preoccupation it incorporated thus underlay a quintessentially 
reformist parliamentary strategy for power. 
A further dimension of local experience determined exactly 
what the social democrats hoped to reform in the existing 
system. As noted above, the local economy was dominated by one 
single firm operating in a fluctuating market. This exposed the 
town, and in particular the manual working class supporters of 
the social democratic movement to the instability and insecurity 
of employment inherent in a capitalist economy. The social 
democrats aimed therefore, on the basis of this local experience 
rat~er than any theoretical analysis of capitalism, to reform 
certain aspects of the capi tal1st economy and thus ameliorate 
the worst effects of capitalist instability. 
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The preceding discussion has suggested that certain 
essential characteristics .of the social democratic movement were 
intrinsically related to the social democratic ethos in Steyr. 
This ethos both incorporated the aspiration to consolidate 
social democratic hegemony within Steyr and also conditioned a 
moderate local reformist strategy. In turn, this ethos was 
itself conditioned and formed by the peculiarities of the local 
milieu which provided the basic framework for· peli tics in the 
town. However, it must not be assumed that the peculiar 
condi tions in the local milieu which gave rise to the social 
democratic ethos remained static during the whole period under 
examination. The following paragraphs outline the relationship 
between the changing nature of the local milieu and the social 
democratic ethos. 
Between 1927 and 1929, the local milieu supported and 
promoted the social democratic ethos. This pertains to a key 
theme which permeates the whole of this study: the relationship 
between the social democratic movement and the most crucial 
factor in the socio-economic background to politics in Steyr, 
the fluctuating economic performance of the Steyr-Werke. The 
economic history of the Steyr-Werke is analysed in Chapter One, 
where it is shown that the works experienced a significant 
revival of its fortunes in 1927 and the first half of 1928. In 
the second half of 1928 and in 1929, the management of the 
Steyr-Werke extended this revival artificially and without 
economic justification, so that the local economy suddenly 
enjoyed boom conditions while the economy elsewhere in Austria 
was stagnant. In this period therefore, the experience of social 
democracy in Steyr diverged strongly from the general, national 
experience. 
Austrian social democracy is generally assumed to have 
experienced a decisive turning point in July 1927 (36). The 
crushing of the workers' demonstration in Vienna and the 
subsequent national social democratic railway strike severely 
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undermined the confidence and morale of the SDAP at national 
level. This applied in particular to the belief in the efficacy 
of a parliamentary strategy to secure social democratic 
interests when parliamentary power was in the hands of a 
fiercely anti-social democratic majority prepared to use state 
power against the social democratic movement. 
However, as is argued in Chapter Three, the social democrats 
were able radically to extend the influence of their 
organisational network in the town against the material 
background of boom at the steyr-Werke after 1927. This enabled 
them to cement their dominance over the local Right and thus to 
realise their hegemonic aspirations in the town. This local 
hegemony had a twofold significance. Firstly, it represented a 
marked deviation from the national experience of social 
democracy. Secondly it served even further to stress the 
uniquely encapsulated and insular nature of the milieu within 
which politics was conducted in Steyr. Encapsulation/insulation 
shielded the local social democratic movement from the 
ramifications of recent poH tical developments at the national 
level. It was thus able to maintain an unimpaired confidence in 
a parliamentary-majoritarian strategy even though the events of 
July 1927 had indicated that such a strategy was increasingly 
illusory and unrealistic. Furthermore, the local economic boom 
prOVided the means for the SDAP town hall majority to implement 
local ameliorative reforms. Thus, between 1927 and 1929, not 
only were the hegemonic aspirations central to the ethos of the 
social democrats realised, but the reformist strategy derived 
from that ethos also retained an apparent efficacy. 
The social democratic ethos was therefore especially 
appropriate to a situation in which the capitalist economy (in 
the local guise of the Steyr-Werke) was buoyant and in which a 
belief in the efficacy of parliamentary democracy could be 
(however spuriously) maintained. In other words, it was 
specifically attuned to the nature of the local milieu in Steyr 
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which existed in the late 1920's, which combined a highly 
localised and insulated context for politics with local economic 
boom. However, between the autumn of 1929 and late 1930, the 
local milieu underwent a wholesale and drastic redefinition. The 
Steyr-Werke collapsed, plunging the local economy into long-term 
crisis, while the "insulation" which shielded Steyr from the 
impact of broader national trends was pierced and eroded as 
factors in national politics increasingly impinged on the local 
context. Hence, even the social democratic "stronghold" in Steyr 
was now subject to the increasingly repressive and progressively 
anti-consti tutional measures of successive governments of the 
Right. The local milieu after 1929 was thus characterised by 
deep economic crisis and lost its insulating function as Steyr 
became increasingly exposed to the increasing national dominance 
of the anti-democratic Right. 
In these circumstances, the ethos of the social democratic 
movement in Steyr was patently inappropriate as a basis for 
political action; its success was contingent on the relative 
well-being of the capitalist economy and on relatively open and 
competitive parliamentary politics. This did not necessarily, 
however, represent a lasting disadvantage for the social 
democratic movement. Any political movement normally has the 
option of redefining its objectives and reevaluating its 
strategy to take into account new circumstances and problems. It 
is argued in this study however, that the social democratic 
movement in Steyr was wholly unable to undertake any such 
reevaluation. This reflected the extreme fixation with 
organisation which prevailed throughout the movement. The 
tendency noted above, whereby organisation became less a means 
to achieve political aLms and mOre an end in itself severely 
prejudiced the its political flexibility. This was especially so 
since the social democratic ethos, largely expressed in a 
preoccupation with organisation, had been supported and promoted 
by conditions within the local milieu between 1927 and 1929. As 
a consequence, the social democrats were unable to abandon the 
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precepts which were established in the 1920's or to adapt their 
approach to the new conditions which prevailed in Steyr in the 
1930' s. The social democratic movement was increasingly 
characterised by a rigidity of approach which condemned it to 
passivity, imlllObilism and fatalistic resignation in the face of 
mass local unemployment and increasing political repression. 
The final major theme of this thesis, addressed in detail in 
Chapter Seven, concerns the cohesion of the movement after it 
had become evident both that the social democratic ethos was 
inappropriate to the new circumstances of the 1930' s and that 
the movement was unable to adapt to these circumstances. It is 
proposed that these two factors served to stimulate the 
. development 
Opposition 
of an opposition within the 
mobilised around in 
movement in Steyr. 
which the party 
leadership in particular clung 
the way 
rigidly to the social democratic 
ethos, with its emphasis on the merits of organisation and of a 
parliamentary strategy, even as that organisation and 
parliamentary democracy were being destroyed, especially after 
March 1933, by the Dollfu~ dictatorship. 
However, it is argued in Chapter Seven that the opposition 
which emerged duri ng 1933 represented much more than just the 
rejection of the unadaptabi1i ty and imlllObiUsm of the party 
leadership; the emergence of opposition also represented in a 
much broader sense a rejection of social democracy as an 
international political tradition. Although the impetus for 
opposition was drawn from the failure of the distinctive variant 
of social democracy which had developed in the pecuUar local 
context of Steyr, it was also strengthened by the growing local 
conviction that reformist social democracy had also failed not 
only in the national Austrian context, but in Germany as well in 
the early 1930's. The consideration of wider developments by the 
emergent opposition represents, it is argued, a "U beration" 
from the narrow, localised consciousness and ethos which had 
hitherto dominated the social democratic movement. It was 
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moreover indicative of an attempt to draw general implications 
from the comparison of different experiences. In other words, 
the opposition was attempting to take on a more theoretical 
approach to politics which recognised and compared the broad 
similarity of the failings of local, all-Austrian and German 
social democracy and consequently rejected social democracy as a 
whole. Emphasis on organisation, parliamentary majori tarianism 
and moderate reform were thus rejected by the social democratic 
opposition in Steyr for a fundamentally new and diametrically 
opposed approach to politics, based around Leninist 
organisational principles, extra-parliamentary tactics and, 
ultimately, the revolutionary reorganisation of society on 
quasi-communist lines. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LOCAL KII.IEU AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN 
STEYR 1927-1934. 
The history of social democracy in Steyr between 1927 and 
1934 consists of two very distinct phases. Between 1927 and late 
1929 the social democratic movement enjoyed its mast successful 
period. Already electorally dominant in Steyr, it was able to 
extend its influence into ostensibly non-political areas by 
means of a local political "machine", a network of patronage and 
manipulation based in the metalworkers' trade union (the 
Xetallarbeiteryerband, or )[AV) and the town hall. It was also 
able to implement modest local social reforms and maintained an 
optimistic and confident attitude towards the prospect of a 
national social democratic electoral victory in the near future. 
However, the period after 1929 saw the collapse of the system of 
patronage and manipulation, 
reform programme and the 
defensive political outlook. 
the disintegration of the social 
emergence of a peSSimistic and 
By 1934 the movement was a weak, 
divided and, far the most part, ineffectual and demoralised 
political farce. 
It is the contention of this chapter, and indeed of the 
thesis as a whale, that the primary explanation for the 
fluctuations in the fortunes of the social democratic movement 
is to be found in the changing nature of the social and economic 
background to politiCS, or local milieu, in Steyr. As 
established in the Introduction of this study, the concept of 
the local milieu refers to the structural characteristics of 
local economy and society in their role as determinants of the 
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nature of local politics. This chapter has the twofold purpose 
of examining the essential features of this local milieu and of 
demonstrating that they conditioned and circumscribed the 
development of social democratic politics. The chapter also aims 
to show that a local milieu may be markedly distinctive to the 
generalised national situation, which is all too often assumed 
to apply equally throughout the nation. The local social and 
economic background to politics in Steyr was highly unusual, 
thus forming the basis of the distinctive, and in national 
terms, deviant experience of the local social democratic 
movement. 
The socio-economic basis of politics in Steyr was defined 
above all else by the Steyr-Werke. This massive car works 
dominated the local economy and defined the local social 
environment. For example, between 1928 and late 1929, some 78% 
of the local (employed) industrial workforce was employed at the 
works; this share never dipped below a level of 53%, recorded at 
the economic lowpoint of the works during the Great Depression 
(see Figure 1). The social structure of the town, and the 
political implications inherent in that social structure, were 
furthermore largely determined by the size and characteristics 
of the workforce at the Steyr-Werke. The workforce was 
overwhelmingly manual, with the result that the social structure 
of Steyr was that of an Arbelterstadt, a town dominated by the 
manual working class (1). In addition, Steyr's long industrial 
tradition of metal-working meant that the manual workforce at 
the car works consisted primarily of skilled workers (2). Such 
skilled metal-workers had traditionally been at the forefront of 
labour movement organisation in Austria (3), and had 
accordingly, since the late 1860's, formed the backbone of the 
social democratic labour movement in Steyr (4). The workforce of 
the Steyr-Werke thus formed the social basis and prerequisite 
for a localised, working class and social democratic stronghold 
in Steyr. 
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One of the most striking characteristics of this social 
democratic stronghold was the almost complete social, economic 
and poli tical contrast it presented to the surrounding area. 
Steyr was a compact, highly industrialised, predominantly social 
democratic town, situated in the middle of a rural, agrarian, 
catholic-conservative and essentially hostile hinterland. Seen 
in electoral terms Steyr was around 60% social democratic; the 
surrounding Traunyiertel was around 70% conservative (5). The 
position of Steyr as an isolated enclave in a contrary 
environment strongly conditioned the ethos of the social 
democratic movement. Isolation promoted the development of an 
insular, inward-looking mentality among the social democrats, 
which was reflected in an exaggerated quest to maximise the 
political influence and power of their organisations within the 
boundaries of the town. 
The social democratic ethos in Steyr thus underlay a drive 
to penetrate and dominate as many spheres of public and private 
life as was possible with social democratic organisational 
influence. This organisational emphasis in the social democratic 
movement was exhi bi ted particularly in the development of two 
parallel power bases in the town: the first lay in the shopfloor 
and Works Council of the Steyr-Werke, where the !QV had been 
able to establish a powerful and exclusive position after the 
First World War; the second lay in the town hall, which was 
under continuous social democratic control between 1919 and 
1934. Both power bases, however, were fundamentally dependent on 
the economic performance of the Steyr-Werke. The bargaining 
strength of the !QV in industrial relations was naturally 
dependent on the economic climate in the car industry. 
Similarly, the financial cornerstone of the municipal budget, 
and therefore of the activities of the social democratic town 
hall, was the local income tax raised from the workforce at the 
car works. Thus, the extent and success of social democratic 
activities in Steyr were largely contingent on, and determined 
by, the current commercial fortunes of the Steyr-Werke. This 
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underlined the extent to which politics in Steyr was conditioned 
by the local socio-economic milieu. Indeed, the recognition of 
the relationship between the economic performance of the 
Steyr-Yerke and the performance of the social democratic 
movement is an absolutely cruoial prerequisite for interpreting 
and understanding the development of social democracy in Steyr. 
The economic development of the Steyr-Yerke in the First 
Republic was highly unstable, exhibiting wild fluctuations whioh 
were either at variance with, or were exaggerated refleotions 
of, broader national economic trends. Three distinct phases can 
be identified: in the first, from 1927 to late 1929, the works 
enjoyed boom conditions, with ever-inoreasing production and 
employment levelsj in the second phase, from late 1929 to 
mid-1930, the car production line was completely shut downj and 
thirdly, from mid-1930 to 1934 the works was operating at only a 
fraction of its full capacity (see Table 2). These exaggerated 
fluctuations were essentially mirrored in the development of the 
social democratic movement in Steyr. Between 1927 and 1929 the 
social democrats were faced with the unusually favourable 
background conditions of boom at the car works. As has been 
noted, their isolated social and political situation encouraged 
them to turn inward and make the most of the opportunities 
available to them for the extension of social democratio power 
and influence within Steyr. Between 1927 and 1929 they had the 
means to do so on an unprecedented scale, as the boom conditions 
at the Steyr-Yerke "fed" into and consolidated the existing 
organisational power bases in the XAV and the town hall. 
The peculiar conditions which existed in the local milieu 
between 1927 and 1929 also represented an almost ideal situation 
for the demonstration of the apparent efficacy and viability of 
the social democratic reformist strategy in Steyr. On the one 
hand, the local insularity born of social and political 
isolation allowed the social democrats to maintain a belief in 
the efficacy of electoral competition as a feasible strategy for 
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power long after other, non-electoral factors had taken centre 
stage in Austrian politics. On the other, local economic boom 
generated the financial resources for the pursuit of modest 
local welfare reforms. Thus the period 1927-1929 was also the 
highpoint of social democratic reformism in Steyr. It is evident 
that in these years the local milieu in Steyr represented a 
uniquely encapsulated, exaggeratedly favourable local 
environment for social democratic politics. The social 
democratic movement faced a wholly different (and highly 
auspicious) framework for its activities than that which faced 
social democrats elsewhere in Austria. In this period therefore, 
the experience of social democracy in Steyr deviated from the 
general, national experience. Broadly speaking, the Austrian 
social democratic movement had taken on an increasingly 
pessimistic and defensive outlook after July 1927; at the same 
time, the social democrats in Steyr were enjoying their most 
active, optimistic and successful years (see section 1.1). 
However, the shutdown of the Steyr-Werke in 1929-1930, and 
the low levels of production thereafter drastically altered the 
framework around social democratic politics in Steyr. 
Exaggeratedly favourable economic background conditions were 
abruptly replaced by exaggeratedly unfavourable conditions as 
production and employment levels at the works were slashed. The 
uniquely encapsulated local milieu of 1927-1929 underwent a 
fundamental redefinition as local unemployment soared, 
immediately eroding the NAV's power base in the Steyr-Yerke, and 
decimating the social democratic town hall's maj or source of 
income. The. organisational power bases of social democracy 
disintegrated and the movement fell into a steep decline. This 
decline was confirmed as the social democratic strategy became 
increasingly unviable in the new circumstances of the 1930' s. 
Abruptly, with the economic collapse of the Steyr--Werke, the 
social democratic movement in Steyr found itself realigned with 
the national trends from which it had deviated after 1927 (see 
section 1.2). Social democracy in Steyr thus proved to be 
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inherently and excessively dependent cn the particular nature of 
the local milieu in the late 1920's. 
1, 1: Social Democracy and the Local Milieu, 1927-1929, 
The isolation of Steyr in a contrary and hostile social and 
political environment fostered the development. of an insular 
social democratic ethos whose essence was reflected in the 
concern to establish Steyr as an exclusive Hocbburg, or 
"fortress" of social democracy. The social democrats sought to 
establish a hegemony over other political parties and movements 
by permeating the town as much as possible with social 
democratic organisational influence amd by sealing it cff as 
much as possible from "outside", 1. e. non-social democratic 
influence (6). The key instruments in the establishment of this 
exclusive "fortress" were the powers held by the HAV in the 
Steyr-Werke and by the social democratic majority in the town 
hall. 
Encouraged by the success of anti-war and anti-governmental 
strikes in the final months of the First World War, ,the HAV 
expanded rapidly in the Steyr-werke in 1919-1920. It was able to 
make use of the strong bargaining hand represented by the 
centralisation of union support and resources in one workplace 
to attain and maintain an especially strong position in the 
works. In particular, the MAV-dominated Works Council was able 
to negotiate a series of extraordinary workplace rights whose 
significance reached well beyond the shopfloor of the works. For 
example, the Works Council was able to levy extraordinary 
contributions - in effect a private tax - on the whole manual 
workforce. A large proportion of the funds thus raised was then 
passed on to finance social 
projects in the town. The Works 
democratic organisations and 
Council also had the ri ght to 
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veto all appointments of :manual workers at the works; in this 
way it controlled a large proportion of the local labour :market. 
The powers of the Works Council were complemented by those of 
the social democratic municipal administration. Here too a 
"party book" employment policy operated, both in the municipal 
bureaucracy and, through the manipulation of the local 
Unemployment Office, elsewhere in the town. The social democrats 
in the town hall also controlled the local police force and thus 
ensured that the exercise of "law and order" in Steyr was highly 
favourable to social democracy. The powers of MAV and 
municipality thus underpinned a network of patronage and 
:manipulation, a classic example of "machine politics". This laid 
'. 
the foundation for a social democratic hegemony over other 
political movements in the town which was to extend far beyond 
formal electoral/numerical superiority to become an inherent 
part of the local political culture (see Chapter Three). 
However, as outlined above, the powers of MAV and municipality 
were direct functions of the econondc perfor:mance of the 
Steyr-Werke. Thus, the network, the foundation of social 
democratic hegemony, was dependent on the size of the workforce 
at the car works. 
Between 1927 and 1929, the Steyr-Werke underwent an 
unprecedented expansion. Production and employment were 
expanding rapidly (see Table 2), and sales were higher than 
forecast in both 1927 and 1928. However, this outward appearance 
of commercial success and prosperity concealed serious flaws in 
the economic structure of the firm. The Steyr-Werke was 
overproducing on a large scale, and stocks had been mounting up 
throughout the latter half of 1928 and during 1929. Increased 
turnover had been achieved only by selling at less than cost 
price on the export market. Dividends had been maintained at a 
recklessly high level in an attempt to court the good favour of 
the financial markets, in order to keep open the possibility of 
a new share issue which could be used to cut excessive debts. As 
a result, profits had been sluggish, and deteriorated into huge 
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losses in 1929 (7). Despite this series of adverse economic 
indicators, the company took no remedial action until August 
1929. "Monstrously dilettantish" in the eyes of Austria's most 
respected economic journal (8), the management of the 
Steyr-Werke had sustained the favourable conditions of 1927 and 
early 1928 artificially into 1929. This "false boom" is of 
crucial importance in understanding the development of social 
democracy in Steyr. On the one hand it decimated the economic 
basis of the firm, leading directly to the complete shutdown of 
the works in 1929 (see section 1.2). More immediately, it 
strengthened social democratic hegemony in Steyr, based in the 
"machine-poli tics" of the network, far beyond the point in time 
when this was justifiable in real economic terms and far beyond 
the experience of social democrats elsewhere in Austria. This 
point is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the local and 
national unemployment rates between 1927 and 1933. Between 1927 
and 1929, the national unemployment rate remained fairly 
constant at around 10%, reflecting the sluggish recovery of 
Austrian industry after the post-inflationary recession of 
1922-1924 (9). In Steyr however, the unemployment rate dropped, 
abnormally, from around 10% in 1927 to 5-6% in. 1928-1929. 
The "false boom" at the Steyr-Werke prOlonged and 
accentuated the highly specific, unique local circumstances 
which conditioned the outlook and activities of the social 
democrats in Steyr. The situation of Steyr as an isolated 
enclave in an alien environment combined with the local economic 
upswing to form an unusually advantageous local situation within 
which the social democrats were able to cement their hegemony in 
the town. The insular ethos born of Steyr's isolation focussed 
social democratic attention on the exploitation of the 
possibilities for influence open to their movement within the 
boundaries of the town. The "false boom" at the Steyr-Werke 
provided the means, via the MAV and the town hall, to realise 
those possibilities. As a result, the social democratic movement 
in Steyr enjoyed a period of localised dominance which 
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contrasted strongly to the general experience of social 
democrats in Austria as a whole. 
It is generally held that the social denocratic movement in 
Austria experienced a decisive turning point in its fortunes in 
1927. The parliamentary elections of April 1927 were an 
unprecedented success for the SDAP. The polling of over 42% of 
the national vote meant, according to the confident prediction 
of the SOAP's national press, that the conquest of power via the 
ballot box was now within the social denocrats' grasp: the next 
election would prove decisive (10). Within three months however, 
the vulnerabi 11 ty of a party dedicated to peaceful, democratic 
means to state and state-sponsored violence and intimidation had 
been vividly illustrated. The brutal suppression of the workers' 
demonstration of 15th July 1927 in Vienna and the mobilisation 
of the Heimwehr against the subsequent social democratic railway 
strike dealt a damaging blow to the morale of the social 
democratic movement and pointed to the real distribution of 
power in the republic. The events of 15th July 1927 exposed the 
social democratic preoccupation with electoral advance as an 
illusory and self-deluding measure of power (11). July 1927 
revealed the weakness of parliamentary denocracy in Austria in 
the face of the extra-parlianentary significance and strength of 
the executive organs of the state and the paramilitary 
organisations of the far Right. As a result the social 
democratic movement was shifted from a forward-looking and 
optimistic footing to one which was defensive and increasingly 
pessimistic. 
The encapsulation of the social democratic movement in Steyr 
within the local milieu of the late 1920's insulated it from the 
implications of these broader national trends. The insular, 
inward-looking mentality fostered by Steyr's isolated situation 
furnished the movement with a narrow frame of reference, a 
blinkered outlook, which deflected the influence of .. outside" 
politics. National, even regional events and trends had little 
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resonance or significance in Steyr: attention was centred firmly 
and almost excl usi vely on the local "stronghold", particularly 
since social democratic domination of Steyr was at its most 
clear-cut in the wake of the "false boom" at the steyr-Werke. 
Local circumstances thus bred an illusory optimism quite at odds 
with the political situation elsewhere in Austria. Steyr 
remained unaffected by the ramifications of the national power 
politics of July 1927; the disparity between local political 
conditions and the growing dominance of the Right on the 
national scene meant that the social democrats could enjoy the 
spin-offs of the artificial local economic boom without facing 
up to the real power relations prevalent in the republic. This 
had major implications for the perceived efficacy of the social 
democratic strategy in Steyr. 
As noted in the Introduction to this study, the social 
democratic strategy encompassed a strong commitment to 
parliamentary-electoral majoritarianism as a basis for the 
achievement of limited welfarist reforms of the existing social 
and economic order. The social democrats thus followed a 
classical pattern of reformist social democracy. Furthermore, 
they did so with great confidence and considerable success under 
the conditions which dominated the local milieu in the late 
1920' s. The "false boom" at the Steyr-Werke boosted municipal 
tax income to provide them with the means to implement local 
reforms. In addition, they were able to retain their confidence 
in the efficacy of a majoritarian strategy long after simple 
electoral arithmetic had been supplanted by more basic 
power-poli tical factors as the real determinants of political 
power in Austria (see above>. The insulated development of 
social democracy within the local milieu denied the relevance of 
national politics to the local situation, thus enabling this 
illusory confidence to be maintained. 
It must be stressed, however, that both the apparent 
efficacy of the social democrats' reformist strategy, and the 
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assertion of their hegemony in Steyr were intimately linked to, 
and ultimately dependent on, the unique framework for poU tics 
represented in the local milieu in the late 1920's. Steyr'snear 
ghetto status as a "red" stronghold in a "black" region endowed 
the social democrats with an inward-directed mentality, which 
both insulated them from the implications of broader national 
political trends, and focussed their energies on the expansion 
of social democratic organisational influence, in the form of 
the network, within the town. Furthermore, the high levels of 
employment arising from the "false boom" at the car works both 
extended and consolidated the network and provided the funds, 
via the local taxation system, for the implementation of local 
municipal reforms. Social democracy in Steyr was thus 
particularly attuned to the nature of the local milieu in the 
late 1920' s. However, the collapse of the Steyr-Verke in the 
autumn of 1929 led to the abrupt and drastic redefinition of the 
nature of the local milieu and shattered the base upon which the 
hegemony and reformist strategy of the social democrats had been 
founded. 
1. 2; The Redefinition Of the Local Ki lieu and the Decline Of 
Social Democracy after 1929. 
In August 1929, the management at the Steyr-Werke finally 
acted upon the huge losses associated with the overproduction of 
the "false boom" of 1928-1929. Production was run down after 
August and over a thousand workers had been dismissed by 
mid-September initially on a temporary basis while the 
production line was rationalised to cut costs and restore 
competitiveness. Management intended to complete the 
reorganisation of production by the end of November. However, an 
event which had extensive ramifications for the Steyr-Werke 
intervened. On 6th October, the collapse of the 
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Bpden-Credi t- ADstalt (BCA) , one of Austria's biggest banks and 
financial patron of the Steyr-Werke was announced. The collapse 
of the BCA was, in large part, a consequence of the amateurish 
way both it and the Steyr-'ierke had been run. The BCA had 
injudiciously lent the Steyr-Werke around ninety percent of its 
total assets. Having thus staked its assets and reputation on 
the future of the Steyr-Verke, the BCA dictated that the works 
should do everything to preserve a heal thy outward economic 
appearance, in spite of the fact that it was producing cars 
which were uncompetitive and could only be disposed of by 
selling them at less than cost price' (12). The result was the 
massive loss by the Steyr-Werke of twenty-four million shillings 
in 1929 (13), which could no longer be covered by the BCA and 
led to the bank's collapse (14). 
The immediate result of the BCA's collapse was the complete 
shutdown of car production in Steyr, pending the announcement of 
any financial rescue package for the bank. Baron Rothschild was 
• persuaded" , allegedly at machine gunpoint (15), to step in, and 
his Credl t-Anstalt assumed all the industrial holdings, assets 
and l1ablli ties of the BCA. The future of the Steyr-Werke was 
only assured in January 1930, when a return to normal working 
was promised as soon as the excess stocks from 1929 had been 
sold (16). In the meantime, the car production line remained 
still, leaving over 3,000 car workers unemployed. Even when the 
production line was eventually reopened in July 1930, employment 
and production levels never recovered to anything near the 
pre-1929 levels (see Table 2). The effect of the economic 
problems of the Steyr-Werke on the local economic situation can 
be assessed from Figures 1 and 2. It is clear that the economic 
foundation of social democracy in Steyr had collapsed. The local 
milieu, the social and economic background to social democratic 
politics in Steyr, was now fundamentally different. After facing 
unusually favourable economic conditions in 1928 and 1929, far 
better than the national average, the sooial democrats now 
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encDuntered an abrupt change, which left a far worse situation 
than that which existed, on average, elsewhere in Austria. 
It was noted above how the local hegemony and the apparent 
efficacy of the reformist strategy of the social democratic 
movement were dependent on the partioular nature of the local 
milieu in Steyr as it existed between 1927 and 1929. By 
implication therefore the collapse of the Steyr-Werke in 1929 
and the resultant redefinition of the local milieu served to 
call into question the assumptions which had hitherto 
underpinned the beliefs and activities of the movement. Local 
hegemony and reformist strategy were "situation-specific", tied 
to and dependent on a combination of impermanent local 
socio-economic conditions. This section examines the 
implications and consequences for the social democratic movement 
in Steyr of the changes in these conditions after 1929. 
The most immediate effect of the collapse of the Steyr-Verke 
was the undermining of the }!AV's position of strength in the 
works. One the one hand, mass unemployment and the reduced 
dependence of the works on skilled workers following 
rationalisation weakened the union's bargaining position. On the 
other, the new management at the works, installed by 
Rothschild's Credit-Anstalt, was assertive and aggressive. The 
resumption of production in July 1930 was made conditional on 
the renunciation of the extraordinary workplace rights the }!AV 
had enjoyed since the early post-war era. The ){AV's weakness 
ensured that the management's terms were accepted (see Chapter 
Two) . This had a devastating ef:fect on the social democratic 
network. The funds raised for the movement by the MAV's "private 
tax" in the works were lost, as were the union's powers of 
patronage in the local labour market. ]{uch of the basis of the 
social democrats' hegemony over other political movements in 
Steyr was thus eliminated. There was also no prospect of the ){AV 
regaining its old powers. Employment and production levels at 
the car works remained low, and with them the potential for 
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strong trade unionism, until after the social democratic 
movement had been crushed in 1934. 
The disintegration of the basis of local social democratic 
hegemony in the network was completed as the municipal 
administration became unable to support its system of patronage 
and manipulation in the wake of the collapse of the Steyr-werke. 
The municipal budget was decimated by the shutdown of production 
in October 1929, and the sluggish performance of the car 
industry after 1930 ensured that there would be no recovery. The 
municipality was forced to cut back its "party book" workforce 
and to pass over control of those aspects of municipal activity 
which had been key elements in the network (Unemployment Office 
and police force) to more affluent ~ and federal authorities. 
The erosion of social democratic dominance left, in effect, 
a power vacuum in the town, which local opposition forces, at 
their forefront the Heimwehr, eagerly exploited. This 
development signalled the final demise of the conditions which 
had characterised the local milieu in the late 1920's, and which 
had provided the basic framework for social democratic success. 
Those conditions - boom at the Steyr-werke and the inSUlation of 
Steyr from the wider political trends prevalent in Austria as a 
whole - had now disappeared. The car works was now in a state of 
semi-permanent economic crisis, and, in consequence, the bases 
of social democratic power in the town had collapsed, thus 
eradicating the localised, insular dominance which had "kept 
out" wider political trends. The assumption by the Heimwehr and 
the christian social movement of political prominence in Steyr 
during 1930 signalled the demise of the social democratic 
"fortress" in Steyr and the realignment of the town with the 
broader political developments -. in particular the national 
renaissance of the Right - from which it had deviated after 1927 
(see Chapter Three). 
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By the end of 1930, the local milieu in Steyr had undergone 
a fundamental transformation. It was now characterised by deep 
and intractable economic crisis, and had lost its insulating 
function as Steyr became increasingly exposed to national 
political trnds. This had a significance which extended beyond 
the erosion of local social democratic hegemony. It also called 
into question the viability of social democratic reformist 
strategy. As noted above, this strategy prescribed a gradual 
accession to power in Austria via the electoral process, and the 
limited reform of the existing social and economic order in 
favour of social welfare objectives. Its viability was very much 
conditional on the situation which existed in the local milieu 
in the late 1920's. At this time, the local milieu insulated the 
social democrats from national political trends and enabled them 
to maintain their (illusory) confidence in the efficacy of 
parliamentary democracy. Furthermore, the "false boom" at the 
Steyr-Werke provided the financial means, through local 
taxation, to cover the costs of local reforms. The collapse and 
stagnation of employment at the works after 1929 therefore 
removed the financial basis of the reform programme. For 
example, in 1929 the municipality gathered some 753,701 
shillings in local income tax; the equivalent figure for 1930 
was 474,791 (17). The decline in income was accompanied by a 
surge in local welfare expenditure; this had, however, little to 
do with concepts of collective responsibility, but rather 
reflected the provision of minimum, statutory welfare relief for 
the greatly increased number of unemployed and their dependents. 
Xunicipal social and economic pOlicy degenerated into li tUe 
more than the formal administration and distribution of largely 
inadequate emergency relief. 
Xoreover, the realignment of Steyr with national political 
trends exposed the social democrats to the dominance of the 
increasingly anti-democratic and steadfastly anti-social 
democratic Right. This revealed the illusory nature of local 
social democratic confidence in the efficacy of parliamentary 
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majoritarianism. In other words, the social democratic strategy 
in Steyr was only viable at a time when the local economy was 
relatively prosperous and in circumstances when a parliamentary 
strategy for power retained an apparent feasibility. The social 
democratic strategy was thus conditional upon and specific to 
the abnormal conditions which existed in the local milieu in the 
late 1920' s, and was unsuited and ineffective in a period of 
economic decline and when the dominance of the anti-democratic 
Right was plainly visible, even in Steyr. 
Some of the basic assumptions of the social democratic 
movement in Steyr were therefore deeply flawed. Both the 
potential for organisational expansion, as epitomised in the 
network, and the welfare-reformist strategy of the social 
democrats became defunct after the Steyr-werke, and with it the 
unique situation of the late 1920's, collapsed. Both network and 
strategy were dependent on a highly specific social and economic 
milieu. Both thus lost their prerequisites and, in turn, their 
relevance after 1929. This can be related to a broader issue, 
which is addressed in detail in Chapter Seven, namely the 
disintegration and collapse of reformist social democracy in 
Steyr. Both the establishment of positions of power and 
influence within the existing framework of society (the 
network), and the desire to modify certain aspects of that 
society via the parliamentary system are typical characteristics 
of reformist social democracy. In the peculiar circumstances of 
1927-1929, they were, in the local context, eminently feasible; 
in the vastly different social and economic background to 
politics in Steyr after 1929, they lost their relevance. In face 
of this (and in face of the inability of an entrenched social 
democratic leadership to lead the movement in adapting to the 
new circumstances see Chapters Four and Seven), there 
developed an embryonic inner-movement opposition after 1929. 
This was centred in the MAV, the youth organisation and the 
paramilitary Schutzbllnd, and sought alternatives to previous 
reformist orthodoxy. Initially sporadic and uncoordinated, the 
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expression of anti-reformist sentiment became more widespread 
and consistent during 1933. KAV, youth organisation and 
Schutzbund finally coalesced into a tangible opposition movement 
at the end of 1933, which gathered in support of a strategy 
unconditionally opposed to the principles and practices of 
reformist social democracy. The roots of this opposition can be 
traced back to the changing social and economic background to 
politics in Steyr: the exaggeratedly favourable conditions of 
the local milieu from 1927-1929 pointed to the potential of 
reformismj the exaggeratedly unfavourable conditions after 1929 
revealed its limitations and specificity and led to its 
rejection by parts of the movement. 
This chapter has discussed how the characteristics of the 
local milieu, the political "habitat" which surrounded social 
democracy in Steyr, influenced and conditioned the development 
of social democratic politics in the town from 1927-1934. 
Several important points emerge from this discussion. The most 
fundamental of these is perhaps something of a truism, given the 
methodological assumptions upon which this study is founded: 
i.e. that social democratic politics were wholly attuned to and 
supported by the particular nature of the local milieu between 
1927 and 1929. The social democrats' drive to attain local 
poli tical hegemony and their moderate reformist strategy were 
ideally suited to conditions of local economic boom and a 
situation where Steyr was insulated from the broader trends of 
Austrian politics. However, the implicit converse of this is 
that social democratic politics would be wholly unsuited to the 
circumstances which existed if the local milieu suddenly 
changed. This was confirmed in an especially severe way by the 
abrupt metamorphOSiS of the political "habitat" in Steyr 
following the shutdown of the Steyr-Werke. Economio boom gave 
way to collapse and Steyr's political insulation evaporated. 
This precipitate reversal of the local framework for politics 
- 44-
illustrated in stark relief the limitations of local social 
democracy. The particular nature of the social democratic 
movement in Steyr was founded upon and promoted by the buoyancy 
of the Steyr-Werke and a belief in the efficacy of parliamentary 
politics. When such conditions no longer existed within the 
local milieu after 1929, the movement lost its rationale and 
fell into decline. 
The chapter also stresses the differentiated experience and 
development 
drastically 
of Austrian social democracy. Steyr deviated 
from the n norm" : local boom and 
quite 
the 
isolated/insulated political development of the town combined to 
create an environment within which social democracy could 
flourish in the town for some time after it is supposed to have 
moved past its peak and on to a defensive footing. This calls 
into question the widespread assumption that the events of 15th 
July 1927 in Vienna represented an all-encompassing turning 
point for social democracy in Austria. Viewed from the 
perspective of (an albeit unusually strong> local social 
democratic movement situated well away from Vienna, the 
significance of July 1927 was limited. In this respect 
therefore, the experience in Steyr provides a significant 
qualification of an existing orthodoxy whose focus has, by and 
large, been restricted to a narrow Viennese milieu, and has thus 
failed to take account of the regional diversity of the social 
democratic movement. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN MAV-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN 
THE STEYR-WERKE. 
The balance of power in !{AV-managelll9nt relations in the 
Steyr-Werke - i.e. the ability of either to pursue its stated or 
implied aims in the works against the will of the other - is of 
crucial importance in the development of the arguments proposed 
in this thesis. The !{AV was able to establish a dominant 
position in industrial relations in the works after the First 
World War and to maintain that dominance against the opposition 
of management until the collapse of the local milieu in 
1929-1930. This chapter argues that this dominance formed an 
essential precondition for the assertion of social democratic 
hegemony in Steyr during the period between 1927 and 1929 when 
the local milieu provided a highly favourable framework for the 
developlll9nt of social democracy. However, as established in the 
previous chapter, the fundamental changes in the nature of the 
local milieu after 1929 drastically redefined the framework for 
the activities of the social democrats. This was reflected in an 
abrupt reversal of the balance of power in union-management 
relations in the car works. Kanagement was able to assert its 
own dominance from 1930j it was increasingly able to override 
and, ultimately, to ignore the concerns of the MAV. Just as MAV 
dominance was an essential precondition for the assertion of 
social democratic hegemony, then so was the reversal of the 
balance of power and the establishment of management dominance a 
crucial element in the collapse of social democratic hegemony 
and the general decline of the social democratic movement after 
1930. 
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In the early post-war period, the NAV-dominated Works 
Council attained a series of shopfloor rights in the Steyr-Verke 
which extended far beyond the provisions of Austrian industrial 
relations legislation. These supplementary rights effectively 
constrained management's ability to direct the firm autonomously 
and established the shopfloor and the manual workforce as the 
thoroughly politicised preserve of MAV functionaries and Works 
Councillors. The balance of power in the works thus lay firmly 
with the MAV (see section 2:1). The attainment of extraordinary, 
non-statutory workplace rights by social democratic trade unions 
and the Works Councils they controlled was not unusual in the 
political upheaval of early post-war Austria (1) (although the 
number of special rights attained by the MAV in the Steyr-Verke 
was exceptional). However, with the stabilisation of the 
political situation and the dissipation of the "revolutionary" 
atmosphere which followed World War One, the confidence of the 
employers returned and was directed almost immediately - and 
wi th increasing success - at the removal of extra-statutory 
union rights at the workplace (2). The management of the 
Steyr-Verke was no exception and attempted to subdue the MAV and 
remove its extraordinary rights during an 8Y.!-week lockout in 
1925. Unlike the situation elsewhere, the attempt was a complete 
failure. Management had undermined its own hand both in a 
tactical sense, by timing the lockout badly, and also in a more 
fundamental sense, by pursuing inept and shortsighted financial 
and commercial policies which had weakened,the financial ability 
of the firm to withstand any significant stoppage of production. 
Koreover, it had very much underestimated the strength of the 
KAV, both in the works itself, and, even more crucially, in its 
position at the heart of the social democratic network in Steyr. 
The extra-statutory rights enjoyed by the MAV formed a key 
part of the network, the "machine" by which the social democrats 
sought to consolidate and extend their influence in the town. 
One aspect of this network which had particular importance in 
the defence of the balance' of power in the Steyr-Verke in 1925 
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was the NAV's right to raise considerable sums of money from the 
manual workforce. A large proportion of this money was then 
passed on to form the financial basis of 
social democratic activities in the 
many non-trade unionist 
town. This financial 
benevolence was repaid during the lockout of 1925 as social 
democratic organisations, in particular the children's 
organisation, the Kinderfreunde, the maj or recipient of KAV 
funding, rallied in support of the union. In effect, the network 
was mobilised behind the KAV, providing an additional resource 
in the conflict over non-statutory rights and vastly 
strengthening its bargaining position. The relative financial 
strength of the social democrats, derived largely from the NAV's 
extraordinary rights and channelled and distributed through the 
network, was therefore a decisive factor in ensuring the victory 
of the union in 1925 and the defence of those rights (see 
section 2: 2) . 
The emphasis placed on the course and implications of the 
1925 lockout in this chapter (in a study whose primary focus is 
on the years 1927-1934) merits further justification. This lies 
in the far-reaching effects the outcome of the lockout had both 
for the balance of power in KAV-management relations in the 
works until the turn of the decade and for the establishment of 
the local hegemony of the social democrats during the 
extraordinary years of 1927-1929. During the 1920's, when parts 
of Austrian industry; led by the AJpine-MQptan Gesellscbaft in 
Upper Styria, successfully attacked even those trade union 
workplace rights guaranteed by law (3), the steyr-Verke was 
unable to follow suit. Its defeat in 1925 ensured the continued 
existence of the NAV's extra-statutory rights and that the 
balance of power in the works remained firmly in favour of the 
trade union. This had .implications which extended far beyond the 
conduct of industrial relations. As noted above, the KAV's 
rights formed a key part of the social democratic network in 
Steyr. As established in Chapter One, the network was a function 
of the level of employment at the car works. Between 1927 and 
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1929, as the works embarked on its "false boom", the social 
democrats had the means to expand the influence of this network 
so that it pervaded and dominated vital aspects of daily life in 
the town (see Chapter Three). The successful defence of the 
MAV's workplace rights in 1925 and the maintenance of a balance 
of power in the steyr-Werke favourable to the MAV were thus 
crucial prerequisites for the assertion of social democratic 
hegemony within the highly advantageous framework of the local 
milieu in the late 1920's. 
However, the balance of power in the car works swung 
violently in favour of management in the aftermath of the 
shutdown of car production at the Steyr-Werke in 1929-1930. 
Three factors are important here. Firstly, the bargaining hand 
of the MAV was much diminished, primarily as a result of the 
mass unemployment caused by the collapse of the local economy in 
the aftermath of the shutdown. Secondly, new federal industrial 
relations legislation undermined the position of the trade union 
in the firm. And thirdly, a new and vigorously anti-unionist 
management had been installed by the car works' post-1930 
creditor, Rothschild's Credit-Anstalt. The new management 
immediately signalled its determination to eliminate the union's 
extra-statutory rights and its unusual position of strength in 
the works. In view of the weakening of the MAV's position by 
mass unemployment and as a result of the new legislation, it was 
successful. In the following years continuing economic crisis 
and high unemployment ensured that the MAV had no chance of 
recovering its lost strength. This had much wider implications, 
as one anti-social democratic newspaper pointed out as early as 
1925:" whenever the dictatorship [the phrase generally 
employed by the local bourgeois press to describe the MAV's 
dominance] in the car works falls, the party too will have lost 
its main power base" 
rights, the MAV could 
(4). Indeed, having lost its workplace 
no longer form the mainstay of the social 
democratic network, and without the network, social democratic 
hegemony in Steyr disintegrated. The reversal of the balance of 
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power in the Steyr-Werke was therefore a central factor in the 
decline of social denocracy in Steyr in the 1930's. 
2,1; Ihe Extra-statutory Rights of the MAV, 
Ihe nature of MAV-management relations in the Steyr-Werke 
after the First World War was conditioned by a series of factors 
which tended to favour the trade union. Management's position 
was weakened at the outset in two ways; firstly, the conpany was 
operating in a highly competitive market, increasingly flooded 
by mass-produced, low-cost imports from the U.S.A.; it was thus 
imperative to avoid any stoppage in production which might 
interrupt supplies and endanger the works' market share. 
Secondly, the necessity to avoid stoppages was underlined by the 
extreme financial insecurity of the firm (see Table 3); any 
significant interruption to production - and therefore cash-flow 
- could easily have signalled collapse and liqUidation. In these 
circumstances, management was more likely to defer to the wishes 
of the MAV than to risk any serious dispute in industrial 
relations, especially since the union's position was inherently 
strong in three respects. In the first place, Steyr's long 
history of metal-working had produced a skilled workforce highly 
amenable to trade union organisation (the first metalworkers' 
union in the town was established in 1889). Following the 
abolition of restrictions on trade union activity in the 
aftermath of World War One, the MAV was able to draw on the 
local tradition of unionisation to establish very quickly a 
strong organisation in the works. Secondly, the strength of this 
organisation was further enhanced by the centralisation of 
membership and resources on one major site. And thirdly, the 
functioning of the works was very much dependent on the skilled 
workers the MAV organised. These factors, whose implications are 
examined in the context of the 1925 lockout in section 2.2, 
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represented the general framework for industrial relations in 
the Steyr-Werke and ensured that the balance of power was tilted 
markedly towards the MAV. This superiority was cemented and 
extended by the focal point of this section, the extra-statutory 
rights held by the MAV-controlled (5) Works Council. 
The supplementary rights attained by the MAV-controlled 
Works Council in the Steyr-Werke were quite exceptional. 
Alongside a Works Council right of veto over recruitments and 
dismissals, the workforce enjoyed the specific right to hawk 
newspapers (i.e social democratic newspapers), display political 
notices and hold collections for political purposes (for the 
parami li tary Schutzbllnd and for the SDAP electoral campaign 
fund) on the shopfloor. In addition, MAV dues, including a 
special supplement for 
deducted from wages by 
amount prescribed by law 
the 
the 
was 
Kinderfreunde, were 
works finance officej 
deducted from wages to 
centrally 
twice the 
fund Works 
were paid 
by the firm, and Works Councillors were paid as normal for Works 
Council activities undertaken in the firm's time (6). It is not 
clear from the available sources (7) exactly how the KAV was 
able to extract such extensive concessions from the management. 
It must be assumed that the basic framework for industrial 
relations in the works, as outlined above, plus the burgeoning 
membership of the KAV in the early post-war years (8) and the 
residue of militancy which had characterised the workfarce of 
the Steyr-Werke in the last months of the First World War (9) 
combined to force such major concessions from management. 
Council activities, one third of Works Council costs 
The extra-statutory rights attained by the Works Council 
directly after the war ensured that the balance of power in the 
Steyr-Werke remained in favour of the MAV for the following 
decade. The shopfloor of the works was established as a highly 
poli ticised vehicle for social democratic agitation and 
fund-raising. In addi tien, the firm effectively provided the 
free administration of both union and non-union (i. e. 
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K1nderfreunde) dues-collection, and the Works Council had 
assullled what might normally have been conceived as exclusive 
managelllent prerogatives in matters of manual worker staffing. 
This latter point ensured that the MAV was able to perpetuate 
the social delllOcratic domination of the shopfloor. Through the 
right to veto recruitlllents, the Works Council was able to 
exclude "unfriendly" elelllents from the works. )!elllbers of 
non-social delllocratic unions, primarily the christian 
llletalworkers, had no chance of finding work. FurtherlllOre, the 
Works Council ran a closed shop; recruitlllent was dependent 
either on lllelllbership in the !!AV or a willingness to join the 
union during the recruitment process (10). Works Councillors 
even colluded with the staff of Steyr's municipal Unemployment 
Office to ensure that only card-carrying social delllocrats were 
put forward for employment at the works (11). This illustrates 
the interaction of different branches of the social democratic 
"machine" in Steyr: the local Unemploynent Office, staffed by 
social democrats employed by the social delllOcratic town hall 
cooperated with the social democratic "'orks Councillors of the 
Steyr-Yerke to make sure that social democrats were given jobs. 
Gi ven the dominant position of the Steyr-Werte in the local 
economy, this ensured that the social democrats exerted a 
massive influence over the local labour market, especially 
during the years of high and expanding employlllent at the car 
works in the late 1920's. An inevitable corollary of this was 
that non-social delllocratic workers were constrained to join the 
)!AV in order to get work (12). Such workers had purely 
instrumental reasons for joining the MAV, directed at one 
particular outcome, 1. e. elllployment. Beyond this, they had no 
interest in the KAV, they lacked commitment to the wider ailllS of 
social democracy and free trade unionism - a point which has 
great relevance in the reversal of the balance of power in the 
works, examined below in section 2.3. 
Alongside its "party-book" staffing policies, the Works 
Council was also able to make explicitly pOlitical usage of the 
-52-
subscriptions it levied from the manual workforce. These were 
set at one percent of wages - twice the amount prescribed by 
law - and raised relatively enormous sums. In 1929, for example, 
the levy on wages raised 166,866 shillings, boosting total Works 
Council income to 221,139 shillings (for comparative purposes, 
this was just under a tenth of total municipal income in Steyr 
for that year (13». In effect therefore, the Works Council had 
a lucrative private tax at its disposal, which was used to 
subsidise a whole series of social democratic causes and 
activities. Table 4 reproduces, in modified form, the 
expendi ture column of the Works Council balance sheet for the 
first six months of 1929. Over a quarter of these funds was set 
aside in 1929 to reimburse some 200 MAV functionaries w~o lost 
wages for supposedly carrying out MAV work in the firm's time. 
These payments bore little relation to the possible work a 
functionary might have carried out. On average, over six 
Shillings, or four and a half hour's pay, were allocated per 
functionary per week to look after the interests of less than 
thirty workers (14) . It is hardly conceivable that each 
functionary could have had so much work to do on behalf of so 
few workers. The implication is that MAV functionary work was 
semi-professionalised. This raises the issues of whether the 
functionaries were motivated by genuine trade unionist 
commitment, or merely by the perks on offer, and whether the 
instrumentalist tendencies noted above extended into the 
functionary network. Again, the implications of instrumental ism 
for the reversal of the balance of power in the works are 
addressed in section 2.3. 
The proceeds of the Works Council's "private tax" also 
served to subsidise other parts of the social democratic 
movement in Steyr (see Table 4). For example, Works Council 
money had purchased, under the auspices of subsidies to the 
Verein Arbeiterbelm (analogous to a British Labour Club), both 
the building which housed the local party headquarters and 
expensive cinema equipment for the party meeting hall (15). In 
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addition, sizeable annual subsidies were granted to the local 
social democratic housing co-operative and to the Kinderfreunde. 
This latter subsidy complemented the "Kindergrpscheo" 
("children's penny"), the special supplement to basic MAV 
subscriptions, which was collected centrally by the Steyr-Werke 
finance office and passed directly to the children's 
organisation. With this twofold financial support from the 
workforce at the car works, the KinderfrellDde organisation for 
the Steyr district was easily the richest per head of population 
in the whole of Austria (16). 
The process of subsidising other social democratic 
organisations had a dual significance. On the one hand the 
ability to raise large SUIllS of lllOney and to have them processed 
gratis by the firm was an expression of the MAV's dominance in 
the car works. On the other hand, it also represented a 
reinforce11Jent of that dominance. The MAV's fund-raising and 
distri buting powers were a key part of the social democratic 
network, channelling funds into other parts of the movelllent and 
thereby significantly increasing its overall financial strength. 
As shall be seen in the following section, this financial 
strength was of crucial importance for the maintenance of MAV 
dominance in the works. In effect, if the management of the 
Steyr-Werke chose to challenge the dominant position of the MAV, 
it would face not only the trade union, but also the 
considerable material resources of the social democratic 
network. The extra-statutory rights of the MAV thus guaranteed 
that the balance of power in the works was weighted very firmly 
in the MAV's favour. Not surprisingly, these rights and the 
practices associated with them were anathema to management, 
which, in 1925, made a concerted attempt to relllOve them. 
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2.2: ImplicatiQDs and CODSeO)Jences of the 1925 LOOkout. 
On 29th September 1925, 
Steyr-Werke was. locked out. 
conflict which precipitated 
the manual 
The evidence 
the lockout 
workforce at the 
suggests that the 
was deliberately 
provoked by management and that the lockout was conceived from 
the outset as a means by which to strip the MAV of its 
extra-statutory rights, and thereby eliminate the crucial 
element in its dominanace in the car works. The lockout thus 
took on the character of a power struggle over the future nature 
of industrial relations, i.e. over the balance of power, in the 
works. The success of the KAV in defending its rights and 
maintaining the balance of power in the works in its favour was 
of critical importance for the unique development of the social 
democratic movement in the following years. The MAV's rights 
were central to the social democratic network in Steyr, and in 
the late 1920' s, in the highly beneficial circumstances which 
then existed within the local milieu, the influence exerted by 
the social democrats via this network increased significantly to 
cement their hegemony over local politics and society. Thus an 
examination of the course of the lockout and the factors which 
ensured MAV success, are vi tal in explaining the subsequent 
development of social democracy in the town. 
The proclamation of the lockout was the culmination of a 
confrontational and aggressive anti-union attitude taken by 
management during the summer of 1925. Throughout the summer, the 
works had been undergoing a technical reorganisation aimed at 
the introduction of assembly line production methods. To 
facilitate a smooth reorganisation, the manual workers' Works 
Council had agreed to a temporary "economic peace" (1. e. a 
suspension of industrial conflict) at the works. By September 
however, it was felt that management was exploiting the 
"economic peace" agreement to hold down wages below average 
levels in the industry. A new wage claim, which even normally 
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anti-!{AV sources considered justified (17), was tabled by the 
XAV but rejected out of hand by management. The developing wages 
conflict between XAV and management was mirrored by a more 
serious conflict between the social democratic white-collar 
workers' union in tbe Steyr-Werke, the !lJJ..nli deI:. 
Industrieangestellten and management. Kanagement had refused to 
recognise nationally agreed supplements to the existing 
collective agreement and had begun to negotiate pay on an 
individual basis, completely ignoring the white-collar union and 
its statutory collective bargaining rights. 
The exploitation of the "economic peace" and the refusal to 
adhere to national agreements with the 
Indllstrieangestellten pOinted to the emergence of an anti-union 
policy at the works. This was confirmed on 28th September, when 
twenty-eight manual workers, twenty-five of them MAV 
functionaries, were arbitrarily and provocatively "picked out" 
(herausgegriffen) and sacked. This was supposedly a puni ti ve 
measure on the one hand for attempts by manual workers to 
intervene in the management-Angestellten dispute in the previous 
week, and on the other because the !{AV's wage claims were an 
"unjustified" disturbance of the agreed "economic peace" (18). 
Kore realistically, it can be seen as a de 11 berate step in the 
escalation of a wages dispute into a more fundamental conflict 
about the position and rights of the trade union in the firm. 
Certainly, given the 100% MAV organisation among the manual 
workforce and the tradition of union strength in the works, 
management must have calculated that the dismissal of 
twenty-five !{AV functionaries would act as a catalyst for 
further conflict. Accordingly, upon the publication of the 
dismissal notices both manual workers and Angestel1te 
spontaneously stopped work and (also somewhat arbitrarily) 
"fetched out" various officals of the firm to explain 
management's actions. At least one official was physically 
assaulted; upon hearing this, management proclaimed the lockout 
of the manual workforce (19). 
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The dramatic escalation of wages conflict into lockout 
suggests that management was deliberately seeking a major 
confrontation with the MAV and that the disturbance on 28th 
September was merely a pretext with which to bring this 
confrontation about. The timing of the lockout backs up this 
view. Between 1923 and 1925, the recovery from the 
post-inflationary recession in Austria had been sluggish, and, 
excepting the post-1929 period, 1925 was the year of the lowest 
employment at the Steyr-Werke during the First Republic (see 
Table 2). This may have suggested a temporary reduction in MAV 
bargaining power, especially since the union had agreed to an 
"economic peace" at the works while the production line was 
rationalised. The willingness to enter this agreement, which in 
effect amounted to a restriction on normal union activities, may 
have been interpreted by management as a sign of union weakness. 
In addition, by early October 1925, three other lockouts were 
running concurrently at firms in the Austrian metal industry: at 
the Alpine works in Donawitz and Eisenerz, at Siemens ~Halske 
in Vienna, and at the Si..... Egydyer steel works in Hainfeld. In 
view of the need to coordinate several conflicts 
silmultaneously, the MAV's overall effectiveness in national 
terms was significantly diminished at this time (20). In all, 
the various factors pointed to a short-term lowpoint in MAV 
strength and to a favourable point for management to attempt to 
assert its authority in the works. 
The publication on 8th October of management's guidelines 
for resolving the dispute confirmed that this was indeed 
management's reasoning (21). According to these, the directors 
were prepared to reopen the firm only under the existing manual 
worker pay structure, and remained unprepared to recognise the 
nationally agreed supplements to the collective agreements of 
the Angestellten. Upon reopening the works, the workers to be 
reemployed were to be specified by name (whereby the number of 
MAV functionaries could presumably expect to be further 
reduced). Finally, and most significantly, "the manual workers 
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shall not lay claim to rights which exceed the rights granted 
them by law": MAV dues would no longer be deducted centrally, 
the Works Council would lose its influence on staffing matters, 
the works would no longer subsidise the running costs of the 
Works Council, and newspapers were no longer to be hawked on the 
shopfloor. The publication of these guidelines thus revealed the 
ultimate aim of management's increasingly anti-union policies in 
1925: the elimination of the MAV's extra-statutory rights and, 
with that, the reversal of the balance of power in the works. 
Not unnaturally, the MAV refused to enter negotiations on these 
terms, and for the next seven weeks, the dispute entered a 
standoff, during which time the real distribution of power in 
the firm became increasingly evident. 
As the length of the dispute increased, it became clear that 
management had vastly miscalculated its potential to impose its 
will on the MAV. Its own position was weakened by the timing of 
the conflict, which, although geared to an assumed temporary 
lowpoint in HAV strength, wholly failed to take into account the 
pressures on the firm created by the nature of the Austrian car 
market. The lockout was begun at a time when important 
preparations for the launch of a new mass-produced, 
assembly-line S1el1X: were in progress. The demand for cars in 
Austria was, in view of the hard, Alpine winters, highly 
seasonal; preparations therefore had to be completed in time for 
sufficient stocks to be ready for the increase in demand for 
cars in the spring season. The longer the dispute continued, the 
more pressure management was under, therefore, to reopen 
production. This was, in effect, an extra bargaining counter for 
the HAV, especially since the market in cars was so competitive. 
In the mid-1920's, cheap, mass-produced Fords began to conquer 
an increasing share of the European market; if the Steyx:-Wex:ke 
missed the start of the season, cheap, foreign competition could 
easily swallow its market share (22). To compound the problems 
facing management, more and more car workers were beginning to 
emigrate to escape the uncertainty of employment in Steyr. 
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Skilled, qualified workers were being lost, again heightening 
management's need to see a quick resolution to the dispute (23). 
In view of the above factors, it must be assumed that 
management did not expect the lockout to last more than two or 
three weeks. This is underlined by the fact that the company 
could in no way afford any lengthy stoppage. Its long-term 
bargaining position had been undermined by its own financial 
policies. Table 3 gives an overview of the financial performance 
of the Steyr-Werke between 1924 and 1929. Two things are 
especially striking: a rapidly accumulating debt burden and a 
level of dividend payments which was startlingly high as a 
percentage of net profits. As noted in the previous chapter, 
profligate borrowing and recklessly high dividend payments had 
been encouraged by the works' creditor bank, the BCA. The BCA 
was determined to maintain the prestige it had enjoyed under the 
monarchy by dictating that both it and its client firms paid 
high dividends to shareholders. In the same quest to maintain a 
healthy appearance in its industrial empire, it granted loans 
far greater than commercial sense would dictate, and which bore 
little relation to either its own assets or those of its 
debtors. As indicated in Table 3, the Steyr-Werke was a 
particularly crass case (24). Hence, despite the outward 
economic vigour which high dividend payments and the large-scale 
rationalisation of production in 1925 might suggest, the works 
was by no means in an assured long-term economic position. By 
1925 it was already walking a financial tightrope: a lengthy 
stoppage of production could have signalled collapse and 
liqUidation. 
In view of the above, the position of management in the 
lockout was exceedingly weak. In effect it had staked its all on 
an early collapse of MAV resolve. This was a disastrous 
miscalculation which vastly underestimated the inherent strength 
of the union and the support it could expect to receive from the 
social democratic "machine" in Steyr. One example of this was 
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the cooperation of the local police, under the orders of the 
social democratic mayor, with the social democratic paramilitary 
organisation, the Schutzbund, in the maintenance of order and 
discipline among the locked-out workers (25). Even more critical 
was the support the MAV received during the lockout from the 
Kinderfreunde, the major financial beneficiary of the MAV's 
fund-raising rights in the car works. It can be seen here that 
the strength of the MAV in the works was a self-reinforcing 
phenomenon: the "outputs" of its extra-statutory rights returned 
as "inputs" into the dispute, strengthening the MAV's position 
in the defence of those rights. 
In cooperation with its National Executive, the local 
Kinderfre!!nde organised a national social democratic fostering 
scheme to look after the children of the locked-out workforce 
for the duration of the lockout. Within fourteen days, 802 
children were li vi ng with temporary foster parents (26). This 
impressive mobilisation of the "machine" was supplemented by 
another Kinderfre!!nde campaign aimed at providing a daily meal 
for another 3,500 children in Steyr (27). Moreover, donations 
sent to Steyr, the Kinderfreunde and the Arbeiterzeitung in 
Vienna eventually totalled 113,352 shillings (28). This amounted 
to around four shillings per worker per week during the lockout. 
In addition, the workers received full union strike pay 
- eighteen shillings per week according to one source (29) - and 
a special 13% discount at the social democratic consumer 
co-operative (30). A proportion of strike pay was granted in the 
form of food vouchers redeemable only at the co-op. The extra 
turnover this produced from workers (especially non-social 
democratic instrumentalists) who would not normally shop at the 
co-op made possible the special discount. If donations, strike 
pay, co-operative discount and the savings made by parents as a 
result of the Kinderfrellnde campaigns are all taken together, it 
is clear that the locked-out workforce had a standard of living, 
which though poor in comparison with normal times, was tolerable 
at least in the short term. The depth of strength embodied in 
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the social democratic "machine" - particularly the KAV-funded 
K1nderfrellnde - thus ensured that the )[AV could endure a longer 
stoppage than management had expected. In turn, the unexpected 
length of the lockout exposed the fundamental weakness of 
management's position. 
Thus, when the JlfAV Works Councillors suggested the 
resumption of negotiations on 21st November, management 
accepted. By the 23rd agreement had been reached. Management was 
forced to retract the demands it had made on 8th October. 
Furthermore, it agreed to recognise the supplements to the 
collective agreements of the Angestellten and the manual workers 
were to receive a one-off lump sum payment, equivalent to a 6% 
pay rise over the year, pending the negotiation o! a new 
collective agreement. The KAV made one concession, whereby it 
was agreed to phase out the central collection of MAV dues by 
the end o! the year. No mention at all was made of the other 
extra-statutory rights called into question during the dispute 
(31). There is even evidence that central dues deduction 
continued in some form after 1925 and that the practice was only 
abolished in 1930 by the " Anti-Terror LawU , Certainly, the 
clerical S:tf:~r.:ex: Ze1:tllDg was still complaining about the 
practice in early 1930, and the KinQ.su::f:r:elJllCe were still 
receiving the benefits of the MAV K1 nd~I:gI:csclHHl in the late 
1920's (32). 
The outcome of the lockout was thus a decisive Victory for 
the KAV. Management had challenged the bases of KAV dominance in 
the works, but had clearly failed in the attempt to assert its 
own authority (while silmultaneously exposing its tactical 
ineptitude and financial weakness). The immediate material 
outcome of the dispute (wage settlements/collective agreements> 
is not significant for the present argument. More important is 
the fact that the XAV's extra-statutory rights remained intact 
and thus that the pro-union balance o! power in the firm was 
confirmed. This ensured that the )[AV and the Works Council could 
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continue to raise and distribute funds and to exert their 
control over recruitments and dislllissa1s .at the works. Taken 
alongside the social democratic municipal administration's 
powers of patronage in the town and its 
local bodies (especially the police 
Office), the MAV's ability to raise 
control over important 
and the Unenp10yment 
funds for the social 
delllOcratic movelllent and the influence it exerted over the local 
labour market through its staffing veto forned the foundation of 
the social democratic network in Steyr. The influence which this 
system of patronage and manipulation could generate for the 
social delllocrats in the town was, as noted in the previous 
chapter, a function of the level of elllp10yment at the 
Steyr-Yerke. Thus, as elllp10yment levels at the works rose 
consistently frolll 1927, and extravagantly during the "false 
boom" of 1928-29, so did the level of municipal activity, the 
alllount of funds raised and distributed by the MAV and the 
influence exerted by the MAV over the local labour market. This 
extension of the influence of the network, as exalllined in detail 
in Chapter Three, represented the basis of the comprehensive 
hegemony enj oyed by the social delllocrats over other po11 tica1 
llIovelllents in Steyr in the late 1920' s. It must be stressed 
therefore, that without the successful defence of MAV rights and 
the powers associated with them in 1925, the social democrats 
would not have been able to assert that hegelllony. 
As a result of its victory in the 1925 lockout, the MAV was 
able to maintain its dolllinance in the Steyr-Werke - and its 
inputs into the network until mass local unelllp10yment 
undermined its strength in industrial relations in 1930. This 
was certainly not the general experience of provincial social 
delllOcratic trade unions in the 1920's, to which the attention of 
the discussion is now turned. An exalllination of the reasons for 
trade union weakness and employer dominance in other regions 
will serve as a neasure of comparison with which to explain and 
rei terate the particular strengths of the !(AV in Steyr 
throughout the 1920's. 
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The most prominent example of a balance of power decisively 
in favour of the employers was the situation in the various 
works of the Alpine-Hontan-Gesellscbaft in Upper Styria. Even by 
the early 1920's, the Alpine had managed to erode or evade the 
implementation of much of the post-war employment legislation. 
By the spring of 1929 it had "virtually emasculated" the social 
democratic trade unions in its plants and promoted in its place 
the "Independent" Trade Union controlled by the Heimwebr (33). 
Lewis attributes this "failure of Styrian labour" to a number of 
factors. Foremost in her argument is 
the Upper Styrian metal industry, 
the particular structure of 
which contributed to the 
development of a weak trade union movement. The emphasis in the 
region was on the production of raw materials and basic metal 
products which did not require a highly skilled workforce. 
Unskilled workers generally have a lower propensity for trade 
union organisation; this was exacerbated in the late nineteenth 
century when the emergent social democratic metalworkers' union 
concentrated its efforts on organising the less numerous, but 
more amenable skilled workers. It was less attentive to the 
concerns of the unskilled, and thus failed to develop a strong 
presence among them. As a result, there was no deeply engrained 
tradition of union organisation to draw from in the First 
Republic and membership levels and organisational densities 
remained low. The nature of Upper Styrian industry also proved 
disadvantageous for the development of strong trade unions in 
two other respects. In the first place, the production of raw 
JlIaterials and basic products is generally more vulnerable to 
economic fluctuation than the manufacture of finished products. 
The Upper Styrian metal industry in fact faced constant crisis 
conditions after the currency stabilisation of 1922. The 
consequent unemployment, aggravated by progressive 
rationalisation measures, compounded the weakness of the social 
democratic unions. Secondly, the geographical dispersal of the 
industrial centres along the valleys descending from the Alps 
JlIade united action by the trade unions difficult. A final factor 
which mil1 tated agai nst these unions was the consistent and 
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determined anti-union attitude taken by the Alpine management 
(34). 
It is evident that the above factors combined to produce a 
situation in which management could dominate the social 
democratic trade unions. The balance of power between unions and 
management was also loaded against the social democrats in other 
areas. In Vorarlberg for instance, the most industrialised Laru1 
outside Vienna, the social democratic trade unions were 
especially weak. Again, this reflected the particular natur~ of 
the industry in the area. The dominant industry in Vorarlberg 
was textiles, 
predominantly 
characterised by decentralised production by a 
unskilled workforce in a proliferation of 
small-scale workshops. Social democratic trade unionists were 
thus faced with the problems of securing a united organisational 
front in a dispersed industry with a workforce whose propensity 
for union organisation was inherently low. This basic weakness 
was heightened by unemployment and the competition posed by 
christian trade unions in a deeply conservative region. As a 
result, the social democrats proved unable to assert themselves 
in the face of anti-unionist employers and an anti-unionist Laru1 
government, which was ever ready to use force to suppress 
industrial action (35). A similar situation existed in the 
Tiro!. The employers, aided by the christian unions and the 
security forces of the Lallli. government, were able to win their 
very first confrontation with the social democratic trade unions 
in 1921 and thus established their dominance at an early stage 
(36). Even in a social democratic stronghold like Wiener 
Neustadt, the social democratic trade unions were relatively 
weak. The local metal industry, which had been geared solely to 
the war effort, proved unable to adapt well to peace-time 
production, resulting in long-term, large-scale unemployment in 
the town. In view of this, the local MAV had found it difficult 
to maintain its position in the firm, and by 1928 the local 
employers' 
Alpine in 
association had begun to follow the example of the 
Upper Styria and was actively encouraging the 
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He1 mwebr' s "Independent Union" to displace the social democrats 
(37). 
The situation at the Steyr-Rerke was entirely different. The 
firm had switched swiftly and successfully from war-time weapons 
production to car production after 1919. Large-scale 
unemployment did not therefore debilitate union strength in the 
early years of the republic. On the contrary, the MAV was able 
to draw on a tradition of skilled worker unionisation extending 
back into the nineteenth century, and quickly recruited a large 
membership in the works. Also to the )(AV's advantage was the 
concentration of Steyr-Rerke production in one town and largely 
on one massive site. This centralised economic structure enabled 
the MAV to develop a strong, central union authority able to 
control a diSCiplined and united organisation. These factors 
combined in the early post-war period to give the MAV a decisive 
advantage in the works. The MAV was able to use this advantage 
to extract major concessions in the form of its 
extra-statutory rights - from management. On the one hand, these 
effectively excluded other unions, notably the christian 
metalworkers, from the shopfloor. The MAV was therefore never 
plagued by the directional splits in the workforce which had 
weakened social democratic unions elsewhere. On the other hand, 
the )(AV's rights consolidated and extended its dominance in the 
works, both directly in the personnel and finance offices and on 
the shopfloor, and indirectly in the strengthening of the social 
democratic network in~the town. 
In view of the strength of the MAV, the management of the 
Steyr-Werke was never able to pursue a consistent anti-union 
policy. Its only attempt to do so in the 1920's foundered on its 
tactical miscalculations, the financial weakness of the firm and 
the extra resources the KAV was able to draw on via the network. 
It did not repeat its attack on the trade union until 1930, when 
mass unemployment had established a wholly different fz:amework 
for industrial relations at the works. Until then, the balance 
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of power in the firm, with all its implications for social 
democratic hegemony in the town, was firmly in the MAV's favour. 
2.3: The Reyersal Of the Balance of Power in the steyr-Werke. 
As noted in Chapter One, car production at the Steyr-Werke 
was completely shut down between late August 1929 and the start 
of July 1930. The "false boom" of 1928-29 was abruptly replaced 
by mass unemployment. This collapse of the local economy 
underlay the redefinition of the local milieu within which the 
social democrats had operated in Steyr between 1927 and 1929, 
thus fundamentally altering the framework for social democratic, 
and therefore MAV activity in the town. In addition, two new 
factors entered the equation, reflecting the fact that social 
democratic activities in Steyr were conditioned less and less by 
local factors in the 1930's, and more and more by the 
implications of national trends. Firstly, the takeover of the 
Steyr-Werke by Rothschild's Credit-Anstalt in October 1929 
resul ted in the dismissal of the existing management at the 
works and its replacement by a new, and more determinedly 
anti-trade unionist Rothschlld management team. Secondly, new 
federal legislation served to restrict trade union activities 
and thus to bolster the position of the employers in industrial 
relations. This section examines the ways in which the 
interaction of economic collapse, new management ideas and 
national industrial relations legislation reversed the balance 
of power between !{AV and management in the Steyr-Werke after 
1929, and indicates the broader implications of this development 
for the social democratic movement. 
The Credit-Anstalt had 
financially in taking over 
been forced to overreach itself 
the BCA, and consequently placed 
stringent financial restrictions on its industrial hOldings, in 
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particular the previously profligate Steyr-Verke. Credit-Anstalt 
firms also had a reputation for aggressive anti-union policies 
(38). These factors inevitably had an impact on the conduct of 
industrial relations in the Steyr-Werke. When negotiations 
opened in June 1930 on the pay and employment conditions which 
would apply on the resumption of production, the new management 
at the works immediately sought to weaken the position of the 
KAV in the works. It served notice to terminate the existing 
collective agreement, announced its intention to cut costs by 
reducing top wages by 10% and, most significantly, its 
commitment to abolish all extra-statutory rights enjoyed by the 
Works Council. Given the importance of the extra-statutory 
rights to the MAV and the whole social democratic movement, 
management's terms were, as in 1925, immediately rejected (39). 
However, the MAV's ability to resist management had been 
drastically weakened in several respects in the ten months when 
car production had been shut down in 1929-1930. 
The single most important factor in undermining the KAV's 
position was the vastly different local economic situation 
introduced by the economic collapse of the car works. Well over 
three thousand MAV members had been unemployed for ten months by 
June 1930 and had no obvious alternative local sources of 
employment in view of the dominance of the Steyr-Verke over the 
local economy. In these circumstances, the overriding concern of 
the average car worker was no longer the privileged position of 
the Works Council or exemplary working conditions, but, simply, 
the possibility of employment. Long-term, mass unemployment 
inevi tably sapped the cOlnmi tment of the membership to preserve 
the KAV's strong position within the firm. This was underlined 
by the fact that the )(AV had automatically lost its powers of 
patronage (i.e. its influence over manual worker staffing 
matters) as long as there was zero employment in car production. 
The union thus no longer enjoyed a "hold" over the non-social 
democratic instrumentalists previously forced to join the MAV 
just to get work .. Instrumentally motivated membership inevitably 
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loses its raison d'~tre when the reason for joining the 
organisation no longer exists. \/hen the MAV proved unable to 
provide employment, the minimal, conditional commitment of 
instrumentalist members disappeared. Similarly, it was noted in 
section 2.1 that even parts of the MAV's functionary apparatus 
may have beell instrumentally motivated in their commitment to 
the union by the financial rewards made available by the Works 
Council for functionary work. By mid-1930 it was evident that 
the financial restrictions placed on the Steyr-Werke and the 
general reduction in demand during the depression would mean 
that the works could not operate at full capacity for the 
foreseeable future. With a reduced level of employment, the 
Works Council would have less income and would not be able to 
afford to fund an extensive functionary network. It is possible 
that this served to undermine the commitment of instrumentalist 
functionaries to their union. A reduced commitment of both 
ordinary members and activists inevitably undermined the MAV's 
bargaining strength. 
The MAV was further handicapped in that the length of the 
shutdown meant that the supply of funds distributed by Works 
Council and MAV to other social democratic organisations had 
long dried up. Consequently, the social democrats no longer had 
the means to launch a support operation by mobilising an amply 
funded network. The MAV thus lacked the back-up resources of 
Kinderfreunde, co-operative etc. which had proved so crucial in 
1925. The MAV's position was made still worse by the extensive 
rationalisation of the production line which had taken place 
between 1929 and 1930. This had reduced the dependence of the 
firm on the skilled workers the MAV had traditionally organised, 
and increased the significance of unskilled workers, with their 
generally weaker attachment to trade unionism. The new 
management at the works recognised 
position accordingly, displaying a 
this and adjusted its 
tactical acumen which 
contrasted strongly to its predecessor's tactical ineptitude in 
1925. Management sought to exploit the implications of 
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rationalisation and drive a wedge between unskilled workers and 
their skilled worker-oriented trade union. It added the promise 
of a substantial increase in mi nimum wages - 1. e. those of 
unskilled workers - to its original terms in an attempt to 
"divide and rule" and thereby undermine the unity and resolve of 
the MAV (40). 
The "divide and rule" tactic was repeated a few days later 
in an act of calculated coercion designed to circumvent the 
right of the Works Council to negotiate on behalf of the 
workforce. Management appealed directly to those workers (also 
members of the MAV works organisation) still at work in the 
small bicycle and ball-bearing factories which formed part of 
the Stel'r-Werke complex, to accept its conditions for the 
resumption of car production. If an overwhelming majority of the 
bicycle and ball-bearing workers accepted the stated conditions 
on behalf of the car workers, they would be "permitted" to 
continue working for the steyr-Werke; otherwise their jobs would 
be at risk (41). The pursuit of such aggressive tactics 
indicates the confidence of the new management and the 
bargaining power it now enjoyed as a result of the shutdown in 
car production. It also emphasises the commitment it had brought 
to Steyr to eliminate the privileged position the MAV had 
established for itself in the works. 
The next stages of the conflict are unclear, but it seellE 
that the National Executive of the MAV intervened without 
consul ting the local union, overruled its stand against 
management and accepted management's conditions on behalf of the 
local MAV. This provoked open criticism at the National Congress 
of the MAV in September 1930. Both the President of the manual 
workers' Works Council in the Stel'r-Werke, August Maser, and his 
fellow Works Councillor Franz Schrangl attacked the National 
Executive's apparent capitulation in the face of economic 
difficulties (42). Maser felt that wage cuts and the elimination 
of trade union rights were not to be accepted without resistance 
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just because of economic problems; on the contrary, it was still 
possi ble for unions in certain firms (1. e. the MAV in the 
Steyr-Yerke) to assert themselves and hold their own against the 
employers (43). But, he continued, 
it often happens that the Works Councillors are shut out of 
negotiations and that only the more senior functionaries are 
involved. We Works Councillors wish to protest against such 
tactics and therefore appeal to the Executive to ensure that 
such things do not happen again in the future .•• Day-in, 
day-out we do the spadework, but when it comes to the moment 
when the cause should be decisively defended, someone brings 
up the catchword of "crisis", and the battle is given up 
without a determined struggle (44). 
The protests by Moser and Schrangl at the MAV National 
Congress in 1930 were the first indication of .opposition within 
the social democratic movenent in Steyr to. the increasingly 
pessimistic and fatalistic outlook displayed by the national 
leadership of the movement. The genesis of their protest has a 
much broader background than the narrow area of industrial 
relations, and is thus examined further in the more appropriate 
context of Chapter Seven. However, it is unlikely that Moser's 
and Schrangl's defiant attitude and their calls for a mare 
activist and offensive approach to industrial relations would 
have prevailed had the National Executive of the MAV not 
intervened in Steyr. Their defiance was based in an illusory 
assessment of the MAV's strength in the works which failed to 
take into account the massive changes in the background to 
industrial relations which had occurred since the suspension of 
car production in August 1929. Ten months' unemployment had 
undermined the rank and file will to resist, had exposed the 
limited commitment of instrumentalist members, and had 
eliminated the extra resources previously made available to the 
J~V through the network. Rationalisation had further undermined 
the JUV's bargaining hand by reducing the works' dependence on 
skilled workers. These factors conbined to shift the balance of 
power in the works away fron the MAV. 
-70 -
The reversal in the balance was completed by two further 
factors which illustrate what might be termed the 
"nationalisation" of the framework for social democratic 
activities in Steyr after 1929 following the redefinition of the 
local milieu: i.e. the displacement of local determinants of the 
nature of (in this case) industrial relations by factors which 
derived from economic and political developments at the national 
level. The first of these derived from the collapse of the BCA 
and its takeover by Rothschild's Credit-Anstalt. This resulted 
in the appointment of a new management at the Steyr-Yerke which 
distinguished itself from its predecessor in its assertiveness 
and tactically astuteness, its determination to deprive the KAV 
of its extra-statutory rights and in its confidence in its 
ability to do so. The second non-local, or national factor which 
directly impinged on the nature of industrial relations at the 
car works was the so-called" Anti-Terror Law" of 5th April 1930 
(45) • 
The "Anti-Terror Law" was designed to ensure a "negative 
ri ght of associati on" at the workpl ace 1. e. the right of the 
individual not to have to join a particular organisation (i.e. a 
social democratic trade union) in order to get work and not to 
have to pay any kind of (social democratic) trade union 
subscription or political levy. It was thus aimed specifically 
at undermining the unity of the social democratic trade unions 
at the workplace and reducing their financial strength. Its 
implementation obviously had severe implications for the balance 
of power in industrial relations at the Steyr-Verke. It made the 
veto right of the Works Council over staffing matters illegal if 
that right was used (as it certainly had been) to promote and 
favour the employment of social democrats. The inability to use 
the staffing veto in a "party-book" sense potentially undermined 
the unity of the MAV organisation on the shopfloor (although 
there is evidence to suggest that the KAV was able in some way 
to circumvent the new legislation and to maintain a 100% 
organisation on the shopf100r until February 1934 (46». The 
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• Anti-Terror Law" also abolished the practice of the central 
deduction in the works finance office of MAV dues and the 
Kinderfreunde Kindergroschen. This inevitably reduced the 
efficiency of dues collection, and, by implication, cut the 
amounts raised, undermining not only the financial basis (and 
thus an important factor in the industrial strength) of the XAV 
but also of the organisation which had given it such valuable 
material support in the industrial conflict of 1925. In this 
way, the "Anti-Terror Law served to further cement the balance 
of power in the Steyr-Werke away from the trade union and in 
favour of management. 
The new power relations in the Steyr-'lerke resulting from 
local economic collapse and the impingement of national factors 
were confirmed when a mass meeting of car workers was called 
early in July 1930 to vote on management's terms for reopening 
production, as accepted by the national MAV. Only ten of those 
present rejected the terms (47). Top pay rates were cut and 
minimum wages increased and the remainder of the MAV's catalogue 
of extra-statutory rights was abolished: political activity on 
the shopfloor was proscribed, no newspapers or other 
publications could be hawked and no poU tical notices could be 
posted in the works. The Works Council levy on wages was reduced 
to the statutory level, and Works Councillors now had to carry 
out their tasks in their own time with no financial support from 
the firm (48). 
Just as a pro-MAV balance of power in the Steyr-'lerke, as 
epitomised in the union's extra-statutory rights, was a vital 
precondition for the assertion of social democratic hegemony in 
the late 1920' s, sO the reverse is true. The reversal of the 
balance of power and the loss of those rights as a result of 
• Anti-Terror Law" of April 1930 and the management-KAV conflict 
of June/July 1930 had tremendous significance for the future of 
social democracy in Steyr. As was noted briefly in section 2.2 
and is examined in more detail in the following chapter, the 
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KAV's rights formed a crucial part of the network which had 
formed the basis of social democratic hegemony in the town in 
the late 1920' s. By mid-1930 the !{AV had lost its aMB ty to 
raise funds and distribute them throughout the social democratic 
movement. In addition, its powers of patronage were severely 
constrained, both by the provisions of the" Anti-Terror Law" and 
by the fact that the workforce of the car works was much reduced 
on resumption of production. Even though the MAV had apparently 
found some mechanism for retaining a closed organisation in the 
works, the potential of its powers of patronage was much 
reduced: in June 1929, 59% of the local labour force was 
employed as a manual worker at the Steyr-Werke, and was thus 
dependent on MAV patronage; in June 1930 the equivalent figure 
was 22%, and in June 1933 it was only marginally more than 10% 
(see Table 5), The loss of its fund-raising abilities and its 
powers of patronage meant that the MAV could no longer act as 
the mainstay of the network. As a result, the network 
disintegrated, thereby eliminating the basis of social 
democratic hegemony in Steyr. The reversal of the balance of 
power in the Steyr-jerke was, in this way, a central element in 
the decline of social democracy in Steyr after 1929. 
The balance of power in the Stel'r-jerke remained in favour 
of management for the rest of the First Republic. This was 
largely due to the continuing economic problems which afflicted 
the works and maintained local unemployment at a high level. 
Having overcommitted itself in taking over the BCA in 1929, the 
Credit-Anstalt itself collapsed in May 1931. After the Austrian 
National Bank had assured its future, its financial assistance 
to industry, which had not been especially bountiful before May 
1931, was drastically curtailed. This ensured for example that 
the level of car production at the Steyr-Yerke had to be reduced 
in July 1931 to six per day when seventeen had been made per day 
a few weeks beforehand, and when fifty per day could have been 
produced if the works operated at full capacity (49). In view of 
the continuingly high local unemployment which resulted from 
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undercapacity at the car works, there was always a reservoir of 
unemployed workers willing and able to replace current 
employees. In the face of this, the MAV was at a severe 
disadvantage and thus never had the chance to regain any of the 
bargaining power lost in 1930. 
The long-term strength of the MAV had been further eroded by 
the process of rationalisation at the car works. In 1925-26 a 
new system of overhead chains was introduced, which largely 
automated the car assembly process, and in 1929-30 similar 
production-line methods were introduced at all stages of car 
production. This had important long-term effects: in 1931-32, 
4,776 vehicles were produced by 3,526 workers; in 1923-24 just 
over half as many vehicles were produced by over twice as many 
workers (see Table 2). Rationalisation thus created structural 
unemployment, adding to the unelUployment problem which had 
greatly weakened the l(AV (50). 
Rationalisation not only affected the quantity, but also the 
quality of the workforce by extending the division of labour. 
Workers tended more and more to perform just a few simple, 
repetitive tasks at their place on the production line, without 
needing any particular skills. The implications of this were 
raised by Koser and Schrangl at the MAV National Congress in 
1930. More and more unskilled women and young men were being 
employed; these were often difficult to organise and were not 
readily amenable to the principles of trade unionism (51). 
Moreover, they gradually displaced the skilled workers who had 
long constituted the backbone of the MAV organisation in the 
works. Hence, although the MAV was able, despite the 
• Anti-Terror Law", to maintain a closed organisation in the 
works after 1929, the workforce tended towards a lesser 
cOmlUi tment to the trade union. Over time this too served to 
undermine the bargaining power of the KAV. 
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The management of the steyr-Werke exploited the MAV's 
weakness and its new-found dominance in industrial relations to 
further undermine the influence and morale of the trade union. 
In the following years it rejected any form of consultation and 
ruled, in effect, by decree in the works. The MAV was forced to 
accept unilaterally imposed wage cuts and changes in working 
conditions, and if it attempted to oppose management's dictates, 
members were indiscriminately sacked (52). Management was 
obviously supremely confident, in view of the reversal of the 
balance of power in the works in 1930, in its ability to impose 
its will on the MAV. By February 1934, it even felt able to 
ignore the MAV completely and to take up negotiations on a new 
collect! ve agreement with the Viennese (! ) Christian 
Ketalworkers' Union. It was confidently announced that the }!AV 
would be "decisively finished off" and rumoured that there would 
be a forced enrolment of manual workers into the christian union 
(53). However, the negotiations between management and the 
christian union provoked a passionate response from the 
previously acquiescent union and workforce. The meetings held by 
the }!AV to protest against management's actions and the terms 
acceptable to the christian union were the best attended for 
years and produced unanimous opposition to management's 
intentions. As a result of the apparently determined mood among 
the workforce, management abruptly dropped negotiations with the 
christian union (54). 
This must not, however, be seen as a reflection of the 
restoration of MAV bargaining power in the works. Indeed, the 
KAV was probably at its weakest point in conventional terms of 
union strength. In February 1934, there were only around a 
thousand manual workers employed in the works, whereas there 
were 3,600 registered unemployed in the town and another 4,000 
in the surrounding area (55). This "reserve army" of unemployed, 
many of them experienced metalworkers, was quite able to carry 
out the jobs of those employed at the Steyr-Werke if management 
were to follow its practice of recent years and dismiss 
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dissenters. The KAV's successful defiance of management in 
February 1934 must be assessed rather against the broader 
political backgound in Austria in 1933-34. 
By early February 1934, the dictatorship of the christian 
social Chancellor, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuj3, had been established 
for over ten months. These months had seen a gradual, 
systematic, "salami-tactic" suppression of the bases of social 
democratic power and influence in Austria (56) (parliament, 
Schutzbund, the social democratic press, the Chambers of Labour, 
"Red" Vienna etc.). The increasingly fatalistic national 
leadership of the social democratic movement acquiesced 
passively in the erosion of social democratic power. This 
provoked increasing dissatisfaction throughout the movement and 
led to calls for a more active defence of social democracy. 
During 1933, this dissatisfaction was reflected in Steyr in the 
gradual development of an inner-movement opposition, which 
unconditionally rejected the passivity of the national 
leadership and of a similarly minded local party leadership. The 
opposition was led by Maser and Schrangl, who had first 
displayed their opposition to passive acquiescence in the 
KAV-management conflict of June-July 1930, and had its support 
in the workforce at the Steyr-'ierke, the Scbutzbynd and the 
social democratic youth movement. By early 1934, the 
inner-movement opposition in Steyr was willing, even determined 
- given sufficient provocation - to put up violent resistance to 
dictatorship (see Chapter Seven). 
The conflict over the right of the KAV to negotiate on 
behalf of the manual workforce at the car works in February 1934 
must be seen in this light. For Moser and Schrangl and their 
supporters on the shopfloor, this was not an issue limited to 
the confines of the works, but was part of wider pol! tical 
developments in Austria. At the turn of the year, Dollfuj3 had 
issued a further series of anti-social democratic decrees, one 
of which sought to eliminate social democratic influence in the 
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works councils. Management's actions at the start of February 
1934 were presumably an attempt to put the new decree into 
practice. This was very much the last straw for Moser, Schrangl 
and the opposition; the MAV's control over the Works Council was 
effectively the last bastion of social democratic power in 
Steyr, and any attempt to remove that power was certainly 
sufficient to provoke the violent resistance the opposition was 
determined to offer: 
as long as the workforce is behind us, the unreasonable 
course taken by management will be rejected. It will come to 
a strike, and we will, of course, set up a picket line. This 
could cause clashes with the police, the gendarmery and 
other reactionary elements. We have a certain police 
official in Steyr ... who is a suspected national socialist. 
If there is any trouble, he will certainly join in with his 
people. And then there is the Heimwehr, which would of 
course intervene immediately, and that will trigger 
hostilities. And we expect the support of the whole Austrian 
working class (August Moser) (57). 
For this reason, i.e. the determination of the MAV to resist 
violently any further attacks on the social democratic movement, 
management backed down in early February 1934. It was unwilling 
to take responsibility for beginning a conflict which, given the 
mood of the workforce, could easily escalate into civil war. 
This certainly does not mean that management's position of 
strength in the firm had been weakened. The MAV was at its 
weakest point in conventional terES in February 1934, and given 
a less tense political background, management would almost 
certainly have implemented their plans. In any case, under the 
prevailing political circumstances, management could reasonably 
expect that the Do11fuP government would remove the remnants of 
social democratic trade union power in the near future. This 
expectation was fulfilled just days later in the aftermath of 
the Civil War, when Do1lfuP decreed the abolition of the social 
democratic trade unions and thus ended the MAV presence in the 
Steyr-Werke. 
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This chapter has attempted to analyse and explain the 
changing balance of power in MAV-management relations in the 
Steyr-Werke in the First Republic and to relate this to the 
wider experience of social democracy in Steyr. It has been shown 
that the MAV was able, unlike other provincial social democratic 
trade unions, to establish and maintain a decisive advantage in 
industrial relations in the works throughout the 1920' s. This 
derived from certain factors inherent in the local economic 
structure (e. g. a centralised and skilled workforce), and was 
cemented both by the extra-statutory rights attained by the MAV 
in the early post-war period and by the tactical and financial 
weaknesses of management (as demonstrated in 1925). The MAV's 
extra-statutory rights were also a central foundation of the 
social democratic network in Steyr. Within the extraordinary 
framework of the local milieu in the late 1920's, this network 
was able to expand its influence to form the basis of social 
democratic hegemony in Steyr, The superiority of the MAV in the 
Steyr-Werke, and the defence of that superiority in the 1925 
lockout, were therefore quite crucial preconditions for the 
establishment of social democratic hegemony in the late 1920's. 
Similarly and logically, the reversal of the balance of power 
and the establishment of management superiority after 1929 were 
also central to the disintegration of social democratic hegemony 
and helped precipitate the decline which beset the movement in 
the 1930's. The central significance of the balance of power in 
the Steyr-Werke in the ability of the social democrats to assert 
their hegemony over other political movements in the town is 
addressed further in the following chapter. 
The reversal of the balance of power in the car works, or 
more precisely the reasons for it, are instructive in a wider 
sense. The foremost element in the reversal was the shutdown of 
car production between August 1929 and July 1930. This created 
mass unemployment in the town and directly undermined the MAV's 
strength in relations wi th management, However, other factors 
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intervened to tip the balance even more decisively towards 
Jllanagement. These - the assertiveness of the new management at 
the works and the "Anti-Terror Law" - derived from "outside" 
factors: the emergency takeover of the BCA by the Cred1t-Anstalt 
and the demands of business circles and the He1mwehr for a 
statutory restriction of trade union acti vi ties. These "outside" 
factors epitomise the progressive "nationalisation" of the 
framework for industrial relations, and more broadly for 
politics in Steyr after 1929. In the 1920's the development of 
social democracy had been conditioned above all else by local 
factors: the social and poli tical isolation of the town, the 
insularity this produced and the economic fluctuations of the 
Steyr-Werke. After 1929 this was no longer wholly the case. 
While the instability of the Steyr-Werke still exerted its 
considerable influence over local politics, Steyr's insularity 
was lost as non-local factors, priJllarily the mounting national 
confidence and assertiveness of the Austrian Right, increasingly 
determined the framework lor social democratic politics in the 
town. The social democratic reaction to this challenge from the 
Right in the 1930' s is a theme which is addressed further in 
Chapter Three and throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC HEGEMONY IN STEYR. 
Between 1927 and early 1930, social democracy enjoyed a 
ccmprehensive hegemony over the political of the Right in Steyr. 
The dominance of the social democrats extended far beyond the 
formal local political arena of elections and town hall politics 
to encompass normally unpoliticised aspects of everyday life and 
to becoJoo an inherent part of the political culture of the town. 
Both the social democrats and their opponents acknowledged the 
status of the town as a "rote Hgchbtlrg" I a red "fortress", a 
"bastion" and "bulwark" of social democratic supremacy (1), 
which, from the non-social democratic point of view, could only 
be broken with outside help (2). The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the mentality which underlay social democratic 
domination, the forms which this domination took, and the 
conditions under which it was achieved. 
The chapter is concerned with the social democratic ethos in 
Steyr. It was noted in the Introduction to this study that this 
ethos arose from the consciousness and experience of Steyr's 
isolation as a working class, social democratic town in a 
conservative, rural region. It comprised an insular, 
inward-directed "stronghold" mentality, whose overriding concern 
was to emphasise and further build up Steyr's status as an 
enclave of social democratic strength and to reject any 
"outside", non-social democratic incursions into the stronghold. 
This mentality underlay 
stronghold internally by 
the concern to consolidate the 
means of the extension of the 
organisational influence of the social democratic movement. 
Primarily by making use of the various and considerable powers 
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of the MAV and of the town hall, the social democrats were able 
to build up a network of organisational influence, through which 
they could control and manipulate vital aspects of daily life in 
their own interests. This network formed the basis of a social 
democratic hegemony in Steyr which contrasted strongly with the 
growing predominance of the Right and the increasing 
subordination of social democracy in Austria as a whole. 
A by-product of social democratic hegemony was the 
development of widespread instrumentalist tendencies within the 
movelllent. lion-social democrats established nominal commi tlllents 
to the movement, boosting its numerical strength, in order to 
secure for themselves some of the benefits and perks available 
to the social delnocratic membership through the network. The 
Umi ted, nominal commi tment of social democratic 
instrumentalists had profound implications for the cohesion and 
strength of the movement if the movement could, for any reason, 
no longer provide the benefits for which they had joined in the 
first place. Once again, this emphasises the dependence of 
social democracy in Steyr on a certain combination of local 
conditions. Instrumentalist commitment to social democracy, and 
more broadly the network and social democratic hegemony with 
which instrumentalism was associated, were tied to the 
particular local milieu which dominated politics in the town in 
the late 1920's. In particular, the powers of MAV and town hall 
were directly dependent on the level of employment at the 
S±eyr-Werke. When car production at the Steyr-Werke was shut 
down'in 1929, the powers of J~V and municipality disintegrated 
and the network collapsed, removing the basis of social 
democratic hegemony in the town and hastening the departure of 
instrumentalist members from the movement. The social democratic 
movement abruptly entered a steep decline whose counterpart was 
the rejuvenation of the local Right, which was able increasingly 
to challenge the traditions of local social democratic 
supremacy. 
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3.1: The Network. 
The social democratic ethos, the mental! ty of the 
stronghold, underlay a fixation with the expansion of the basis 
and influence of the movement's organisational infrastructure in 
Steyr. This fixation resulted in the evolution of a network, a 
political "machine" which, harnessed and mobilised the strengths 
of individual social democratic organisations in the service of 
the wider interests of the movement. This network had three 
major constituent branches: the KAV's ability to raise funds for 
other parts of the social democratic movement; powers of 
patronage in the local labour market: and the ability to 
manipulate the offices and organs of the municipality .. 
The MAV's extra-statutory rights in the Steyr-Werke were a 
crucial mainstay of the network. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the union had the right to hold paH tical collections on the 
shopfloor and to have an extraordinary union subscription levied 
centrally in the works finance office for the KinderfreuDde. It 
was also able to raise twice as much money as was decreed by law 
from the manual workforce in order to fund the activities of the 
Works Council, Much of this was then passed OD to other social 
democratic organisations (see Table 4). In 1928 and 1929 the 
Works Council granted total subsidies of over 295,000 shillings 
to other organisations (3). In all, the MAV was able to provide 
a very solid financial basis for the rest of the movement. 
The second major element of the network was the control 
exerted by the social democrats over the local labour market. It 
was noted in Chapter Two that the MAV enjoyed massive powers of 
patronage in Steyr via its closed shop at the Steyr-Werke and 
its collusion with the municipal Unemployment Office. At the 
peak of employment at the car works in 1928-1929, between five 
and six thousand manual jobs at the Steyr-werke depended on the 
patronage and goodwill of the MAV and/or the favour of the 
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Unemployment Office. In addition, municipal jobs were filled 
very much on party-book lines (4). If the full-time jobs 
provided privately by social democratic organisations in Steyr 
are added to municipal party-book and Steyr-'ierke union-book 
jobs, the full extent of employment dependent on social 
democracy can be assessed. Table 5 shows that social democracy 
had an influence over around 56-62% of jobs in the town in 
1928-1929. The maj ori ty of the local labour market was thus 
controlled by the social democrats in this period. Through the 
XAV in particular, social democracy in Steyr had, in effect, a 
large-scale, pro-social democratic employment agency at its 
disposal - especially when employment was at its highpoint at 
the car works in 1928-1929. 
The third major part of the network resulted from the social 
democratic dominance of municipal politics. As noted above, 
municipal employees were recruited on party-book lines. In turn, 
the administration of the municipality was carried out with 
social democratic concerns in mind. Municipal departments and 
organs were quasi-social democratic 
Hauslmayr, Director of the Xagistrat, 
institutions. Ferdinand 
the municipal "civil 
service", and primary adviser to the mayor, was a member of the 
SDAP's District Committee. The Unemployment Office liaised with 
the Works Council in the Steyr-lierke in order to put social 
democrats forward for jobs at the car works. The manager of the 
Xunicipal Enterprises, Franz Mellich, was both President of the 
local social democratic Crematorial Association and military 
leader of the SchlltzbllDd. The municipality supported the 
Schutzbund in several ways - renting out an explosives store, 
lending out lorries to transport weapons etc. - and much of the 
mili tary acti vi ty of the Scblltzbund was carried out under the 
cover of the Municipal Enterprises' operations (5). It is 
instructive that when the SchutzbllDd called for an economic 
boycott of Heil!lWllbr sympathisers in December 1929 without the! 
backing of the SDAP, the boycott post=,·c ap;?".H2:.t ".. 1;1.2 
.- ij..j -
,s...;cl..t h..J,;";' ;,..:..:\.: u'.;;!..;: ":'...l1-' t:...!t.'."/;"!;;!1l Lhe two urganisattons that when 
.{dUel, w",", replaced as manager of the Municipal Enterprises, 
his successor also took over as military leader of the 
Schutzbund (7). 
The most significant aspect of social democratic control 
over the municipal administration was the fact that the police 
in Steyr were a IDunicipal force. In this respect, Steyr was 
unusual. In most other towns, the federal police kept law and 
order, and in rural areas, the provincial gendarmeries. Steyr's 
independent police powers derived from a Habsburg Imperial 
decree of 1862 (8) and were jealously guarded by the social 
democrats after the First World War (9). Al though no direct 
evidence exists, it seems that the social democrats were able to 
purge the local police force of non-social democratic elements 
during the 1920's. By 1926 the local police force also 
functioned as the eleventh Section of the Steyr SDAP (10). In 
the late 1920's, according to reports of the federal police in 
Linz, only party functionaries were recruited into Steyr's 
police. Of eight officers in Steyr, only the leader of the force 
could be assessed as a "solid bourgeous type". The remaining 
seven officers and most of the fifty plus constables were 
card-carrying social democrats (11). 
The whole police force was responsible and answerable to the 
social democratic mayor, Franz Sichlrader, who used his 
influence over the police to intervene in the penal process to 
the benefit of social democrats wh[) had committed minor offences 
(usually in fracas with Heimwehr members) (12). Sichlrader 
reduced fines to minimal amounts and then even let them be paid 
off in instalments. Short periods of detention were also reduced 
and files necessary 
in the town hall. 
for the prosecution of offenders were" lost" 
It was reported in mid-February 1930 for 
example that around twenty-five cases pending since 20th October 
1929, when social democrats clashed with the Hei mwehr , were 
still awaiting a hearing (13). There existed a particular, 
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social democratic conception of law and order in Steyr. The 
events of 15th July 1927 in Vienna had shown how the police 
could be used as a weapon against social democracy. This was -
as Steyr's christian socials immediately recognised (14) - not 
possible in Steyr. On the contrary, the police could be and were 
in the following years used to defend the position of social 
democracy in Steyr from the ascendant Right in Austria (see 
section 3.5). 
The network thus channelled and exploited to the full the 
patronage and powers of MAV and municipality so that the 
influence of the social democratic movement extended far beyond 
the shopf1oor of the Steyr-Verke and the local council chambers 
to permeate even such everyday matters as individual employment 
prospects and the practice of law and order in Steyr. In this 
way, the local dominance of the social democratic movement was 
firmly underlined. This dominance was particularly clear-cut 
during the years of the ":false boom" at the Steyr-Werke. The 
"yields" of both MAV and town hall powers were both directly 
dependent on the level of employment at the car works. As 
employment levels rose consistently between 1927 and 1929, so, 
naturally, did the level of funds the MAV was able to raise from 
the workforce and the extent of MAV influence over the local 
labour market. Similarly, the town hall was dependent :for much 
of its income on the local direct taxes levied from the 
Steyr-Werke workforce. As the size of the workforce grew during 
the "false boom", so did municipal income and, in consequence, 
the range and extent of municipal activities. The economic boom 
conditions characteristic of the local milieu in Steyr in the 
late 1920's thus fed directly into and boosted the network. At 
this time the influence exerted through the network was at its 
peak and formed the basis of social democratic hegemony in the 
town. 
The network did however have two significant inherent 
weaknesses. The first was, paradoxically, the source of its 
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strength in the late 1920' s: its relationship to the level of 
employment at the Steyr-Werke. If this was substantially cut 
back, social democracy was bound to face difficulties in 
maintaining its dominant position in Steyr. The financial bases 
of the social democratic movement and the municipality, bath 
extracted largely from the Steyr-Werke workforce, would dry up 
and the level of control aver the local labour market would fall 
in proportion to the decline in jobs at the car works. This was 
indeed the case after August 1929 and is examined below in 
section 3.4. The second weakness forms the focus of the next 
section. 
3.2; Instrll1nentalism and tbe Network. 
In several different ways the constituent elements of the 
network encouraged an instrumentally motivated commitment to 
social democracy. A significant part of the organisational 
strength of social democracy in Steyr was thus founded in the 
instrumental commitment of non-social democrats or indifferents 
to the social democratic movement. Such a commitment was 
condi tional upon the continued receipt of certain benefits 
associated with membership in the movement. This section aims to 
examine the extent of instrumental ism in Steyr and to assess its 
implications for the development of the movement. 
The extent of social democratic patronage in the local 
labour market was the most important factor which encouraged 
instrumental ism in the movement in Steyr. The proportion of the 
local labour force dependent for its employment on social 
democracy is shown in Table 5. In the boom years of 1928-1929 at 
the Steyr-Werke, over half of the labour force in Steyr was in a 
job dependent on social democracy. In this situation some 
non-social democrats were inevitably forced to join social 
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democratic organisations to get a job. This applies especially 
fcr recruitments into the expanding Steyr-li'erke workforce. In 
Septelnber 1928 for example, a christian worker organised in tbe 
christian metalworkers' union was taken on at the works. 
Subsequently he was asked by a Works Councillor about his trade 
union membership. The worker declared that he was in the 
christian union, but was nevertheless quite prepared to pay 
subscriptions (einzuzablen) to the MAV (15). In other words, 
this worker's proposed commitment to the ]{AV was stated purely 
in formal, financial terms. Also instructive is the information 
supplied by Alois Zehetner, Steyr-li'erke Works Councillor in the 
1930's: 
When manual workers were taken on, the person concerned also 
had to get a signature from the Works Council. This decided 
'Yes' or 'No'. In the process, the recruit1llent into the 
trade union was c01llpleted if the person concerned was not 
yet organi sed (16). 
011 the basis of Zehetner's information, it seelllS that the 
MAV itself was unconcerned if non-social democrats were 
organised in the union; recruitment into the union was a mere 
forlmlity that went with the job. This must especially have been 
so in 1928-1929 when the reserves of social democratic 
unemployed were nearing exhaustion as the workforce at the 
Steyr-li'erke grew: the MAV increasingly had no choice but to 
accept the employment of non-social-democrats. There is 
certainly evidence to suggest that even Heimwehr sympathisers 
had been recruited into the workforce - and by implication the 
XAV - by mid-1929 (17). The exact extent of instrumental1sm in 
the ]{AV is uncertain; the fact that Heimwehr sympathisers, 
loathed by the social democrats and certainly their last choice 
as workmates, had been taken on at the car works despite the 
XAV's recruitment veto indicates that it was widespread. 
Instrumentalist tendencies extended into the MAV's 
functionary network through the practice of remunerating 
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functionaries at the Steyr-Werke. As noted in the previous 
chapter, MAV functionaries were remunerated at a nominal, 
inflated rate for wages they supposedly lost for carrying out 
XAV work in the firm's time. KAV functionaries were thus a 
semi-professionalised, privileged caste, particularly 
by the perks susceptible to an opportunist commitment inspired 
on offer. The lack of opposition among the car workers to the 
Steyr-Werke's attack on the KAV's extra-statutory rights in 
1930, at a time when it was clear that the Works Council would 
no longer be able to fund a large-scale functionary apparatus, 
indicates that opportunism did indeed play a role (18). 
The exemplary pay of the 
create an atmosphere which 
motivated. Municipal manual 
municipal workforce also helped 
appealed. to the instrumentally 
workers had in some cases 
considerably higher wages than equivalent workers in private 
firms. Municipal Ang",stellte worked relatively short hours, 
received early pensions and high pay (more than federal 
Angestellte). Pensions were assessed at 100% of normal salary -
unique in Austria - and the municipality paid its employees' 
incOlue tax and pension contributions (19). As Michels noted, the 
association of economic existence (e. g. employment prospects, 
XAV functionary or municipal perks) with dependence on the 
social democratic movement can produce a commitment to social 
democracy not informed by conviction but by instrumental ism: 
it is ... indisputable that to the average man the close 
association of his own economic existence with his 
dependence on the socialist party seems a sufficient excuse 
for the sacrifice of his own conviction in order to remain 
in a party with which he is in truth no longer in full 
sympathy (20). 
This could be reinforced by what he called "proletarian 
assurance" (21), the provision of material benefits to members 
of the social democratic movement as a means of mobilisation. 
Four social democratic organisations fall into this category in 
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Steyr: the Consumer Co-operative, the Tenants' Association, the 
Crematorial Association and the District Health Insurance Fund. 
All these were private organisations although the health 
insurance fund had semi-state status. All offered material 
benefits to their members. In 1927 for example, the Co-operative 
granted a 1. 5% rebate on goods sold to members; the rebate 
increased with extra turnover in the following year (22). The 
Tenants' Association could offer invaluable aid at rent 
tribunals and other housing disputes: during 1929 it legally 
represented members in housing disputes on 915 occasions and 
scored a 95% success rate (23). The Crematoria I Association 
offered free cremations and burials and free !!laintenance of 
graves in perpetuity for a contribution per member of 0.1 
shillings per month (24). Health insurance funds were private 
organisations which carried out certain statutory duties. They 
were generally organised on political lines and all had to 
provide a basic level of health care. The social democratic fund 
in Steyr however went further than its statutory obligations, 
providing extraordinary sick pay and occasional allowances for 
unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged members and their families 
(25) . 
Michels predicted a "considerable accession of strength" to 
the social democratic movement frolD such "proletarian assurance" 
(26). This was borne out in Steyr. All the above-mentioned 
organisations had a rising membership at least until the Great 
Depression made its mark (27). The real issue though is the 
nature of the new members of the 1920's. Inevitably !!lany of them 
were attracted not by the broad aims of social democracy but by 
the material benefits on offer; many had an instrumental 
moti vation. 
Al though the exact extent of instrumental ism in the social 
democratic movement in Steyr is not easily quantifiable, the 
existence of so !!lany instrumentalist tendencies - derived from 
the control over the labour market, financial perks and 
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"proletarian assurance" - indicates both that the nature of the 
network as a ki nd of mutual benefit society promoted 
instrumentalism and that the phenomenon was widespread. Having 
established this, the discussion can now turn to the 
implications of instrumental ism for the movement, in particular 
its effects on the real strength, the internal structures and 
the tactical cohesion of the social democratic movement. 
The social democratic movement had an unquantifiable but 
significant number of instrumental members whose support was 
condi tional upon the continued receipt of material benefits. By 
direct implication, the numerical strength of social democracy 
was itself conditional upon the continued ability to provide 
those benefits. Obviously this ability was intact and at its 
greatest extent between 1927 and 1929 during the "false boom" at 
the Steyr-Werke when the network was at the peak of its 
influence. In this situation there was every reason for the 
instrumentally motivated to join social democracy. The situation 
was however fundamentally changed in 1929 by the collapse in 
employment at the Steyr-Werke and the onset of general economic 
depression in the town. Thereafter social democratic/MAV powers 
of patronage in the labour market were much reduced (see 
Table 5); the social democratic "employment agency" simply had 
far less jobs on its rolls. The luunicipality - financially 
dependent on high levels of employment at the Steyr-Werke - was 
also forced to cut back its workforce and its pay scales. The 
KAV too was starved of funds by the cut-backs at the car works 
and could no longer afford to distribute perks to its 
functionaries. The general economic crisis resulted in a fall in 
the number of jobs available in social democratic organisations 
and a limitation of the resources and benefits of the 
"proletarian assurance" associations. 
In other words, the material benefits available from the 
social democratic movement were, like the network from which 
they were derived, dependent on the economic performance of the 
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Steyr-Werke. Instrumentalism thus heightened the dependence of 
social democracy on the buoyancy of the car works. When mat£ri~l 
benefits fell with the !~~!-,?!rr·~Yi::;~·h:. :tft~.r !,)::!9. J;l:!,= 
cr.",'. t;'~i ,-",o,-"",L,,·';' U • .>i,- condltional support and hastened the 
·..!-.;.::;lillC uf social democracy. 
Instrumentalism also affected the structure and tactics of 
the social democratic movement, albeit in a negative sense. The 
existence of a significant instrumental membership meant that a 
section of the movement was, on the whole, inert and indifferent 
to what the leadership of the movement did. The passivity and 
docility of the instrumentalists <negatively) legitimated the 
leadership's policies, reduced the potential for opposition and 
thus reinforced the authority and position of that leadership. 
This issue will be dealt with in more detail in the following 
chapter. For now it is sufficient to note that social democratic 
leadership was an entrenched, inflexible, bureaucratic elite 
which proved incapable of adapting to new circumstances in the 
1930's. The seeds of this inflexibility were sown during the 
prime days of the social democratic network in 1927-1929. Set 
against the background of boom at the Steyr-Werke, this was 
social democracy's most successful period. The network provided 
a flourishing basis of power and influence in the town. In 
addition, as discussed in Chapter One, the reformist strategy of 
the social democrats was also, apparently, vindicated at this 
time. The potential for inner-party opposition was reduced both 
by the apparent success of existing policies and by the docile 
instrumental membership. In consequence the policies pursued 
became institutions as entrenched as the leadership and the 
social democr;'1tic movement in general entered a rut in which it 
would become increasingly stuck in the 1930's. 
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3.3: The Social Democratic Stronghold Mentality. 
However, the negative implications of instrumentalism did 
not become apparent until after the collapse of the steyr-Werke. 
Until then the hegemony of social democracy in Steyr, as 
guaranteed by the network, remained intact. This localised 
dominance further reinforced the stronghold mentality which was 
central to the social democratic ethos in Steyr. The insular 
ethos of the social democrats incorporated a narrow and 
blinkered frame of reference which amplified the illlportance of 
local events and developments and deval ued the relevance of the 
"outside" world. In this frame of reference, the existence and 
maintenance of social delllocratic hegemony in Steyr was of 
supreme illlportance. On the other hand, events and trends of 
great inportance for the national social democratic movement had 
only minimal impact in Steyr. This is well illustrated by the 
lack of local impact made by the general advances made by the 
Austrian Right after 1927. Even the events and aftermath of 15th 
July 1927 had little effect on the social democratic movement in 
Steyr. By 19th July it had becollle clear that Austrian social 
democracy in general had suffered two massive setbacks in quick 
succession. The vulnerability of social democracy to the power 
of the executive had been bloodily illustrated, of all places in 
"Red Vienna", its heartland and showcase, as the police shot 
indiscriminately into the workers' demonstration on 15th July. 
And, in addition, the railway strike called in protest by the 
SDAP's national executive had been broken with alarming rapidity 
by a combination of Heirowehr intimidation and the security 
forces of right wing Land governments. The ultimate weapon of a 
movement dedicated to the use of peaceful means was patently 
ineffective. Kid-July 1927 was thus a turning point for Austrian 
politics as a whole and for social democracy in particular. The 
social democratic movement had been able to maintain a strong 
position in Austria since it left governlllent in 1920 largely by 
virtue of the potential, or latent strength implied by its huge 
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membership and organisational structure. This strength had been 
challenged and proved illusory in July 1927 by the guns of the 
Viennese police, the Heimwehr and the provincial gendarmeries. 
The balance of power in Austria had shifted decisively to the 
right and social democracy was forced onto an explicitly 
defensive footing. 
Apart from temporary agitation and outrage and a short burst 
of organisational activity, Steyr's social democrats remained 
largely unaffected by the events of July. When news of the 
shootings in Vienna reached Steyr in the night of 15th-16th July 
the Schlltzhllnd was immediately put on alert. Its leadership and 
the SDAP District Committee sat in permanent session taking the 
"necessary precautions" against "unforeseen eventualities" (28). 
However, after a mainly informative open-air protest meeting on 
16th July, the response of the social democrats took on a 
markedly superficial character. On the 20th July a tokenistic 
fifteen minute strike of mourning was held at the Steyr-Verke 
and a number of other local firms and on 25th the mayor spoke 
briefly in mourning to the town council (29). But on the whole, 
the social democratic movement carried on as normal. There was 
no evident feeling in Steyr that social democracy had suffered a 
great setback. The challenge to social democracy from the Right 
had no repercussions in Steyr. Mayor Sichlrader's words in the 
council meeting on 25th July are instructive: "We are all'sti11 
under the shocking impression made by the dreadful events which 
have befallen the population of the federal capital." (30) In 
other words, the shootings in Vienna may have been "shocking" 
and "dreadful", but their effect was, in Sichlrader's eyes, 
restricted to the population of Vienna; Steyr was not affected. 
Sichlrader's attitude was that of a concerned, but detached 
onlooker. This was no doubt encouraged by the subsequent lack of 
impact of the failed transport and communications strike - there 
was no large railway community in a town isolated away fron the 
major railway lines, so there were no local feelings of 
humiliation when the strike was broken. 
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The detachment of the social democrats in steyr from the 
events and implications of July 1927 does however have a more 
basic quality. July 1927 did not pierce the stronghold mentality 
of social democracy in Steyr. The insularity of the social 
democratic movement in Steyr meant that events were perceived 
predominantly in local terms. In local terms, July 1927 had had 
little effect. There had been no explicit challenge to the 
hegemony of social democracy in Steyr. Steyr was still an 
apparently impregnable social democratic stronghold. The 
strength of social democracy had not been proved illusory in 
Steyr as it had in Austria in general. The events of July 1927 
had conclusively shown that the latent strength implied by the 
massive organisational infrastructure of Austrian social 
democracy was worth little when faced by hostile and determined 
federal and provincial governments backed by an active 
extra-parliamentary Right. Steyr's social democratic movement 
was different in that its organisational infrastructure was tied 
to real local power. The local strength of social democracy was 
not latent, or potential, but very real and active and diffused 
by the network throughout local politics, economy and society. 
The consciousness of this was unimpaired and insulated the 
social democrats from the implications of the nationwide upsurge 
of the Right after 1927. 
The insulated development of social democracy in Steyr was 
enhanced by the lack of Heimwehr activity in the Steyr area. The 
increasing prominence of the Heimwehr was the most obvious 
manifestation of the changed power relations in Austria after 
1927. In helping to break the railway strike in July 1927, the 
Heimwehr was thrust onto a pedestal as the saviour of the 
bourgeoisie from "red revolution". With the material support of 
foreign governments and Austrian heavy industry it became 
"something approaching a popular movement" (31). In Upper 
Austria, as elsewhere, a large-scale recruitment drive was 
begun. However, the leader of the Upper Austrian Heimwebr, Ernst 
RUdiger Starhemberg, initially concentrated his propaganda and 
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organisational work in the )[jib) yiertel around Linz (32). The 
Trallnyi erte) , the area around Steyr, remained largely untouched 
by Heimwebr activity until late 1929. rn other words, there was 
no explicit challenge to the local hegemony of social democracy. 
The social democratic movement was able to continue undisturbed 
its insular, insulated existence. 
While the insular mentality of the social democrats in Steyr 
cushioned them from the effects of national trends, it also 
amplified the perceived significance of events within, Steyr. rn 
particular, the social democrats would not tolerate even a 
symbolic challenge to their hegemony in the town. The open 
appearance of a militant opposition on the streets of the town -
considered an exclusive social democratic domain was 
especially vehemently rejected. This applied mainly to the 
Helmwebr, which launched a concerted challenge to social 
democratic hegemony in 1929-1930. 
democrats to the attempts by the 
The response of the social 
Heimwehr to gain a pOlitical 
foothold in Steyr is examined in section 3.5 below. The issues 
raised by the Heimwehr challenge were foreshadowed though by the 
events surrounding a gymnastics festival held by the local 
German (i.e. Pan-German nationalist) Gymnastics Club in July 
1928. The festival provides a significant insight into the 
mentality of the social democrats in Steyr, in particular the 
importance attached to the social democratic "monopoly of the 
streets", the sole "right" of the social democrats to march and 
parade through Steyr. 
The gymnastics festival provoked a considerable furore in 
the social democratic movement. Some of the festival's 
participants represented the extreme in German nationalism, 
sporting national socialist regalia and parading with German 
military flags. This was perceived as a provocation and caused 
great indignation among the social democrats. rt was felt that 
the "monopoly of the streets", symbol of social democratic 
hegemony in the town, had been challenged by the open display of 
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German nationalist emblems. The social democrats responded on 
two levels. The first in'lol ved an unofficial (but officially 
approved) spontaneous reaction of younger social democrats and 
centred on confrontation and violence. Several scuffles broke 
out between nazis and young social democrats, and during the 
festi val parade a group of young social democrats, allegedly 
incited by high party functionaries, stole one of the German 
flags and almost started a mass brawl (33). According to a 
christian social councillor, the already excited mood of some 
social democrats then degenerated into a "scarcely bel ievable 
witchhunt for non-social democrats" as various people, including 
uninvolved passers-by, were beaten up (34). 
The official SDAP response had a substantially different 
character but was directed at the same end: the deterrence of a 
repeated challenge to the monopoly of the street. At 
extraordinary meetings in the party sections the party sought to 
mobilise the network against the perceived nationalist 
challenge. The party responded with the scarcely veiled threats 
of expanding the paramilitary Scblltzbllnd and boycotting the 
businesslnen and shopkeepers who took part in and cheered on the 
festival in favour of the social democratic co-operative (35). 
The social democratic memberShip was urged to "punish" those who 
supported the opposition through an economic boycott. Similarly, 
the Works Councillors and MAV functionaries from the Steyr-Werke 
demanded that the twenty-five or so Steyr-Werke Angestellte who 
marched in the festival parade should be sacked (36). 
The two types of social democratic response to the 
gymnastics festival - militant, belligerent confrontation and a 
purposeful mobilisation of the network both reflect the 
intolerance of social democracy in Steyr to a challenge to its 
lnonopoly of the streets in the town. This was the essence of 
social democratic stronghold lnentality. The view was that Steyr 
was a "red" stronghold in which other movements had no 
legitimate place and which could and would repel any challenges. 
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The dual response to the outside challenge seen at the 
gymnastics festival was to be repeated on several occasions in 
1929 and 1930 when the HelInwehr attempted to break into the 
stronghold (see section 3.5). 
3.4: The Collapse Of the Network. 
In the late 1920' s the social democratic movement in Steyr 
enjoyed an unusually strong position. On the basis of a network 
which harnessed the powers of the social democratic 
organisational infrastructure, the movement was able to 
establish a comprehensive hegemony over the political opposition 
in the town. This was complemented by a stronghold mentality in 
the movement which insulated it from negative political trends 
and actively rej ected any challenge to its hegemony. However, 
all threelnain branches of the social democratic network - the 
XAV's fund-raising powers, social democratic powers of patronage 
in the local labour market and the manipulation of municipal 
powers - were basically dependent on employment levels at the 
Steyr-Werke. It was because the workforce of the Steyr-Werke 
expanded steadily between 1927 and 1929 that the influence of 
the network increased to lay the basis for social democratic 
hegemony in Steyr. This section analyses the effects of the 
shutdown of car production at the Steyr-yerke in August 1929 on 
the network and social democratic hegemony in Steyr. 
The collapse in employment at the 
deci:mated the financial basis of 
Steyr-Werke immediately 
the municipality. As 
unemployment grew, municipal income from direct taxes naturally 
fell, and fell further as the crisis·in an economy dominated by 
the Steyr-Werke "knocked-on" through the town. Despite severe 
cut-backs in both workforce and pOlicy programme, the municipal 
budget forecast for 1930 still projected a deficit of over 
- 97-
250,000 shillings (37) • The financial straits of the 
municipality hastened the implementation of a municipal 
asset-stripping programme. In 1930 an important part of the 
network was lost as the municipal Unemployment Offi.:e WCI" pa33.d 
under the jurisdiot1(m of th!:: :i)is'L.::i·.:;t Industl'i.:.·d CCl!J..lrJ..S:.:iiLn l~ 
Ll~!z. A2"!"j iu'b..l1'2 c:.,j··ui-·~~·d.i...':':Jll U~Lwt:!\..!ll Uneluployment Office and 
;io! ~;"- ':'uU!1{.;il 1'1 lhe SI "Y r-\lerke to direct social democrats into 
~v3ilable jobs was precluded. 
The worsening municipal financial position also led to the 
federalisation of the municipal police force, a vital part of 
the network, in 1930. The decision to negotiate for the 
federalisation had been taken - with reluctance - for financial 
reasons as early as 1928 (38). Negotiations had dragged on 
slowly until the collapse of municipal tax income made savings -
from whatever source - a matter of urgency. After a federal 
government investigation, Steyr's police force was federalised 
with effect from July 1st 1930 (39). The potential savings for 
the municipality. were considerable: in 1929 for example, the 
upkeep of the municipal police accounted for a sixth of all 
municipal expenditure (40). The political loss was larger. 
Steyr's independent police powers had created a unusual 
situation in Austria in that the police force .was friendly to 
and steered by social democrats. The partisan nature of the 
local police also helped social democracy maintain its "monopoly 
of the streets" in Steyr until after every other major 
industrial town had been subjected to a symbolic Heimwehr 
parade. After federalisation in July 1930, the police - with a 
force three times the size of the old municipal one - 'veered 
off into the bourgeois LageJ.:" and became "particularly 
dangerous" for social democracy (41). Within a month of 
federalisation the HeimWftlu:.' s application to hold a rally in 
Steyr had been accepted and within two months the Heimwehr had 
realised its much-vaunted "March on Steyr" (see section 3.5). 
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The Heimwehr rally at the end of August 1930 signalled the 
final demise of social democratic hegemony in Steyr. By then 
though, the social democratic movement had already been 
intrinSically weakened. Its financial base, provided through the 
MAV's extra-statutory rights in the Steyr-Werke, had been 
destroyed. Al though the rights of the MAV remained formally 
intact until July 1930, they were dependent on high employment 
levels at the Steyr-Werke for their effecti veness in raising 
funds to pass into the social democratic movement. Without high 
employment the rights were immaterial. Low employment meant low 
receipts from Works Council subscriptions, the K1ndergroschen 
and the political collections on the shopfloor. The financial 
situation of social democracy worsened further as the effects of 
high unemployment in the town began to make an impact. In 1930 
for example, the number of SDAP subscription stamps issued 
reflected a general membership decline and fell by 5,000. Closer 
analysis reveals also that the number of "full payment" stamps 
issued fell by 31,000 and the issue of reduced price 
"unemployed" stamps rose by 26,000 (42). The SDAP's income was 
falling rapidly and the same must apply for the self-raised 
incDlne of the other social democratic organisations. The loss of 
MAV-raised and decline in self-raised finance meant that the 
social democratic movement gradually became starved of funds and 
unable to maintain its 110rmal level of activities (43). 
The third main branch of the network - control over the 
local labour market - was even more clearly a direct function of 
the level of employment at the car works. Although it seems that 
the MAV retained its influence over recruitments after its other 
rights were removed by the new management in July 1930 (see 
Cahpter Two), the size of the workforce was a fraction of the 
1929 level. What is more, it continued to decrease steadily 
until after the MAV was banned in 1934. Similarly, the municipal 
workforce was also progressively reduced after 1929 as municipal 
finance dried up. Taking into account those employed by social 
democratic organisations as well, the number of local jobs 
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dependent on social democracy fell from 6,201 in 1929 to 2,421 
in 1930 and 1,164 by 1933. Almost two-thirds of the total labour 
force in Steyr had been in a job dependent in some way on social 
democratic patronage or favour in 1929. A year later less than a 
quarter was (see Table 5). 
There was now no real reason for those instrumentalists 
among the four thousand or so ex-car workers who had joined the 
MAV just to get a job to remain involved in the union. 
Membership of social democratic organisations was no longer a 
potential passport to a job. Intrumentally motivated members 
began to retract their conditional support and to weaken the 
social democratic movement. This tendency was enhanced as the 
financial incentives associated with social democracy 
disappeared. The relatively high pay of municipal employees was 
downgraded as part of various municipal austerity measures (44) 
and the Works Council in the Steyr-Werke was unable to fund an 
extensive functionary network. The social democratic 
"proletarian assurance" organisations were also less able to 
provide previous levels of material benefits in the general 
economic crisis. There was less and less reason for those with 
instrumental motives to remain even a nominal social democrat. 
It is however difficult to quantify the effect of revoked 
instrumental support. The social democrats were not neatly 
di vided into "instrumentalists" and "idealists". Some indication 
of the decline in support for social democracy is though given 
by the attendances recorded at various social democratic events 
in 1930. The celebrations on Mayday in 1930 were attended by 
around 3,500 people; this compares poorly with the 5,000 present 
in 1929 (45). When Otto Bauer, the highly respected leader of 
the SDAP spoke to a mass meeting in July 1930 in Steyr, some 900 
attended. In September 1929, a lesser known party leader, 
Wilhelm Ellenbogen, attracted over 2,000 (46). Furthermore, only 
a handful of those present at a mass meeting of car workers, 
also in July 1930, rejected the terms of the steyr-Werke which 
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eliminated the MAV's special position in the works (47). By this 
time it was clear that the workforce would be much smaller than 
in 1929, reducing the possibilities of MAV patronage, and that 
the Works Council would not have the funds to support and reward 
a large functionary network. 
After August 1929 the social democratic network began to 
disintegrate. The shutdown of car production at the Steyr-Werke 
had radically altered the socio-economic framework for politics 
in the town. As a result the mainstays of the network in the MAV 
and town hall crumbled, eroding the basis of social democratic 
hegemony. Social democratic decline was hastened by the collapse 
in instrumentalist support for the movement. This left a power 
vacuum in Steyr, which the forces of the Right, led by the 
Heimwehr, eagerly filled. 
3.5; The Challenge Of the Right and the Soclal Democratic 
Response. 
On 10th August 1929 a He! IDwehr section was founded in 
Steyr. Its aims were made clear at the inaugural meeting; the 
"red foremen" were to be ej ected from the Steyr-Werke and social 
democracy in Steyr was to be "overthrown" as in Vienna [on 15th 
July 19271 and Donawitz, the Upper 
Heimwehr's "Independent Trade Union" 
social democratic influence in 
Styrian town 
had all but 
the works 
where the 
eliminated 
of the 
Alplne-Montan-Gesellschaft (48). A series of parades and 
meetings were held in the second half of 1929 in the villages 
around Steyr both to drum up support and symbolically to 
"approach" and "encircle" the town. By December 1929 the 
Hei rnwebr felt confident enough - and the implication is that 
social democratic hegemony had weakened suffiCiently to allow it 
as the network crumbled - to hold regular, fully uniformed 
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"Sunday strolls" on Steyr's main square. These were intended 
explici tly as a challenge to the social democratic "monopoly of 
the streets". If the Heimwehr could establish the right to walk 
freely and openly in Steyr, social democratic hegemony would be 
visi bly and symbolically broken. 
The social democratic response was informed by the 
stronghold mentality which doggedly rej ected any challenge to 
their hegemony. As shown over a year earlier at the German 
gymnastics festival, this had two aspects: the official, 
purposeful mobilisation of the network against the challengers, 
and militant, even violent confrontation which was unofficial 
but with the sanction of higher authority in the movement. 
Confrontation ,was encouraged in late 1929 by the fiery 
pronouncements of the party newspaper, the Steyrer Tagblatt 
(49), and by the militant rhetoric of high party functionaries. 
The vice-mayor, Julius Ru~mann, is reported at one point to have 
said: "Vie simply do not let the Heimwehr into Steyr. It must be 
spelled out once and for all that Steyr is a workers' town" 
(50) • 
The SDAP's District Leader, Franz Schrangl, went further, 
emphasising that if the Heimwehr attacked the social democratic 
:movement, "then nothing can hold us back. Get in there and 
thrash their skulls in" (51). Subsequently local farmers present 
in Steyr for the weekly market who wore the characteristi,c 
cock's feather or other livery of the Heimwebr were persecuted 
and intimidated (52). At least twenty-five social democrats were 
arrested for incidents during and after the passage of Heimwebr 
vehicles through Steyr en route for a rally in a nearby village. 
Two social democrats even fired live shots at Hel mwehr :members 
returning from the festival (53). Social democratic 
confrontation reached its highpoint between December 1929 and 
February 1930 when the Heimwehr held its regular ·Sunday 
strolls". Several hundred, mainly younger social democrats 
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insulted and often assaulted the forty or so intrepid 
·strollers· . 
The challenge to the social democratic monopoly of the 
streets posed by the Heimwehr was thus emphatically rejected. 
This was once again complemented by a IDOre subtle official 
response. This centred on a mobilisation of the network to help 
protect the symbolic "monopoly of the streets" and maintain 
social democratic hegemony in the town. The municipal control of 
the police .proved especially useful in this respect. The local 
polic", , a numerically weak force of some sixty officers and 
constables, was largely powerless to protect Helmwehr members, 
was disinclined to anyway because of its affiliation to the 
SDAP, and was prevented from any concerted intervention by its 
social democratic municipal masters. J!ayor Sich1rader allegedly 
reprimanded some constables for trying to take action against 
social democratic offenders (54). He refused to arm the police, 
even with truncheons, and turned down offers to bring in 
reinforcements of gendarmes to help keep order (55). Finally, he 
used his powers to intervene in the legal process to the benefit 
of those few social democrats actually convicted of public order 
offeces (56). 
The inaction and ineffectiveness of the municipal police 
ensured the success in the short term of militant, youthful 
confrontation in the defence of the monopoly of the streets. 
There is evidence however to suggest that stronghold mentality 
took on its own momentum as the social democratic youth and the 
Scbl!tzbnnd, as if in antiCipation of their key role in the 
developing inner-movement opposition in the 1930' s, began to 
evade the control of the social democratic leadership. The 
social delDOcratic youth increasingly cooperated with the local 
communists in their attempts to deny the Heimwebr access to the 
town (57). Just before Christmas 1929 the Schntzbund too moved 
onto a more confrontational footing. Acting on its own 
initiative, it issued a call to boycott the shops· of certain 
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Heimwehr sympathisers in Steyr. Bright red placards announcing 
the boycott in inflammatory language were posted on to the 
advertising hoardings owned by the Municipal Enterprises, 
leaflets were distrihuted naming the shopkeepers to be boycotted 
and detachments of Schutzbjjndler kept guard over their shops to 
ensure the boycott was upheld (58). The boycott proved highly 
controversial and led to the decision of the bourgeois parties 
to quit the next municipal council meeting. For the first time 
](ayo1' Sichlrader explicitly renounced the strategy of 
confrontation and distanced himself from the actions of the 
Schutzbund. The social democratic leadership hegan to shy away 
from confrontation, perhaps in recognition of the declining real 
power of social democracy as the network underwent progressive 
erosion. 
The loss of social 
fully apparent at the 
announced its intention 
democratic leadership authority became 
end of January 1930. The Helmwehr 
of holding a "stroll" on 2nd February 
attended for the first time by Heimwehr supporters from outside 
(from some twenty-six nearby villages) (59). This "stroll" 
subsequently took on the character of a showdown over the future 
of the social democratic "monopoly of the streets". In the 
preceding week there were "unusually strong" gatherings of young 
social democrats and communists in the town centre who were "in 
fighting mood" and of the opinion that "Steyr is a pure workers' 
town, where the Heimwehr had no business to be" (60). The 
Sch!ltzbund then heightened the confrontational atmosphere by 
announcing its intention of holding a rival "stroll" on 2nd 
February. 300 Schu1;zbjjndler were only prevented from confronting 
the Heimwehr on Steyr's town square by the last-minute 
intervention of Mayor Sichlrader (61). 
Sichlrader was evidently disturbed by the fact that the 
tension in the town in the week preceding 2nd February had come 
to the notice of outside authorities. Since mid-December 1929 
there had been a persistent outcry in the Upper Austrian 
-104-
bourgeois press against the partisan nature of the municipal 
police and social democratic aggression against the Heimwehr in 
Steyr. Bourgeois delegations demanded the federalisation of the 
police in Steyr and, in the short term, police reinforcements in 
meetings with local, Land and federal authorities (62). The Land 
government eventually obliged and ordered the dispatch of 
reinforcements of police to Steyr on 2nd February ('33). This a·"t 
effecti vely abrosatecl the ""utalce,,; cl' ':;1:" towll ill ,,~curi i_y 
l!l3+" tel~s. Tne ~;-~t;·a. pcl.i.c~ prcs~f!c::: DJ.; 2nd February largely kept 
t"~ .e·c,··COO ;;,,"cL:.! tl"'JUDCl'atic and communist protesters away from 
the 100 or so Heimwehr supporters. Sichlrader's intervention to 
restrain the SchutzbllUd, presumably aimed at preventing a bloody 
confrontation which might have been put down by force by the 
potentially unfriendly outside police presence, then ensured 
that the Heimwehr could walk the streets relatively undisturbed. 
The usurpation of local security responsi bili ties by the 
Land showed that the social democratic "monopoly of the streets" 
could be breached. The monopoly was dependent on the complicity 
of the partisan municipal police force. The militant 
confrontation of the youthful Left and the Schutzbund in the end 
backfired on the social democrats by drawing Steyr to the 
attention of outside security authori ties. Sichlrader's 
intervention signalled his acceptance that the network and he 
himself had nothing left to offer in the fight against the 
mounting Heimwebr challenge once his police powers had been 
undermined. As the network disintegrated, it could logically no 
longer be employed in the struggle to maintain social democratic 
hegemony. The official, network-mobilisation response to the 
Heimwebr challenge fizzled out when it became apparent that its 
major weapon, which would in any case soon be federalised, was 
inadequate to contain' the Heimwebr. Sichlrader's actions in 
restraining the Heimwehr on 2nd February and the SUbsequent 
social democratic exhortations to moderation (64) announced the 
capitulation of social democratic hegemony in Steyr. 
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The role played by the local, non-Heimwebr bourgeoisie in 
the demise of social democratic hegemony in early 1930 is 
significant. Since tbe end of the monarcby, the bourgeoisie had 
bowed before the dominance of the social democrats in Steyr. The 
bourgeois parties, the christian socials and the pan-Germans, 
had been unable to challenge this dominance and were forced to 
accept the prevailing, heavily pro-social democratic political 
culture of the town. Only with the surge in Heimwehr activity in 
1929 did the bourgeoisie stir. It regarded the Heimwehr as an 
ideal instrument with which to break social democratic 
domination in Steyr and threw its full weight behind it (65). 
Once the Heimwehr had made its initial incursions into Steyr in 
December 1929, the established bourgeois parties felt confident 
enough to act on their own. As the social democratic "hold" over 
Steyr weakened as the network crumbled, the bourgeoisie enjoyed 
increasing room for manoeuvre. In an unprecedented step, the 
bourgeois parties quitttld the lDunicipal council meeting on 20th 
December 1929 in protest at the shopping boycott called by the 
Schl!tzbl!ud. They even called on the Land. and the federal 
government to ban the Schutzbund for actions which exceeded its 
legal statutes (66). 
The increased confidence of the bourgeOiS parties was 
reflected further in the delegations sent by them to demand the 
federalisation andlor reinforcement of the local police (67). As 
was noted above, this proved a decisive development in the 
breaking of social democratic hegemony, resulting eventually in 
the dispatch of outside police to Steyr. This set a precedent. 
Future militant protest against the appearance of the Heimwehr 
in Steyr 
potentially 
could easily result in the intervention of a 
unfriendly police force controlled by right wing 
politicians. Although some social democrats initially refused to 
renounce their confrontational stance (68), the social 
democratic movement by and large acquiesced. Social democratic 
stronghold mentality also collapsed once it was clear that the 
organisational basis of the movement's hegemony - the network -
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had crumbled. By mid-J{arch 1930, Heimwehr members were able to 
go about their business in Steyr openly and without interference 
(69). On 1st July the new federal police force took over in 
Steyr. In approving a mass rally of the Heimwehr on 31st August 
and effectively banning a planned counter-rally of the 
Sch"tzb"nd on the same day, it merely formalised the broken 
hegemony of the social democrats (70). 
This chapter has illuminated the preoccupation with 
organisation which was central to the social democratic ethos in 
Steyr. The powers and functions of individual centres of 
organisational strength in the movement were harnessed, 
channelled and reinforced through the network so that the 
strength of the whole of the network was far greater than the 
sum of the organisational strengths of the individual parts 
could ever have been. This concentration of organisational 
strength formed the basis of social democratic hegemony in the 
town. A key feature of the network was that, in many respects, 
its strength and influence served the material interests of the 
social democratic Inembership (e. g. the provision of employment, 
financial perks, "proletarian assurance" etc.). Inevitably, this 
materialistic emphasis invited the danger of attracting "fellow 
travellers·, opportunist instrumentalists with no more than a 
shallow material commitment to the movement. These were only 
"paper" members, whose coJnmitment disappeared immediately the 
network could no longer generate material benefits. The 
instrumentalists also contributed, via the passi vi ty of their 
corunitment, to the consolidation and ossification of the 
policies and position 
great significance in 
the leadership led 
of the movement's leadership. This took on 
the early 1930's when the inflexibility of 
to increasing dissatisfaction in the 
movement, and eventually to the crystallisation of an active and 
organised left wing opposition. A foretaste of this was given by 
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the temporary militancy of the Schutzbund and younger social 
democrats in late 1929/early 1930. 
The chapter has also shown how the successful pursuit of the 
social democratic preoccupation with organisation and the 
assertion of social democratic hegemony was conditional on the 
particular circumstance of the local milieu in the late 1920' s. 
Vi thout the boom at the Steyr-Verke the social democrats would 
not have been able to consolidate and concentrate their 
organisational strength or, therefore,. to establish their local 
hegemony. This point is underlined by the rapidity with which 
the network and social democratic hegemony disintegrated after 
the shutdown of car production at the Steyr-Verke in August 
1929. The efficacy of the social democratic preoccupation with 
organisation was contingent on local economic prosperi tYi it was 
thus inherently flawed and unreliable as means to serve social 
democratic interests consistently and effectively. However, as 
discussed in the following chapter, the preoccupation became 
more and more engrained as the single tactic of an increasingly 
inflexible party leadership. 
Nevertheless, the hegemony of the social democrats in the 
late 1920's, however impermanent its foundations, blatantly 
contradicted the broader trend in Austria towards the 
predominance of the Right and the increasing subordination of 
social democracy. The social democrats in Steyr remained 
impervious to this trendi they were insulated by the stronghold 
mentality which was central to their ethos. This mentality 
ensured that national developments had little resonance in 
Steyr, whereas local events had supreme importance. The 
Heimwehr's challenge to social democratic hegemony in late 
1929/early 1930 was thus, initially at least, vigorously 
rejected. However, even the energetic defiance 
this mentality could not forever ignore the 
encouraged by 
fact that the 
collapse of the Steyr-Werke had undermined the basis of social 
democratic hegemony. By the spring of 1930, the Heimwehr 
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challenge was successful. At this point, the social democrats 
found themselves newly realigned with the national trends from 
which they had previously been insulated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARTY STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICS OF THE SDAP. 
This chapter contends that the internal structure of the 
SDAP in Steyr was a major determinant of the political strategy 
of the social democratic movement. In the 1920' s, the party 
structure became increasingly bureaucratic and ossified. It was 
governed by a strong sense of hierarchy and discipline and was 
devoid of any meaningful democratic input either from ordinary 
members or from the ranks of the party activists. The party was 
dominated by a 5mall, unchallenged leadership elite, which, 
annually confirJlled in its position as if by right, remained 
virtually unchanged throughout the period under examination. In 
this position, the leadership e11 te developed an attitude which 
increasingly saw the extension and consolidation of the 
organisation as self-justification, as their primary political 
concern. The activist melnbers of the SDAP were similarly imbued 
with a passion far organisation. Their energies were fully 
consumed in the petty, administrative tasks necessary for the 
smooth running of the organisation. Organisational work became 
the centrepoint of their lives; far the activists too, 
organisation became an end in itself. 
Thus bath the party leaders and activists had a fetish for 
organisation for its own sake. This had profound implications 
far the nature and flexibility of the party strategy. The size 
and welfare of the organisation became the raison d' et re of 
political life. The organisation was therefore never to be 
jeopardised, it had always to be preserved and consolidated. 
This was reflected in prudent, moderate policies and a tactical 
caution which rej ected innovation and relied on established 
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methods and practices. One of the major themes in the remainder 
of this study is the caution and inflexibility of social 
democratic pOlicy and tactics in Steyr in the early 1930' s. 
This chapter seeks to establ ish that this caution and 
inflexibility dedved from the nature of the party structure in 
Steyr. 
The internal structure of the SDAP in Steyr is examined 
below in a critical comparison with the theories of Robert 
Kichels as set out in his seminal work on the sociology of 
poli tical parties (1). Michels' work concerned the nature of 
expanding andlor large-scale organisations. He suggested that 
any expanding organisation will inevitably develop an unwieldy 
bureaucratic structure, dominated by an oligarchy with a fetish 
for organisation for its own sake. As has been argued 
throughout this study, the social democrats in Steyr had a 
basic preoccupation with the expansion of the movement's 
organisational infrastructure. This preoccupation reflected the 
nature of the social democratic ethos in Steyr. The expansion 
of organisational strength was the insular reaction of a 
movement isolated within a hostile social and political 
environment; it was a means to underline the nature of Steyr as 
a stronghold of social democracy set wi thi n a region dominated 
by the Right. Since the fundamental orientation of the social 
democratic ethos in Steyr was directed towards organisational 
expansion, it is argued that the SDAP was especially prone to 
conform to the syndrome discussed by IUchels. 
Michels was convinced of the inevitability of oligarChical 
rule in any expanding organisation. He held that as the scale 
of an organisation expands, it becomes impossible for every 
member to be able to oversee all its activities. A division of 
labour and specialisation of function become a technical 
necessity. 
with the 
Representatives of 
direction of the 
the membership are thus entrusted 
organisation. An organisational 
hiet-archy of directors and ordinary members is created, which 
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can become more and "ore complex as functions are sub-divided 
and specialisations narrowed as the organisation expands. A 
bureaucratic superstructure develops, which wrests effective 
control of the organisation away from the ordinary members. 
Every division of labour represents a dimunitioll of the control 
of the membership, and by implication, an accession of power 
for those performing the specialised functions: 
The more extended and the more ramified the official 
apparatus of the organisation the less efficient 
becomes the direct control exercised by the rank and file, 
and the more is this control replaced by the increasing 
power of connni t tees (2). 
In theory, those delegated by the membership of a political 
party to direct the organisation are usually subj ect to the 
criticism and democratic control exercised by the membership. 
In practice, the ordinary members are incompetent; they do not 
possess the specialised knowledge and expertise needed to be 
able to criticise and control. Furthermore, with each division 
of labour and each incremental specialisation, the delegates, 
or leaders, become more and more indispensable. There are only 
d limited number of people able to perform specialised 
functions, so that ultimately, the party cannot do without the 
leaders: 
This special competence, this expert knowledge, which the 
leader acquires in matters inaccessible, or almost 
inaccessible to the mass. gives him a security of tenure 
which conflicts with the essential principles of democracy 
(3). 
In other words, no matter what formal arrangements are 
provided for the election and re-election of the leaders, their 
indispensability will automatically secure for them an 
indefinite tenure. This, and the inability of the rank and file 
to criticise and control the leadership must mean that 
inner-party democracy is a sham. There is a fundamental 
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incompatibility between the specialisation of function and 
hierarchy inherent in any large-scale organisation and 
effective democratic control. Inner-party power is concentrated 
firmly and uncontrollably in the hands of the leadership. 
Having attained this position of power, Michels asserts, 
the party leader undergoes a "psychological metamorphosis" (4). 
He who has attained power "will not readily be induced to 
return to the comparatively obscure position which he formerly 
occupied" (5). The consciousness of power encourages vanity and 
greed, which is reflected in the attempt to consolidate and 
extend further the basis of that power. T;'is inclod"s the 
accumulation of various party fULlcti.O:1G ~.l!:d tL~ attempt t'J gi vc:-
the party orgtl.:!.::.is.::::ti:;::. ..;,.n :"ler wider base and an ever 
il~C! 8dsin3 sph..::re of influunce. New paths of act! vi ty are 
opcned and pursued with vigour and new specialisations are 
taken on. In the process, sight of the "immortal principles" of 
socialism is lost, and the "fanatical advocates of the 
organisational idea" become "stuck in a purely bureaucratic 
mode of thought, with no insight into wider political concerns" 
(6) • 
The party leader/bureaucrat also tends to identify his own 
interests with those of the party organisation; the fanatic of 
organisation takes on the attitude of "k parti c' est mo1!' (7). 
This fusion of party interest and self-interest is furthered by 
the material dependence of many of the leaders, increasingly 
employed by the party, on the organisation. The leaders become 
highly conservative in an organisational sense; the 
organisation is the party's and their primary concern and must 
therefore never be endangered in any way. This is reflected in 
the political arena by policies of prudence, caution and 
responsibility, of piecemeal, incremental reform. Hichels 
concluded: 
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The party becomes increasingly inert as the strength of its 
organisation grows; it loses its revolutionary impetus, 
becones sluggish, not in respect of action alone, but also 
in the sphere of thought. More and nore tenaciously does 
the party cling to what it calls the 'ancient and glorious 
tactics', the tactics which have led to a continued 
increase in nembership. J(ore and 1ll01-e invincible be,comes 
the aversion to all aggressive action (8). 
The value of using lUchels' views of the party organisation 
as a franework for this chapter is that he describes a real 
situation which bears many simlari ties to that within the 
party organisation in Steyr. Kichels' theories are developed 
from the situation he observed in the German SPD from around 
1890 to 1915 (with less frequent references to other socialist 
partit!s in the same time period). He thus differs from the 
other major socialist theorists of the party organisation 
(Lenin, Luxemburg, Gramsci etc. (9», who took a prescriptive 
orientation. They put forward what they would ideally like to 
see in the organisation of the party. Their outlook was 
optinistic, suggesting alterations or improvements in the way 
the party organisation, especially its leadership, should be 
conceived, in order to ensure the development towards 
"revolution". lHchels was essentially peSSimistic and was 
unconcerned to suggest improvelnents. He chose to describe what 
already existed and to claim a universal validity for these 
findings excessive, cunbersome bureaucracy and the 
inevitabili ty of oligarchical rule. He describes an attitude 
which elevates the "organisation" from a means to an end, while 
on the other hand, the "idea" or "ilmnortal principles" of 
socialism are relegated in favour of a tactical caution which 
relies on tried and trusted methods. This chapter proposes that 
the SDAP in Steyr conformed to this model and seeks to 
establish that the caution and inflexibility of the party 
derived from oligarchical and bureaucratic tendencies similar 
to those described by Michels. 
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4.1: Hierarchy and Democracy in the SDAP. 
The SPAP in Steyr waS an organisation of considerable size 
and diverse function. It could rely on around 60% of the votes 
at. elections and was the ruling party in Steyr's town council. 
Apart from its municipal poliCies and responsibilities, the 
town council majority played a major role in the social 
democratic network, as discussed in the last chapter. The SDAP 
waS also the centrepoint of a district organisation with 
thirty-seven sections and almost 10,000 melJ1bers in Steyr and 
the surrounding v~l1ages in the late 1920' s (10), and had a 
supervisory role with regard to the various local social 
democratic aUXiliary organisations. The scale of the 
organisation is reflected in a basic, hierarchical division of 
labour in the formal party structure; it had three levels: 
section, activist meetings/conferences and district 
organisation. The district organisation represented not only 
the town, but also the social democratic sections in the nearby 
villages. In practice though, it was dominated by the ni ne 
party sections in Steyr itself (11), which comprised around 
5,000 melJ1bers in the late 1920's. 
At section level, the level of the ordinary, non-activist 
melJ1ber, there was a continuous round of organisational, 
informational and educational meetings and events as well as 
some light entertainment. Section life was organised by a 
network of petty activists, who were responsible for basic 
administrati ve tasks such as advertiSing lJleetings, collecting 
subscriptions, hawking the party press etc. It is unclear 
exactly how many of these activists there were. An informed 
estimate would be 150 (12). These met regularly in general 
activist meetings and in the more exclusive conferences of the 
section leaders. 
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The sovereign body of the district party was the annual 
District Conference. This consisted of delegates from the party 
sections and auxiliary organisations and the whole district 
leadership. The conference annually elected the District 
Commi ttee which was responsible for the day-to-day running of 
the party and the co-ordination of the whole district's 
activities. The District Committee, consisting of around twenty 
social democrats, formed the top, and dominant level of the 
social democratic organisational hierarchy in Steyr. The formal 
structure of the party might seem to provide opportunity for 
influence to percolate up from the members and activists to the 
leaders. In reality though, the level of rank and file and 
activist participation in party affairs was low and the quality 
of this participation was limited. Power within the party was 
concentrated firmly in the hands of the district leadership. 
At section level, participation was not encouraged. After 
dispensing with administrative formalities at section meetings 
(minutes, financial report etc.), the assembled members were 
then lectured by one of the local party notables. There was not 
much room for creative discussion. As Josef Mayrhofer, member 
of the SDAP in the First Republic notes: "If it was a purely 
informative meeting, inspired by some current happening, then 
of course there waS not much discussion (13). In a survey of 
246 section meetings between 1928 and 1932, 155 or 63% of the 
lectures were of such an "informative" nature about some aspect 
of current affairs (14). The role of the member at a section 
meeting was purely receptive. He or she was there to hear and 
take in, but not to question what a representative of the 
leadership had to say. This was also the case at so-called 
"discussion evenings" in the sections. These were instituted to 
provide - according to the party newspaper - occasions when 
current events in politics, economics and social policy could 
be discussed in the intimate atmosphere of the section (15). 
The need for special discussion meetings implies <and confirms 
the above analysis) that normal section meetings were not 
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forums sui table for reasoned debate. However the discussion 
evenings were no improvement. They distinguished themselves 
from normal section meetings only in that the evening was begun 
and ended with some form of entertainment and that two party 
notables instead of one gave a lecture. The two lectures were 
then summarised by the section leader. At no pOint were 
contributions from the floor sought or encouraged (16). 
Discussion evenings and 
disciplining agenCies, 
section meetings 
directed not 
alike were inner-party 
at increasing popular 
participation, but at instilling in the rank and file the views 
and outlook of the party leadership. At the basic level of the 
party, conformity, rather than diversity of opinion, was 
encouraged. 
In 1929 the style of party meetings was attacked (for the 
first and only time). Under the Stel'rer Tagblatt headline: "An 
End to Boring Meetingsl " , a functionary suggested a new format 
for social democratic meetings in an attempt to stimulate 
greater interest among the members (17). He proposed a much 
less formal type of meeting, abandoning a fixed agenda and 
long, "dry" reports and lectures for breVity, humour and 
entertainment. The official party response in the Stel'rer 
IaghJaj;j; vehemently rejected such innovation. The writer 
(presumably the editor, Josef Kirchberger, a member of the SDAP 
District Committee) emphaSised the necessity and superiority of 
the established meetings forlDdt in candid. and, for the purposes 
of this thesis, instructive terns. In his eyes, social 
democratic meetings bore the major responsibility for the rise 
and successes of the SDAPj they were, he continued, the most 
effective means of proletarian education and enlightenment and 
promoted class consciousness, "iron discipline" and 
"unconditional solidarity and party loyalty" (18). 
In other words, party meetings were conceived of as a means 
to educate the rank and file to the qualities of unity and 
discipline. They were not thought of as a means by which to 
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assess and take account of rank and file opinion in the 
development of party policies. The virtues Kirchberger 
mentioned - unity and discipl1ne - were furthermore reiterated 
and reemphasised constantly in the rhetoric of the SDAP in 
Steyr. Any challenge posed to the party - e.g. the German 
Gymnastics Festival of 1928, the Heimwehr campaign in Steyr in 
1929-1930 and the surges in local communist strength in 1931 
and national socialist strength after 1932 - was met by calls 
for discipline, solidarity and unity (19). The emphasis on 
inner-party discipline was accentuated by repeated rhetorical 
recourse to militaristic terminology: the youth movement was 
the "cadet school of the party"; the tasks facing the party 
necessi tated a "well-drilled and disciplined army of 
functionaries"; the activist dues collectors were the "unknown 
soldiers in the posi tiollal war of the proletariat, who 
conscientiously collected month after month the ammunition for 
the great army of class warriors". (20). The emphasis on 
discipline generally and the allusions to mi 11 tary discipline 
in particular reinforce the impression of a local party which 
functioned according to the dictates of the top of its 
hierarchy. At section level there was certainly no democratic 
input; section life was directed towards the dissemination from 
above of information and discipline. 
The social democratic activist in Steyr had a far greater 
intensity of involvement in party life than the ordinary, 
non-activist member. There were far more meetings of the 
activists than of the ordinary members. These were on the whole 
of three types: meetings of individual section cOmmittees, 
district-wide activist assemblies and district conferences of 
section leaders only. Meetings of the section committees 
reflected the nature of acti vist work in the sections and 
concentrated exclusively on organisational matters. The 
district level activist gatherings had a wider remit, taking in 
not only organisational matters but also current political 
events and trends and local municipal politics. Meetings 
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concerning the latter two subject areas were however, as at 
section level, characterised by the domination of proceedings 
by representatives of the district leadership and by the lack 
of creative input by the other participants. The function of 
the activists was either to agree to and thereby legi ti:mate 
municipal policies already decided at higher level (21) or to 
receive tactical instructions (22). 
Only in petty inner-organisational matters did the 
activists respond - with some vigour - to the suggestions of 
the local leadership (23). This was a pattern repeated at the 
annual District Conferences and reflects, in Michelsian terms, 
the bureaucratic nature of the party: as the scale of the party 
organisation and the division of labour increased, specialised, 
inner-organisational tasks were delegated to the activist 
n8twork. The activists, as will be seen in section 4.3 below, 
were totally preoccupied with these tasks. They were the 
archetypal "fanatical advocates of the organisational idea", 
with "no insight into wider political concerns" (24). 
The professed tasks of the District Conference were to 
review the previous year's work whilst at the same time 
discussing "thoroughly and profoundly" the tactical direction 
to be followed in the coming year (25). Not surprisingly, given 
the lack of inner-party discu6sion at section and functionary 
levels, the conferences did not even approach the fulfilment of 
these tasks. The review of the past year took the form of 
detailed reports by the Party Secretary. These reports were a 
dry, organisation by organisation guide to membership, the 
amount of meetings held etc. and refrained from any attempt to 
prescribe a futul-e course from past experience. What is more, 
they were accepted by the 150 or so assembled delegates 
uncri tically, without debate and even "with great satisfaction" 
(26). 
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There was no discussion of future tactics at the 
conferences. The debating energies of the conference delegates 
were fully consuJued in the discussion of internal 
organisational matters, usually concerning the setting of 
higher party subscription rates. The intensity and liveliness 
of these debates contrasted strongly with the usually receptive 
and reactive role of the party faithful. At the 1928 conference 
for example, some fourteen delegates, around one tenth of those 
present spoke in the annual subscriptions debate (2'1). The 
Ste)ITer TBgblatt saw such debates as an indication of "inner 
healthiness" and of the primacy of freedom of expression in the 
party (28). This view needs considerable qualification. The 
debates may have shown the undoubted healthiness of a strong 
organisational ethos in the SDAP, but this hardly equates with 
freedom of expression. 
below the leadership 
The range of topics freely discussed 
level of the SDAP was minimal. The 
majority of issues, especially those concerning the tactics and 
policies of the party in Steyr, were decided within the ranks 
of a limited leadership circle and then transmitted without 
contradiction to the rest of the party. The leadershIp was not 
under th~ t2ff.:ctive ..::cntyol of the p.:u·ty m83r:bersnip or even of 
the ~ctl\,Yists. Autb.8!~i·Cy in the party 1"lowed clearly from the 
'tup dcn·TrJ.',·/ard:3. 
ThIs compares closely with the analysis of Michels, who 
predicted a progressi ve dimuni ti on of the powers of the rank 
and file as functions were hierarchically divided and 
sub-divided. As functions became more and more specialised, the 
lower levels of the party hierarchy did not have the knowledge 
and expertise to exercise control over the leaders. The 
specialised knowledge of the activists in inner-organisational 
matters was perhaps an exception, but it was limited. Their 
knowledge did not extend to broader tactical or policy concerns 
and the ordinary, non-activist members were even worse placed. 
Inner-party decision-making power was concentrated firmly at 
the top of the party hierarchy. This situation was consolidated 
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both by the propagation of inner-party discipline, as discussed 
above, and by the developing indispensability of the leaders. 
The concentration of tactical and policy decision-making in the 
hands of the leadership had the inevitable corollary that the 
leaders were the only party members qualified to make tactical 
and policy decisions, and thus to lead the party. The lack of a 
credibly qualified alternative ensured the existence of a 
stable and unchanging leadership with potentially unlimited 
tenure. 
Although the District Conference annually elected the 
lnembers of the higher party committees, the elections had no 
more than a "rubber stamp" function. Between 1928 and 1933, 
there was no instance of contr·oversy in the elections. No 
candidate~ put themselves forward to challenge the incumbents; 
the official slate of candidates, put forward by the conference 
elections committee, was the only slate to vote on. This was 
either accepted by acclamation or with a unanimous vote. 1928 
provides the exception, when some of those on the official list 
attracted "only" an overwhelming majority of the votes cast 
(29). The elections were not elections in a competitive sense, 
but existed to confirm and legitimate the authority of the 
established local leadership. As a result, the membership of 
the District Committee remained highly stable. Table 6 shows 
that the only changes in the membership of the "inner" District 
Commi ttee between 1928 and 1933 were a formal alternation of 
the two luminaries of the women's organisation, Erna Schwitzer 
and Fanny Pammer, and the departure (death?) of Franz Huber. 
The membership of the "outer" committee of ordinary and 
supervisory members was only slightly less ossified. 
Power in the SDAP in Steyr was thus concentrated very 
firmly in the hands of the leadership elite of the party. The 
leaders were secure and unchallenged in their positions; they 
presided over a hierarchical, highly disciplined party 
structure, with no real democratic content. Having said that, 
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it is doubtful whether many in the party actually desired any 
real level of democracy in inner-party affairs. Kichels noted 
that the majority of party members in the pre-war SPD was 
completely indifferent to decisions the party might make; they 
voluntarily renounced their formal democratic rights (30). And 
in his examination of the organisation of the Austrian SDAP, 
Peter Kulemann makes the point that, as a mass party, it 
theoretically accepted anyone as a member as long as he or she 
was prepal'ed to pay party dues (31). Entrance into the party 
does not automatically equate with a commitment to participate 
and demand an active role in the party deciSion-making process. 
This is especially pertinent in Steyr because of the existence 
- as established in the previous chapter - of such a large 
instrumentally motivated lUelQbership in the social democratic 
movelQent. !{any party members joined not out of political 
commitment or the desire to help formulate party policies, but 
for basic reasons of personal, material interest. These party 
members were simply not interested in inner-party democracy. 
They were essentially passive and indifferent to political 
issues in the party. This helped, in a negative sense, to 
legi timate the authority of the leadership and reduced the 
pottmtial for opposition within the party. The instrumentalists 
thus further secured the dominant position of the party 
leaders. 
4.2: The Nature of the party Elite. 
The party e11 te in Steyr consisted of the twenty or so 
members of the District Committee in Steyr. As Michels 
suggested, the elite had a highly developed organisational 
mentality. It sought to extend both its own power base within 
the party and social democratic movement as well as the general 
sphere of influence of the party in the town. According to the 
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party's annual report of 1928: "The roagic word for all progress 
is organisation!" (32). Organisational advance was the raison 
d',are of the party elite. Because of its dominant position in 
the party, this was naturally reflected in the political 
outlook of the party as a whole. The social democrats in Steyr 
followed a politics of "small steps", or "partial achievements" 
(33). Advances should be made where possible, but under no 
circumstances should they b" detrimental to the organisation. 
Although any verification or rejection of a Hichelsian 
"psychological metamorphosis" of the party leaders is difficult 
to establish, there is evidence to suggest that the party elite 
had a certain "greed" for power. The eH te was cOllcerned to 
broaden its inner-organisational power base where possible. 
This was achieved primarily by an accumulation of functions, 
either vertically in the party, or horizontally in the town 
hall, the J~AV or other social democratic organisations. Of the 
members of the District Committee in 1932, only one, to my 
knowledge, held no other social democratic office at the time; 
the remainder held at least two and usually more. This was, in 
part, a result of the elite's Jnonopolisation of delegated 
positions in higher party bodies by mutual nomination. This was 
certainly the case for delegates to the Upper Austrian and 
national party conferences. These were elected at the District 
Conference (unanimously, as was the practice) "according to the 
proposal" made by a member of the District Committee (34). 
Other accumulated functions reflected the individual's "career" 
in the party. Julius Ruj3mann, for example, was a "local 
statesman", whose various functions derived from his membership 
of the town council (see Figure 3). August Moser on the other 
hand (Figure 4) was primarily a trade unionist, and Franz 
Sichlrader's interests were fairly evenly spread (Figure 5). 
The party elite sought to "collect" functions and the 
power aesociated with them. This indicates that the members of 
the elite received some kind of personal, psychological benefit 
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from performing the functions and exercising the power. If this 
is so, the implication is that the level of personal benefit 
received was related to the extent and health of the 
organisation and the number of functions available. The party 
elite thus developed a narrow, bureaucratic, organisational 
mentality which identified personal interest with the interests 
of the party organisation. The identification of self-interest 
with party interest was intensified by the IMterial dependence 
of most of the elite on the social democratic movement. Of the 
twenty-three members of the District Committee in 1932, sixteen 
were in a job directly or indirectly dependent on local social 
democracy (see Table 7). Two, Vitzany, the local M.P., and 
Sichlrader, Steyr' s :mayor, owed their existences to social 
democratic votes. Five were employees of social democratic 
organisations (Tribrunner, Klement, Kirchberger, Heu:mann and 
DreJ31) and another five had passed through the MAV's 
recruitment veto at the Steyr-Werke (Schrangl, Maser, Schopper, 
Sperl and Sieberer). Ferdinand Mayrhofer was an employee of the 
municipality and the three teachers Roithner, Azwanger and 
Schwitzer worked under the administration of the social 
democratic town hall maj ori ty. The material existence of these 
sixteen party leaders was lal'gely dependent 011 the existence of 
the organisation. Because its personal interests were 
intertwined with the successful development and continued 
existence of the organisation, the party ell te tended towards a 
phlegmatic organisational conservatism. 
The organisational mentality and conservatism of the ell te 
was expressed in several ways. It promoted, for example, "a 
tendency towards an exclusive and all-absorbing speCialisation" 
to the detriment of an awareness of wider political concerns 
(35). Franz Sichlrader, mayor of Steyr and holder of the 
finance portfolio in the town hall, presents for the impression 
of total self-immersion in the particular problems and details 
of municipal finance. Sichlrader was the author of numerous 
articles on Steyr's financial situation in the local press and 
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national journals. He gave many speeches on the subject in the 
council chamber and. the Upper Austrian I.Bndtag, and was 
involved 
Austrian 
in regular 
and federal 
financial discussions 
governmen ts (S6) . 
with 
Anton 
the Upper 
Azwanger, 
vice-IDayor after 19S0, had a simi lar preoccupation with his 
municipal welfare portfolio (S7>. Party leaders were immersed 
in tl,e technicalities of their respective organisational 
fields. They tended therehy to lose sight of wider issues and 
to develop a narrow-minded and rigid outlook, lodged in the 
perceived 
functiolls. 
importance of their particular organisational 
Organisational 
reflected strongly 
mental! ty and conservatism was also 
in the reports prepared by the full-time 
Party Secretary and Deputy Treasurer on the District Committee, 
Karl Klement, and given to the annual District Conference. In 
the late 1920's, a period of growth for the social democratic 
movement, these were punctuated with calls to develop, extend, 
consolidate and intensify the organisation and to preserve any 
advances that had been made (38). In tlle decline of the 1930' s, 
the elDphasis changed towal'ds attempting to establish 
Ullcollvincingly the general strength of attachment and 
commi tment to the organisation and towards making good any 
losses (39) (made largely, it must be assumed, by widespread 
defections of instrumentalists). lIbatever the background 
condi tiOlls, the organisation was always the centrepoint of the 
elite's considerations. A quote from Klement's 1928 report 
depicts this attitude: 
The more solidly we build up the organisations of the 
proletariat, the better each individual is integrated, the 
stronger we are, the better we can gather together the 
revolutionary energy and creative forces of the Austrian 
proletariat into a unified will (40). 
It is instructive that at no point in the report did 
Klement elaborate on the goals to be striven for by the 
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"unified will" which would develop frolll stronger organisation. 
His "revolutionary" and "creative" phraseology was elllpty 
rhetoric. The sincerity of his report lay in the professed 
desire to build up the organisation. Organisation had become 
self-justification. The party elite was relllote from what 
Kichels called the "immortal principles" which guided the 
social democratic movement in its early days. It was distracted 
by its lnaterial dependence Oil the movement, the 
per50nal/psychological bellefi ts gained from exercising party 
functions and its narrow and bureaucratic functional 
specialisations. Organi5ation was llO longer a means by which 
the "immortal principles" would be realised; it had become an 
end in itself for the party elite. 
The party elite's preoccupation with extending and/or 
defending the party organisation was reflected in the wider 
political strategy of social delnocracy in Steyr. Overall 
political advance was equated directly with organisational 
advance. This notion had practical local relevance in the late 
1920's in the form of the network. The exploitation of fruitful 
avenues of organisational influence in the Steyr-Werke and the 
municipality created a unique situation of localised social 
democratic hegemony. Although this situation was only 
temporary, and conditional on an extraordinary up5wing at the 
Steyr-Werke, it provided local evidence of the potential 
success of a strategy of incremental organisational advance. 
This potential provides 
the elite adhered to 
1930' s. 
one reason for the tenacity with which 
this organisational strategy in the 
In broader terms, the elite had a very mechanistic 
conception of political power: it held that the SDAP would 
gradually evolve into power as the social democratic melllbership 
and voters approached the critical point of 51% of the 
electorate. After the April 1927 federal elections, which saw 
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the SDAP's national vote increase from 39.6% to 42.3%, this 
conception was clearly defined: 
An intensi ve recruitment of new members and subscribers to 
our press must be begun, so we can achieve at future 
elections that which was not yet possible in the election 
campaign which has just finished (41). 
Isolated wi thi n the local milieu and insulated from broader 
poll tical trends in Austria, the social democrats in Steyr 
persisted in directing their activities towards expanding their 
electoral base, in preparation for the final victory they 
confidently expected, the conquest of power in the state (42). 
The recruitment of new social democrats - usually particular 
target groups like womell, slllall businessmen, female youth, 
rural youth or the rural population in general (43) - was the 
centrepoint of local social democratic activity. Every new 
vote, every new member, every new mandate etc. was regarded as 
a step towards ultimate political power in Austria. This notion 
was seemingly validated as the SDAP's national vote gradually 
increased. A premium was thus placed On the sheer size of the 
organisation. The larger the organisation, the nearer were the 
social democrats, by implication, to power in the state. 
In this sense, the SDAP in Steyr was a microcosm of the 
party at national level. The national party aimed to see the 
whole of a broadly defined (44) Austrian working class 
organised in the party. This it sought to do by widening the 
appeal of the party, especially ln relation tQ the peasantry 
and tile r~.i.igi!Jus ele<..:tordte (45). Tbe natiQl1al party had a 
distin.ct. fixdt:ion \i.i th its upwl1l'd electoral fI trend" in its 
., search for maj ori ty" 
anything which went 
(46), and a 
beyond this 
distinct antipathy for 
essentially moderate, 
evolutionary strategy for power. Kulemann notes in this respect 
that the national party leadership "put the brakes on" whenever 
mili tant or radical tendencies gained influence in the SDAP 
(47). He attributes this to a conservative tendency in the 
"party 
party 
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bureaucracy" or eH te at national level. 
structure was, like the local level 
The national 
in Steyr, 
characterised by a lack of inner-party democracy and an 
ossified leadership group, virtually unchanged since the end of 
the First World War. This group enjoyed its formative political 
experiences before the war, at a time when the SDAP was making 
slow, but seemingly irrepressible progress (48). As a result: 
They tended especially to view the further expansion of the 
party and its structure, the occupation of public offices 
and the winning of positions of power in society as 
laboriously achieved successes. Because of this, they also 
tended ... to conservatism with regard to organisation and 
tactics (49). 
Furthermore, the natiollal party elite was dependent on the 
party organisation, both in lnaterial terms and ill terms of 
prestige. This reinforced a conservative mentality which 
subordinated the quest for new achievements to the defence of 
what already existed (50). This became most evident during the 
Dollfujl dictatorship, when the lIatiollal leaderShip sought to 
appease Dollfujl in a fruitless attempt to preserve the 
remailling achievements of the republic and of "Red Vienna" 
(51) • 
The party elite in Steyr was bound by a similar obsession 
to defend existing achievemellts at all costs. Aftel' the network 
collapsed in the wake of the Stel'r-Werke in late 1929/early 
1930, this obsession became particularly acute, as the eH te 
had by then little left to COli serve but the core party 
organisation. Its overriding concerll was to avoid any 
controversy which might be detrimental to part of, or even the 
whole organisation. This first became apparent late in 1929, 
when the Heimwehr was trying to establish a foothold in "red" 
Steyr. On the one hand, confrontation with the Hei mwebr was 
encouraged on the streets of Steyr. This was "safe", because 
the municipal police force could be relied upon to favour the 
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social democrats. On the other hand, when the Heimwehr held 
parades in nearby villages, or when it was merely travelling 
through Steyr, the party leadership advised the avoidance of 
confrontation (52). In these situations, security was the 
responsibility of the provincial gendarmery, a fOI'ce broadly 
sympathetic to the Heimwebr. Any confrontation with the 
H"irnwehr under these circumstances would likely develop into a 
confrontation with armed and unfriendly gendarmes. The 
intervention of Sichlrader to prevent the SchlltzbllDd 
confronting the He! llIwehr in Steyr on 2nd February 1930 (see 
Chapter Three) must be seen in the same light. A clash between 
the two paramilitary forces might have been put down with force 
by the outside police presence, whose right wing tendencies 
would ensure that the social democrats bore the brunt of their 
illtercessi on. 
The social democratic leadership would Dot risk bringing 
the wrath of the state down on the party organisation. Party 
discipline, • the strongest dam, the safest stronghold of the 
proletariat" becalne increasingly important in "preventing the 
'wild', one-off actions of formless groups" (53). This was 
especially so after the permanent installation of a strong, 
anti-social democratic federal police force in Steyr in July 
1930. Thereafter, the party leadership was to issue the order: 
"Do not let yourselves be provoked!" with monotonous regularity 
when faced by controversy in the politically tense atmosphere 
of the 1930' s. Faced by the provocations of the Heimwehr and 
increasingly repressive central governments, the social 
democrats withdrew timidly into their organisational shell, 
aVOiding any confrontation which might daJnage the organisation. 
Even after the fundamental changes in the local political 
framework which took place in 1929-1930, the activities of the 
SDAP remained much as before. Efforts were still directed 
towards the recruitment of new members in an effort to win an 
electoral majority. During the November 1930 federal elections 
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campaign for example, a few days after social democratic 
buildings in Steyr had been officially searched for weapons for 
the first time, the workers were advised to maintain discipline 
and calm and not to provide any excuse for the intervention of 
the executive: "All our forces must be gathered for the 9th 
November [election dayl, so we are able then to give the 
goverment the right answer" (54). The elite adhered adamantly 
to a politics of persuasion, an attempt to amass enough social 
democratic support to gain influence over the state. 
were enthusiastically collected in support of 
Signatures 
initiative 
legislation drawn up by the national SDAP on social insurance 
In 1930 (55). The coincident 1931 Landta& and municipal 
elections were approachtld with an unusual vigour (56) as was a 
recrui tn.ent drive in October 1932 (57), which was held with the 
following aims in mind: 
Every party comrade is to win a new fellow fighter! A 
batall iOIl of social democratic party members ... means a 
regiment of social democratic voters. And many social 
democratic voters mean successful defence against reaction, 
protection of the achievements of the revolution and a 
better future for the workers of Austria: Socialism! (58). 
Admirable though the commitment of the Steyr party elite to 
the democratic electoral process may have been, it was no 
longer attuned to the Realpolitik of Austria in the 1930' s. The 
Austrian Right had been committed to the abandonment of the 
republican constitution of 1919 at least since the late 1920's. 
The preference was for an authoritarian, corpol'a t i st 
alternative derivtld from catholic social theory. This, of 
cout'se, left no room for the class-oriented poU tics of the 
SDAP. In March 1933, the aims of the Right approached fruition, 
as Chancellor Dollfuj3 by-passed parliamentary rule and began to 
govern by emergency decree. The SDAP - in Steyr as at national 
level had lost the democratic arena to which its whole 
outlook and activity was directed. As Otto Leichter points out, 
as long as the Austrian Right adhered to the democratic 
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constitution, the SDAP had a reasonable chance of defending its 
achievements. Its tactics had developed within and were best 
suited to a relatively open democracy. However, as soon as the 
governments of the Right abandoned competi ti ve parliamentary 
politics for authoritarianism and dictatorship, the SDAP was 
"last" : 
For the semi-visible battleground of illegality, of half 
and three-quarters fascism requires forces different from 
those the mass party would have been able to deploy in the 
bright light of democracy (59). 
The strategy of the party elite in Steyr was increasingly 
outmoded in the 1930' s. Its mechanistic conception of political 
pow"r and adherence to tried and trusted political methods were 
exposed as indequate i n th~ struggle to maintain past 
achievements in the face of a dominant, authoritarian Right. As 
at national level, the local party was afflicted by an 
inflexibility of tactic and a rigidity of response to the new 
background conditions clf the 1930' s. The eH te' s evolutionary 
strategy, conditioned by its preoccupation with organisation, 
was established decisively during the 1920's. Its apparent 
success in the insulated environment of the local milieu -
steady electoral adlTance and the local hegemony derived from 
the network - gave ita legitimacy which, in the absence of 
inner-party democracy, remained unchallenged. The elite's 
strategy became just as engrained, ossified and 
institutionalised as the elite itself. As discussed above, the 
eli te' 5 self-interest was identified with the interests of the 
party organisation. The overtly organisational strategy the 
elite followed - expansion in the favourable circumstances of 
the 1920' s, defence and preservation in the 1930' s - was 
logically self-serving. It would not be changed as long as the 
e11 te retained the psychological and material benefits derived 
from its position at the head of the party. 
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But the strategy followed by the party e11 te was a patent 
failure in the 1930' s. Neither was the rise of the right 
stellllned, nor was the social democratic organisation 
successfully preserved: membership in the SDAP slipped from 
around 5,000 in 1928-1929 to a mere 3,737 in 1931 (60). It is 
thel'efore not surprising that an opposition faction emerged in 
the Inovement in Steyr between 1930 and 1933, which rejected the 
established strategy of the party el1 te. This faction drew on 
dissatisfaction among the ranks of the MAV, the Schutzbund and 
the social democratic youth. Although the leaders of the 
faction were, to some extent, prominent party figures, the 
opposition was centred outside the party. Explicit inner-party 
oppositIon reJnained minimal. A partial explanation for this 
lies in the strict inner-party discipline propagated by the 
el1 te. Hare significant though is the nature of the activist 
caste in the SDAP in Steyr. 
4.3: The llablte Of tJle Party Act,iyists. 
As the party expands, a group of active Jnembers is drawn in 
to perform tasks which are relatively I~nial, but indispensable 
for the smooth functioning of the organisation. They form a 
layer in the hierarchical party bureaucracy between the leaders 
and the rank and file, non-activist members. In Steyr, as 
elsewhere (61), the activists were highly conscious of their 
status as a differentiated caste within the party organisation. 
There was all explicit inner-party demarcation between activists 
and ordinary members. Activists were privy to special "Activist 
Meetings" and there were also exclusive "Conferences" for the 
section leaders (62). Party "Schools" were set up for the 
training and education of the activists (63). And every year at 
the District COllference, the activists were singled out for 
special praise for their tireless and self-sacrificing work on 
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behalf of the party (64). In short, the activists were accorded 
a prestigious and respected rank within the party hierarchy. 
Michels attributed the decision to enter the party 
hierarchy and take on this prestigious rank to materialistic 
moti ves. Working within the socialist party offered the worker 
a chance to secure a rise not just in inner-party but also 
social status: "For an intelligent German workman there is 
hardly any other way which offers him such rapid opportunities 
of 'improving his condition' as service in the socialist army 
(65). Activist work was the first step towards a paid position 
in the party lead"rship or bureaucracy, the first step in 
leaving behind the proletarian lifestyle of the ·Jnanual worker 
and . becoming a "deproletarianised" member of the petty 
bourgeoisie. Work in the party bureaucl-acy raised the activists 
above their original social po si tion. Entry into the party 
llierarchy was therefore an aim of proletadan social ambition 
(66). 
In this respect, lofichels' iilldlysis is not applicable to the 
local party in Steyr. It has a highly matel'ialistic bias and 
neglects the more psychological factors he elsewhere finds 
ilDportant. Although the activist caste in Steyr did represent a 
recrui ting ground for the party leadership, this role was 
limited. In absolute terms there were relatively few leadership 
positions to rise into. The positions which existed were, in 
any case, largely unavailable due to the inertia of the 
leadership elite. Assuming though that the activists did have 
petty bourgeois aspirations, there was no guarantee that these 
would have been fulfilled even if they did eventually attain 
membership of t.he eli te. Of the Jnembers of the District 
Committee in 1932, only eight out of twenty-three (Witzany, 
Sichlrader, Mayrhofer, Tribrunner, Klement, Kirchberger, 
Heulllann and Drelll - see Table 7) 
considered higher on the social scale 
had jobs which might be 
than typical manual 
worki Dg class employment and which were also related to their 
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position in the social democratic movement. 
"Oeproletarianisation" and petty bourgeois aspirations in the 
party hierarchy were not significant phenomena in the SOAP in 
Steyr. 
Josef Buttinger provides d much 
interpretation of activist cOl.mi tl,ent in 
more convincing 
Austria. In his 
discussion of the hypothetical "Frau l{eier", the archetypal 
social democratic acti vi st, he assesses why the commitment of 
the activists to the SOAP remai ned so strong even after the 
dissolution of the party in February 1934 (67). For Frau Meier, 
the party was "home, fatherland and religion". She identified 
her life completely with that of the party. In doing so, she 
was able to feel as significant, respected and powerful as the 
party was. Her dedication to serving the (social democratic) 
community gave her a worthiness, importance and sense of 
purpose denied her in hel' normal daily life. Socialism for Frau 
;.reier was not a question of a utopian future society, but 
consisted of nothing more than her present life and work in the 
party. Her dctivist work did not bl'ing with it social mobility, 
but a sense of significance and self-importance unavailable 
elsewhere. This produced a tenacious adherence to the party as 
a centre of personal life. 
Sources of information on activist commitment in Steyr are 
limited. Josef Kayrhofer, social democratic youth activist in 
Steyr in the First Republic, provides an exception, asserting 
that the community spirit of party life was the major 
motivation for involvement (68). More broadly, social democrats 
in Steyr were dominated by the consciousness and experience of 
their isolation within a non-social democratic region. In this 
situation, it may be assumed that active involvement in party 
life (and that of other social democratio organisations - see 
Chapter Five) provided compensation and reassurance. Party work 
thus became, as for "Frau Meier" a focal point of daily life. 
It can therefore Le assumed that the .><:ti vists in Steyr largely 
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conformed to Buttillger's stereotype. Among the activists there 
"as therefore both a great personal satisfaction derived from 
working for the party and an intense self-identification with 
the party. Like the party elite, the activists received certain 
p"rsonal/psychological benefits from their role in the party. 
They too had something to conserve. They thus shared the 
organisational conservatism of the elite. 
The organisational conservatism of the activists in Steyr 
was accentuated by the type of tasks they carried out. They 
were charged with the maintenance and operation of the 
organisation: "The party organisation stood and fell with the 
activists and their enterprise" (69) • They provided essential 
contact between mass membership and the party. Party meetings 
were advertised personally by the activist network and party 
subscriptions 
perhaps Ueir 
were likewise personally collected. 
most crucial task. 'ii thout income, 
This was 
the party 
obviously could not exist. Great importance was thus lent to 
the work of the "sub-treasurers", the dues collecting activists 
(70). This is reflected in the intensity of debate on the level 
of subcriptions at the District Conference and at functionary 
meetings which was noted in Section 4.1. The activists were 
also responsible for h"wking the party press, recruiting new 
party members" at every possible opportunity and making sure 
that existing members remained in the party (';'1). They were 
experts in general inner-organisational affairs. The whole of 
their energy was consulned j n admi nistrati ve and organisational 
natters. 
This was what Otto Bauer characterised in a famous and 
influential speech in 1928 as "revolutionare Kleinarbeit" (72), 
literally "revolutionary work of minute detail". Bauer's 
terminology implied that every minute detail of activist work, 
every subscription, every new recruit etc., was a step towards 
"revolution", or, in less rhetorical terms, the ultimate 
electoral success of the Social Democratic Party. For the 
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activists too, organisational advance was directly equated with 
political advance. The strength of the organisation was 
directly related to the social democrats' perceived proximity 
to power. The act! vists shared not only the elite's 
organisational conservatism, but also its mechanistic 
conception of poll tical power. Both groups thus had a fetish 
for the extension, consolidation and preservation of the 
organisation. This identity of outlook, strengthened by the 
personal benefits activists and elite drew from the existence 
of the organisation, explain why protest over the inflexibility 
of party tactic in the 1930's did not originate from within the 
party hierarchy. 
The SDAP in Steyr was poH tically circumscribed by a fetish 
for organisation. The organisational preoccupation central to 
the social democratic ethos in Steyr was intensified by the 
organisational conservatism inherent in oligarchical rule, so 
that organisation was increasingly regarded as an end in 
itself. 
The nature of the party structure in Steyr largely 
conformed to the model elaborated by )!ichels. The party was 
dominated by an inert elite which was tied to a self-serving 
political strategy based in organisational advance. Its 
interests were equated with those of the organisation. The 
resul t was moderation and inflexibility. The eH te was 
dedicated to evolutionary organisational advance both in local 
and in national terms. In the unique local milieu of the 
1920's, when local economic boom was complemented by insulation 
from wider poH tical trends in Austria, this strategy seemed 
successful. Locally, 
provided . proof of 
electoral advance of 
network and social democratic hegemony 
its efficacy. Nationally, the steady 
the SDAP bore witness to the apparent 
correctness of the perpetual drive to recruit new members and 
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voters. The apparent success of the organisational strategy in 
the 1920' s promoted its institutionalisation. Under completely 
different local background conditions in the 1930' s - collapse 
in the local economy and realignment with national (Le. 
authoritariall and anti-social democratic) political trends -
the strat,~gy remain"d the sawe: "The sentiment of tradition, in 
cooperation with an instinctive need for stability, has as its 
resul t that the leadership represents always the past rather 
than the present" (73). 
Some reason for this may be provided by an understandable 
recourse to "tl'ied and trusted" methods in an era of upheaval. 
Xore pertinent is the fact that the organisational strategy 
served the personal interests of the party elite. They depended 
an the organisation for the personal benefits they received 
from the exercise of inner-party power and from employment by 
the party or related organisations. The inflexibility of the 
organisational strategy derived primarily from the 
organisational conservatism of a party elite whose interests 
were intertwined with those of the party organisation. This 
inflexibility was consolidated by the existence of an activist 
caste which had much the same preoccupation. The activists were 
"Frau Heiers"; the party and tr,eir petty organisational work 
were the centrepoint of their li ves. 
once again with party interest 
organisational conservatism. 
Personal interest merged 
and produced an deep 
The internal structural characteristics of the SDAP in 
Steyr produced a cautious, 
distinguished by an intense 
moderate and evolutionary outlook 
inflexibility. The implications of 
this outlook as regards social democratic strategy and the 
development of inner-movement opposition are assessed in 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SOCIAL DEXOCRATIC SUB-CULTURE. 
Excluding party and trade unions, there were over fifty 
other social democratic clubs and organisations in Steyr. The 
esti:ma.ted aggregate membership of these organisations is over 
20,000 (see Table 8). Although this figure obviously includes 
many multiple, overlapping memberships, it is quite clear that a 
great deal of social democratic energy waB expended on 
activities outside the realm of formal party politics and trade 
unionism. These are usually referred to as ·cultural" 
activities. ThiB is taken to mean not JUBt culture in its narrow 
sense of intellectual and artistic enlightenment, but also in 
the wider sense of the behavioural patterns of a specific social 
group, in this caBe the Bocial democrats. ThiB chapter iB based 
on the assumption that tbe nature of social democracy cannot be 
deduced solely from an examination of the social democratic 
party the trade unions, but that it was also derived from, and 
reflected in, the activities and values of these fifty plus 
"cuI tural" organisations. 
The chapter contends in particular that this sub-culture of 
social democratic organisations reflected the moderate, 
reformist Btrategy of social democracy in Steyr. As noted in the 
Introduction of this study, this strategy incorporated a strong 
commi tment to parliamentary democracy. The parliamentary 
political sYBtem of the repUblic was regarded, in an essentially 
evolutionary strategy, as a forum within which, over time and 
with a gradual electoral advance, social democratic aims could 
be realised. A critical examination of the sub-culture 
illustrates social democratic republican commitment both in the 
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conviction with which the anniversaries o:f the :founding o:f the 
republic were celebrated, and in the determination to de:fend, 
physically if necessary, the constitution of the republic. The 
social democratic strategy also incorporated a qualified 
acceptance of the Austrian social and economic order. While 
accepting the basic parameters of the existing order, the social 
democrats also rejected and sought to reform certain of its 
features. They thus had an ambivalent relationship to the 
existing order. The sub-culture provides ample evidence of this 
ambivalence. Certain elements were radically and consistently 
opposed to bourgeois-capital ist society, others conformed 
largely with existing norms, while others still took an 
intermediate position. 
As established 
Democratic Party in 
in the previous chapter, the 
Steyr became increasingly ossified 
Social 
in both 
its organisational structure and its tactical outlook. This 
became particularly apparent in the 1930' s. The innnobilisln ot 
the party provoked the development of a left wing, oppositional 
faction in the social democratic movement, which emerged as the 
decisive social democratio force in Steyr during 1933. the roots 
of this opposition derived partly - as is examined belm< - tram 
elements within the social democratic sub-culture. 
The pursuit of activities in the various cuI tural 
organisations served for many to breed a sense crt emotional 
securi ty based in the sol1dari ty of collective experience. Ihis 
was important in providing some compensation for the generally 
disadvantaged socio-economic position of the social democratic 
membership and in particular for the feelings of social and 
pou tical isolation inherent in the situation of the social 
democratic stronghold o:f Steyr within a rural and conservative 
region. However, the sheer organisational diversity of the 
sub-culture also encouraged Vereinsme1ere1, a "mania" for 
establishing and joining the proliferation of social democratic 
clubs. Energies were consumed in activities which did not 
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necessarily have anything to do with the political struggle of 
the social democratic movement. In this way, the sub-culture 
tended to distract from politics by further reinforcing the 
organisational preoccupations of the movement. It thus 
contri buted to the political inflexi hili ty of the movement and 
thereby to the development of opposition in the early 1930's. 
At this point, it is necessary to elaborate on exactly what 
is meant by the term "sub-culture". This study employs the 
typology developed by Dieter Langewiesche, who defines a 
sub-culture in its relation to the do~nant culture of a 
society. He sees the dominant culture as a system of mutually 
recognised and interlinked partial cultures, each reflecting the 
specific conditions of existence of different social groups. 
These partial cultures are fully integrated within the dominant 
culture. Their opposite is a counter-culture, which rejects the 
dominant culture in its entirety, and aims to replace it with a 
completely new form, in effect a new dominant culture. A 
sub-culture lies between the two extremes; it is a group culture 
which combines elements of conformity with others of opposition 
to the dominant culture (1). As noted above, the relationship of 
the soclal democratic cultural organisations to the existing 
ord"r of Austrian society, i. e. the dominant culture of that 
society, was ambivalent. This is typical, in Langewiesche's 
terJIB of a sub-culture. 
The analysis in this chapter is based upon the cultural 
organisations listed in Table 8 and consciously ",xclud"s 
detaU",d reference to the acti vi ties of Social Democratic Party 
and trade unions despite their undoubted influence on the 
'specific conditions of existence" of individual social 
democrats. Al though this distinction is therefore somewhat 
arbitrary it does reflect the differentiation made by leading 
social democrats in the First Republic between the political, 
trade union and cultural aspects of social democratic activity 
(3) • 
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The diversity and proliferation of these cultural 
organisations in Steyr is indicative of the attempts made by 
social democrats throughout Austria to demarcate as many 
acti vi ties undertaken by social democrats as possible from the 
influence of the dominant culture of Austrian society and to 
place them in an exclusively social democratic context. After 
its exit from coalition in 1920, the social democratic movement 
was isolated away from national political power. It was also 
denied the opportunity to wield any significant influence in the 
:management and direction of the economy by the failure of the 
1916-1919 revolution to effect any real change in the capitalist 
pattern of ownership of the means of production in Austria. The 
only practical opportunity for significant social democratic 
influence throughout Austria was the organisation of the free 
time and private lives of the membership (3). The SDAP sought 
therefore, convinced of a gradual, electorally-based return to 
political power in the near future, to build up among its 
followers an organised social democratic "state within the 
state" or sub-culture, which was intended both as a preview and 
as a nucleus of a future socialist society and culture (4). 
The dominant culture in Austria was highly conservative, 
based upon the values and institutions of a relatively backward, 
predominantly agricultural, capitalist economic system and of a 
reactionary Catholic Church which exerted great influence over 
Austrian state and society. The interests of Austrian capitalism 
and clericalism were bound together by a dual aversion to both 
the parliamentary-republ1can state form established after the 
First World War and the social democratic movement intimately 
associated with it (5). In political terms, this dominant 
culture was reflected in the position of the 
clericalist-conservative Christian Social Party as the :major 
force in the national government between 1920 and 1936. 
It was from this dominant anti-republican, capitalist and 
catholic-clericalist culture that the social democrats sought to 
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demarcate themselves. They sought to replace it with an 
alternative based around a commitment to the constitutional 
procedures of the republic and permeated with secular and 
collectivist values. The stimulus towards cultural demarcation 
was strengthened in Steyr by the status of the social democrats 
as a "ghetto· movement i their town was a "red" stronghold in a 
predominantly "black· region, whose piety and conservatism in 
many respects epitomised the dominant culture in Austria. This 
conditioned the emergence of a local ethos whose essence was an 
insular, inward-looking stronghold mentality. This not only 
underlay the development of the network (see Chapter Three), but 
also heightened the concern to demarcate the movement from 
outside influence. The cultural AhgrenzlIng (demarcation) 
attempted by the social democrats in Steyr thus had two motive 
forces. On the one hand they adhered to the broad cultural 
strategy of the Austrian SDAP which sought to create the nucleus 
of a future order within the existing one. On the other, 
Abgrenzung was also an instinctively defensive response to their 
social and political isolation, a reflex of their stronghold 
:mental! ty. 
Previous studies have tended to concentrate al:most 
exclusively on Vienna as an example of a demarcated social 
democratic sub-culture in Austria. These studies generally 
propose that the municipal policies of the social democrats in 
the Vienna town hall complemented and extended the cultural 
aspirations of the myriad social democratic cultural 
organisations to produce a near-complete "state within the 
state" (6). The preoccupation with Vienna has tended to obscure 
the fact that the social democrats in the provinces were also 
culturally active. Steyr in particular had certain unusual 
preconditions which were highly favourable for the development 
of a social democratic sub-culture. Foremost among these was the 
general status of the town as an isolated, encapsulated enclave 
of social democracy. Inaddi tion there were particularly dense 
concentrations of manual workers, the prime constituency of the 
-142-
SDAP in Steyr, in certain areas of the town: in the YehrgrabeD, 
around the network of streams and water channels which provided 
power for the early factories, and in the Ennsleite, an estate 
built next to the expanding Steyr-Yerke in the First World War, 
which was a particular stronghOld of car workers in the First 
RepubliC. These areas were 75-90% social democratiC in electoral 
terms (7) and represented ideal base for the development of a 
closed and demarcated sub-culture. 
This chapter examines the extent, 
implications of social democratic AbgreDzllng 
consistency and 
in Steyr from the 
dominant culture in Austria. In the first two sections, aspects 
of the sub-culture are discussed in their relationship to the 
dominant culture. In section 5.3, the effects of the social 
democratic cultural activity on the tactical flexibility of the 
social democratic movement are critically assessed. A constant 
concern is to draw out the implications arising from the 
commitment to Abgrenzllng in as far as they relate to the 
reformist strategy of the movement, as examined in Chapter Six, 
and the rejection of that reformist strategy by an emergent 
inner-movement opposition after 1930, as examined in Chapter 
Seven. 
5.1: Republicanism and Wehrhaftigke1t. 
The commi tment to the processes and form of the 
parliamentary republic established after the First World War in 
Austria was the most clearly defined aspect of the social 
democratic sub-culture in steyr. Thousands of social democrats 
displayed their unequivocal support for the republic in the 
annual "Day of the Republic" celebrations. They correctly saw 
themselves as the only significant poH tical force in Austria 
committed to the repUblic and parliamentary democracy. In a 
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state which contained few other committed republicans and many 
committed anti-republicans, they were (despite their position as 
opposition party at national level) the "state party" of the 
Austrian, First Republic. The republic was identified with the 
social dellDcratsj it was seen as their creation, arising from 
turmoil in the aftermath of the First World War and the 
dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, and was regarded by the 
social democrats as a forum within which they could realise 
their aims. This epitomises the social democratic commitment to 
a gradual, evolutionary strategy for power, based on an 
allegedly irrepressible upward electoral trend. 
However, despite this optimistic outlook, the social 
democrats were aware, especially given the nature of the region 
which surrounded Steyr, of the scale and militancy of opposition 
in Austria to "their" repUblic. In 
importance was attached in Steyr 
Yehtbaftigkeit, the capability and 
physical self-defence. Since social 
view of 
to the 
readiness 
democracy 
this, great 
concept of 
to undertake 
was largely 
identified with the republic, social democratic Yehrhattigkeit 
embodied not only self-defence, but also the defence of the 
republican constitution against the authoritarian tendencies of 
the Austrian Right. Wehl:hlltt.l gke.1L. in Stey,. "as rei nlorced by 
the local stronghold mentality, by the local consciousness 01 
isolation within a hostile environment. 'this was retlected. i,n 
the militancy and violence with which the social democratic 
"monopoly of the streets· was upheld, initially at least, 
against the incursions of the Heimwehr in 1929-1930 (see Chapter 
Three). This was the defensive, wehrhaft response of an isolated 
"ghetto" movement to a dominant culture, represented by the 
Heimwehr, which waS unremittingly hostile to social democracy 
and the parliamentary democracy cf the First Republic. The 
establishment of social democratic territory as a "no-go-area" 
for the Helmwehr in 1929-1930 was an act of social democratic 
self-assertion away from the unwanted norms of "outside" 
society. 
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Yebrhaft.ig';kelt was viewed however very much as a last 
resort; the cultivation of an attachment to the principles of 
the republican constitution was the first priority of the social 
democrats. This was an attitude encouraged from an early age. 
Every year for example, the social democratic Kinderfreunde in 
Steyr organised children's "holiday colonies" in the Al pine 
countryside. The children were encouraged to practice 
self-administration at the colonies, using the processes and 
institutions of the First Republic as a model. Each dormitory 
elected "town councillors", who ill turn elect~d a "mayor", a 
"public prosecutor" I a 11 judge" and a "policeman". A 
"Gonsti tution" was drawn up, and any law-breaker faced a trial 
(defended by his own "lawyer") and a sentence of punishment (8). 
This experiment in self-administration undoubtedly had general 
educational merits; in a more specific sense it equally 
undoubtedly had considerable effect in developing in 
i~rrpressionable children in their early teens and younger a 
lasting attachlnent to the constitutional processes of the First 
R~public. 
The celebrations on 12th November, the "Day of the Republic" 
".:~·e the most striking manifestations of social democratic 
"'=l'uhl..lcanisJn in Steyr. They also illustrated vividly the lack 
of bourgeois enthusiasm fQ)' the republic, and underscored in 
hIghly visible terms the nature of the town as an enclave 
dominated by social democratic norms. The cleft between dominant 
culture and social democratic sub-culture, in this case between 
anti-republicanism and republican commitment, was visualised in 
the intensity of festi ve decoration on the buildings of the 
town. The commercial centre of the town in and around the town 
square, catholic church buildings, the police station (after the 
federalisation of the local police) and predominantly non-social 
democratic residential areas remained undecorated. The town 
hall, co-operative businesses and social democratic residential 
",trongholds like the Webrgraben and the Ennsleite were, on the 
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other hand, festooned with state and party flags, colourful 
bunting, and impressive night-time illuminations (9). 
The Republic Day Festival ranked behind only the traditional 
Kayday celebrations in terms of importance in the social 
democratic calendar of festivals. Festivities extended over two 
days and attracted mass attendances in a carnival atmosphere, at 
least until government restrictions were applied to public 
marches after 1930. In 1928, probably the peak in Republic Day 
participation, around 6,000 attended a torch-lit procession of 
the social democratic youth movement and gymnasts on the evening 
of 11th November. On the following day, a massive 8,000 marched 
in procession to the town square to hear speeches by Kayor 
Sichlrader and SDAP District Leader Schrangl (10). 
The Republic Day celebrations of the social democrats were 
intended as a "mighty and powerful" demonstration of their 
commitment to the democratic republic, a "vehement manifestation 
of the republican idea" (11). It was held that the republican 
consti tution was the only possible way forward in the 
development towards socialism (12). Consequently, Republic Day 
was not just a celebration of the founding of the republic, but 
also served as a deterrent show of strength and defiance by the 
social democratic stronghold against local opponents of the 
republican state form. This function naturally grew in 
importance as politics became increasingly polarised, especially 
in the 1930's, between the constitutionalist social democrats 
and assorted anti-constitutional oovements and parties on the 
Austrian Right. Republic Day became a protest against the 
growing dangers of Heimwehr or clericalist dictatorship (13). It 
also became an expression of social democratic will in Steyr to 
defend the republican state form. For example, the 1931 Republic 
Day Festival took place two months after an abortive He1mwehr 
putsch (the Pfrimer Putsch). It was, in these circumstances, a 
particularly sober and serious occasion, far removed from the 
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more carnival atmosphere of the celebrations in the mid to late 
1920's: 
Steely determination lay on the faces of all those who 
declared to the world on 12th November their willingness to 
defend the republiC with all the means at their disposal. 
The deep seriousness and conspicuous silence, which lasted 
for the whole of the procession, typified the readiness of 
the workers in Steyr to fight and impressed a special 
character on the demonstration. (14). 
The willingness of the social democrats to fight physically 
to defend the republic and its constitution was expressed 
primarily in the existence and values of their defence 
organisations: the Scblltgbund, whose full name was, 
characteristically, the "Republican Defence League", and the 
military gymnastic <Yehrtyrner) sections of the social 
democratic gymnastics clubs, which cultivated the Wehrhaft1gke1t 
of the social democratic youth. The Schutzbnnd was created all 
over Austria in the first half of 1923 in response to the 
fascist takeover of power in Italy in 1922 and the increasing 
activity of right wing militias in Austria at around the same 
time. It brought together, in a more systematic and disciplined 
structure, the various social democratic "stewards' formations" 
(Ordnerschaften) which had developed since the end of the First 
World War (15). The founding of the Schutzbynd in Steyr in June 
1923 was accompanied by the establishment of a group of "Young 
Stewards" in the youth movement (Soz1 al1stische Arbeiter111gend, 
or SAJ). This was later integrated into the formations of the 
military gymnasts (16), who were, in tUrn, under the command of 
the Schlltzbnnd. 
Christine Vlcek identifies three goals which the Schutzbund 
was to fulfil. The first two, the development of both psychical 
and physical Wehrhaft1 glreit , of both the mental qual1 ties and 
the basic physical abilities needed in a physical struggle for 
the aims of the movement, were prerequisites of the third. This 
third goal proposed that the SchytzW,nd should act as·a support 
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for the SDAP in the internal power politics of Austria; it was 
intended to deter potential and, if necessary, to repel any real 
bourgeois attacks on the social democratic movement or the 
republic (17). This conception was given theoretical support in 
the SDAP's Linz Programme of 1926 (18) and practical relevance 
in July 1927 with the brutal suppression of the workers' 
demonstration in Vienna, and the mobilisation of provincial 
executive and Heimwehr against the subsequent social demooratic 
communications strike. 
Thereafter, and especially in light of the increasing 
activity and influence of the HeiTDwehr in the region around 
Steyr from the seoond half of 1929, far more attention was paid 
to Wehrhaftigkeit in Steyr. Recruitment into the Schutzbynd was 
stepped up and TDili tary symnastics training (marching, fully 
clothed running, obstacle course, hand-grenade throwing and 
shooting) was intensified (19). 
The inoreased emphasis placed in the sooial democratic 
movement on paramilitary activities was interpreted, or at least 
portrayed in the local clerical press as "feverish" preparation 
for offensive civil war and "bolshevist" dictatorship (20). This 
was certainly not the self-perception of Schutzbynd and 
Wehrtyrner in Steyr. In the first place, the 8cbutzbynd was 
conceived as "a purely defensive organisation"; the notion of 
defensive force, as embodied in the Linz Programme of 1926, was 
fully acoepted in Steyr. The sooial democrats would only resort 
to force if they had first been attacked with foroe (21) . 
Furthermore, the paramilitary organisations in Steyr had no 
ambition to erect a dictatorship of any kind. They were 
concerned to emphasise their comndtment to the democratic 
republic and to democratic methods. They regarded the 
intensification of paramilitary activity from the late 1920' s 
onwards as an unfortunate, but necessary response to the 
anti-republican aggression of an expanding Heimwehr (22). The 
strength of social democratic republican comnd tment in Steyr 
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made the effort to counter the Hefmwehr by Dilitary means a 
self-evident and logical extension to more orthodox political 
activity. This view was represented forcefully by Ferdinand 
)[ayrhofer, military leader of the Schutzbllnd in Steyr, at the 
SDAP District Conference in February 1932: 
He emphasised the peaceableness of the working class, but 
explained that strong defences are also necessary to defend 
the rights of the workers and to ensure the safety of the 
republic and of democracy. To stormy applause, he stressed 
that we are not preparing and arming ourselves to attack, 
but to defend (23). 
However, the undoubted depth of republican feeling in the 
social democratic movement in Steyr and the readiness and 
determination to defend the constitution by physical means, was 
restrained until February 1934, by which time effective 
resistance to the anti-republican Right was no longer possible. 
Both at local and at national level, the leaders of the social 
democratic movement were captives of a tactical caution and 
inflexiblli ty, which refused to release Scbytzbllnd and 
Yehrtyrner to perform the job they had been trained for, namely 
the physical defence of the repUblic. The commitment of the 
social democratic leadership in Steyr to the form and processes 
of the republic was undoubtedly consistent and unwavering, even 
during the Dollfu/3 dictatorship. It was, however, rarely (and 
after the Pfrimer Putsch never) prepared to underscore this 
republican commitment - at a time when the eleotoral process and 
other basic democratio rights were being 
undermined - by sanctioning the physical defence 
As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, 
progressively 
of the system. 
this led to 
dissatisataction l.n S.Qhy:!;zbun.d.. and Wehrtm:lllU:.lSAJ ranks, "hl.ch 
resul ted in defections to the less inhibited communists and 
national socialists and contributed to the development ot 
opposition on the left of the social democratic movement in the 
early 1930's. 
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5.2; Ambivalence towards the Spoial and EcoDomic Order. 
The previous section of this chapter examined aspects of the 
social democratic sub-culture which stood in clear and direct 
opposition to the dominant culture in Austria. This section 
seeks, on the other hand, using selected examples from the 
sub-culture, to examine the ambivalence of the relationship 
between social democracy in Steyr and the economio and social 
order of capitalist, catho1ic-clericalist Austria. 
This ambivalence was exhibited most obviously by the 
co-operative movement. Co-operatives were regarded in Steyr as a 
"precondi tion for the reorganisation of capitalism" by acting 
silmultaneously as producer, distributor and consumer, and 
thereby eliminating the bourgeOis middleman and cutting off 
capitalism's supply of funds (24). In other words, they had an 
explicitly counter-cultural aim, directed at the replacement of 
capitalist with co-operative economic principles. However, until 
such time as "capitalism" had been starved of funds and could be 
"reorganised", the co-operatives necessarily had to compete with 
the capitalists under all the usual principles of capitalist 
competi tion (25). The aims of the co-operatives in Steyr were 
therefore, in the short term, indistinguishable from those of 
their capitalist rivals: "to attain a decisive position in the 
distri bution and production of goods" (26). Despite its 
counter-cultural aims, the co-operative movement's day-to-day 
activity remained inevitably conformist. 
However, this section refers on the whole less to matters 
directly concerning the capitalist economy - over which the 
social democrats, co-operatives apart, had little or no 
influence - than to the order of society in Austria. This is a 
somewhat "catch-all" category, conceived to cover the attempts 
by the social democrats to influence and direct the spare time 
activities and private lives of their supporters away from those 
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characteristics of the dominant culture which were considered 
detrimental or unsuitable. These included basic characteristics 
such as the influence of the church in secular matters, the 
propagation of competitive individualism, more prosaic matters 
like the reliance on alcohol to "enliven" spare time activities, 
or even just the pursuit of relatively innocuous activities in ~ 
non-social democratic environment. 
The general concern of the social democrats was to set up, 
separate from, but within the existing order, the elements of 
the new social order which would come into being after the SDAP 
had conquered state power. 
attempted in this respect 
However, the AbgrenzlIng which was 
in Steyr was only partially in 
apposition to dominant norms; in many respects social democratic 
activity remained, or even aspired to be in conformity with 
elements of existing society. There was a spectrum of 
relationships between sub-culture and dominant culture, ranging 
froD outright conformity to radical opposition. Abgrenzung was 
only pursued in a consistently oppositional sense, with view to 
the establishment of completely new cultural norms, in the 
anti-clerical1st sentiments and activities of the social 
democrats and in their children's and youth organisations. On 
the other hand, many of the minor social democratic cultural 
organisations (e. g canary breeders, allotment gardeners, chess 
players, philatelists etc.) lacked any distinct culturally 
oppositional orientation. They simply catered for a formal 
demarcation from similar bourgeOiS clubs. Other social 
democratic cul tural organisations, like . the Women's 
Organisation, offered little opposition to dominant cultural 
norms. Others still sought to take over those elements of the 
existing culture which were considered worthy and useful. These 
organisations were separated from the dominant culture in their 
social democratic environment, but acted alongside and not 
against it. 
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Of the major social demoratic oultural organisations in 
Steyr, the Women's Organisation conformed most to dominant 
norms. Social democratic women's activities were generally 
traditional or stereotypical women's activities. Even though 
some social democratio women in Steyr had become town 
counoillors, party or trade union functionaries, school or 
welfare officials and lay magistrates (27), no attempt was made 
by the Women's Organisation to build on the emancipatory trend. 
On the contrary, the Women's Organisation adhered to 
traditional, household-based concerns. It ran courses in sewing, 
crochet, knitting etc., and sought to mbilise women around 
stereotype issues, particularly with regard to shopping and the 
cost of living, and, with the onset of economic depreSSion, 
welfare activity (28). Women were also seen to have an 
especially important function in the co-operative mvementi 
their traditional role in the household as housekeeper/shopper 
deemed them to be particular targets for co-operative propaganda 
and for recruitment into co-operative work (29). 
The apparent lack of ambition of social democratic policy 
towards women can be derived from several factors. In the first 
place, at a time of high unemployment and poverty (after 
1929-1930), there were not the material resources available for 
the development of new, perhaps more emancipatory lines of 
acU vi ty for women. Secondly, women in Steyr tended to be mre 
attached to religious beliefs than men (30) and, if at all 
sooial demoratic, then less strongly committed to the mvement 
than men (31). For both these reasons, a minimalist and 
traditionalist women's programme was a sensible and realistio 
taotio for a movement dedicated to the oonquest of power by 
force of numbers: it was less Ukely to "frighten off" morally 
and sooially conservative religious women and, 
mobilisation, oould prove attraotive to the 
indifferent female sooial demooratic sympathisers. 
in terms of 
relatively 
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A final reason for the limited scope of women's policies in 
the social democratic movement was almost certainly the attitude 
of men. Langewiesche notes in the general Austrian context, that 
social prejudices still exercised a strong restraint on any 
women's activities which transcended the boundaries of ths home. 
Even in supposedly progressive social democratic working class 
families, the traditional view of a woman's role in society 
(children, housekeeping etc.) still prevailed. This explained 
the relatively low propensity of poH tical organisation among 
women (32). Such social stereotypes became particularly potent 
in Steyr after the collapse of the Steyr-wgrke and onset of mass 
unemployment and poverty in the town. Women's political activity 
was immediately a superfluous expense in the eyes of many men, 
who frequently refused to allow further political involvement, 
even though reduced subscriptions for the needy were available 
(33). In this case, the social democrats were unable (or 
unwilling) - despite their rhetoric about sex equality and the 
emancipation of women (34) to break down the 
patriarchal-authoritarian family relationships inherent in the 
dominant Austdan, and indeed European cultural tradJtJon. 
The cultural conception of the social democrats in Steyr 
made specific provision in other areas for the qualmless 
assumption of bourgeois cultural tradition. This concerned 
"culture" in its narrow definition of artistic and intellectual 
enlightenment, or "high" culture. The social democrats were keen 
to gain access to and "pry loose" those elements of the high 
cuI ture which had "immense value", like the works of the great 
classical composers, poets and authors and so on (35). According 
to the social democratic Arts Centre, set up in 1928 to promote 
"genuine art" in Steyr, the "cultivation of art and literature 
was part of the programme of socialist education" (36). 
Similarly, the social democratic Workers' Library sought to open 
up the literary achievements of European culture to the social 
democratic membership in Steyr. Despite occasional complaints 
about the library members' lack of enthusiasm for books on 
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socialist theory and the social sciences in general, it was 
recognised that the library's purpose was to provide a service 
with a general cultural rather than specifically socialist 
educational content. Indeed, over 90% of the demand for 11 brary 
books was in the category "Fiction, Drama and Poetry" (37). Much 
as the choral and musical organisations strove to attain a high 
cultural le""l in their performances, measured in terms of the 
cultural tradition in Austria (38), the library strove to raise 
the qualitative level of its fiction, drama and poetry holdings. 
So while the worst popular literary kitsch was excluded, any 
works of high quality, even by clerically oriented authors, were 
acceptable and desirable (39). 
In respect of artistic culture, of music and literature, the 
opposition of the social democrats to the existing order was 
qualified by the quality of what the existing order had to 
offer. The social democrats in Steyr were striving to overcome a 
kind of cultural inferiority complex; in the recollection of one 
social democratic functionary in the First Republic, it was 
important for them to be able to say: "Look here, we have this 
culture, we have the ability to master it" (40). They felt the 
need to clilDb up to a cuI tural level quali taU vely higher than 
that traditionally open to the lower classes in society. In 
doing so, they accepted existing, bourgeois parameters of 
qual! ty and thus conformed wholeheartedly with bourgeois 
high-cultural tradition. 
The cultural conformity of the Women's Organisation and the 
posi ti ve acceptance of existing cultural norms in music and 
literature contrasted starkly with anti-clericalist tendencies 
in the sub-culture and the aims and acti vi ties of the social 
democratic children's and youth organisations. These retained a 
consistently and explicitly opposi tional, counter-cultural 
orientation. Anti-clericalist feeling was a strong undercurrent 
in the social democratic movement in Steyr. Its strength was a 
potent reflex of the local social democratic stronghold 
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mentality. The Catholic Church was especially influential in the 
type of rural society which surrounded Steyr and was deeply 
hostile towards social democracy. In this situation, social 
d.mocratic hostility towards the influence of the catholic 
religion was a fairly logical response. This hostility was 
represented organisationally in the local Crematorial 
Association and in a strollg Free Thinkers' Movem"nt which saw 
ita primary task in the attempt to reduce the influence of the 
church, and whose attempts to do so have been criticised by 
sources both friendly and hostile to the social democratic 
movement as "regrettably low· and "primitive" (41). 
However, the perSistence of clerical influence in society 
was recognised, especially in providing, through the annual 
calendar of church festivals (Christmas, Easter, Corpus Christi 
etc.), temporal points of identification imprinted in the minds 
of the whole population. As a response, social democratic 
festivals were set up throughout Austria in direct competition 
with (and often modelled on) catholic festivals (42). The 
strength of anti-clericalism in the social democratic movement 
in Steyr was illustrated in the explicitly and confontationally 
anti-church character of certain of these festivals. This 
applied particularly to the ostensible celebrations of the 
sUllUller solstice at the same time as Corpus Christi, despite 
exhortations from higher social democratic bodies to tone down 
the confrontational stance (43). 
The provision of education and entertainment untainted by 
catholic church influence was also one of the main aims of the 
Kinderfrellnde in Steyr. This organisation in particular was 
concerned to enforce the "totalitarian" (44) ideal of social 
democratic cultural activity. Every possible children'S activity 
was to take place in an exclusiv.ely social democratiC, 
Kinderfrellude milieu, 
influence: 
completely sealed off from outside 
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Our concern relnains the same: to hold the child as far as is 
possible away from all bourgeois events and influences, to 
bind it to our ceremonies, fest! vals and meetings, to our 
work and institutions so strongly, that they become an 
indispensable need (45). 
This is characteristic of the social democratic commi tlnent 
in Steyr to an evolutional-Y strategy for political power. The 
SDAP would, it was held, come to power in the near future, and 
the younger generation would then have the task of completing 
the process of AbgrenzlIDg from the old order and establishing 
the content of a new socialist order of society (46). Children 
and youth were seen as the cuI tural avant-garde of the social 
delllocratic movement. The Kinderfreunde had a central role in 
preparing the younger generation for this highly. important task 
by shielding these nascent social democrats from the influences 
of bourgeois 
activities 
society. A massive 
was established in 
network of facili ties and 
an attempt 
comprehensive demarcation (47) (at least until 
to provide 
the supply of 
funds dried up after the collapse in employment at the 
Steyr-Werke in 1929-1930). Evidence of the importance attached 
within the social democratic lllovement to the aims and activities 
of the Kind"rfre1lode is given by the level of funds lllade 
available to them in the 1920' s. The )~AV' s Kindergroschen and 
the Steyr-Werke Works Counei I' s annual subsidy gave the 
Kinderfre1lode an income which far exceeded that of the Social 
Denocratic Party in the Steyr district (48). Evidence of the 
ensuing success of Ki nderfr<,!lIllde Abgrenzung is in turn displayed 
in the envious and even admiring comments of clericalist sources 
in Steyr, which persistently advocated the imitation of social 
delllOcratic methods in the organisation of children and youth 
(49). 
The acti vHies of the K1 nderfre1lnde were directed above all 
at the development of a basic collecti vist spirit among the 
children. Little more could be attempted until the children were 
older, and had developed stronger critical faculties (50). The 
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youth movement, the SAJ, could though be more ambitious in its 
objectives. In the evolutionary outlook of the social democrats, 
youths were seen as the "combatants of the fu ture" and as the 
"builders of the coming world" (51) of socialism. This was 
reflected in the mid to late 1920' s in a low key and largely 
unpolitical, but in cultural terms, highly idealistic role for 
the social democratic youth in Steyr (52). A dogged and 
puritanical abstinence from alcohol and nicotine was encouraged 
which has held firm among ex-SAJ members still alive today. This 
was accDl"panied by an indulgence in physical f1 tness, sporting 
and I'ambling acti vi ties. SAJ acti vi ty was directed above all at 
producing the mental strengt.ll of chal'acter and the physical 
stamina needed in the perc"ived future role of the social 
deJUDcratic youth. Alcohol and nicotine were seen as both 
physically and spiritually harmful, while outdoor activities not 
only cuI ti vated physical health, but also provided the mental 
challenges necessary for the development of strong socialist 
characters (53). 
The social democratic youth in Steyr also built on the 
collectivist, community spirit encouraged from an early age in 
the Ki nderfrellllde. The youth movement arranged a full programme 
of events and activities for weekday evenings and weekends, all 
of which were undertakell in an explicitly collective atmosphere 
(54). Sporting activity, primarily undertaken in the gymnastics 
clubs, sought for example to negate the competitive 
indi vidual ism and sensationalism of "record-chasing" bourgeois 
sport. Openly competitive sports, like football were frowned 
upon (55). Instead, a down to earth collectivist approach at an 
average level of competence was preferred, epitomised in 
eurhythmic displays of dance and gymnastics intended to portray 
the historical struggle and future Victory of the working class 
(56) . 
Like the Kinderfrellnde,. the youth movement's attention in 
Steyr was on the future i its acti vi ties - the development of 
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mental and physical strength and of a collectivist outlook -
were aimed at that point when the SDAP was to conquer power in 
Austria, when the "builders of the coming world" WQuld be 
released to fulfil their task. In the m .. antime, the SAl was to 
perfect, in iill l'elati',ely unpolitical and peripheral role, the 
new cul tUl'"l ideals whic;h would permeate the future society. The 
SAl was faced here by a somewhat paradoxical situation from 
around the turn of the decade. In the late 1920's, in the then 
favourable conditions of the local milieu, the social democratic 
movement in Steyr was enj oying its most successful period. In 
this position, it was quite reasonable that the SAl should 
concentrate on its future role, as the prospects for the future 
were still, apparently, good. With the redeHni tion of local 
political circumstances after the shutdown at the Steyr-Werke, 
the situation was however very much different. The future was 
now far from promising and the outlook became worse as time 
progressed and as the Austrian Right consolidated an 
increasingly authoritarian rule. The inevitable question facing 
the SAl was whether to stay on the sidelines and continue 
preparing for a future which was becoming more and more 
unlikely, or whether it should enter the political arena and try 
to arrest the slide of the movement. 
As elsewhere in Austria, the youth movement opted for the 
second al ternati ve and abandoned the "surrogate politics" (57) 
represented in its idealistic cultural activities. It elllbarked 
instead on an innovative and active politics of pl'otest and, 
increasingly, confrontation directed against the various local 
and national opponents of social democracy. After 1929, the SAl 
became the politically most active element in the social 
democratic movement. In doing so, it demanded a change in tactic 
in the face of the fundamentally different background conditions 
facing the movement in the 1930' s. The Social Delllocratic Party 
was shackled by its ossified and bureaucratic internal structure 
and proved unable to respond. The activism of the SAJ was 
therefore both an implicit rejection of and a focus of 
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opposition to the inflexibility and passivity of the party. It 
developed its new, poU ticised role on two fronts. The first 
concerned the infusion of more innovative practices into some of 
the established activities of the SDAP. Satirical humour, 
derived from the "political cabarets· of the Viennese 
Smialist,j ::Bobs Veranstaltungsgruppe (58), was harnessed for use 
in electoral agitation and recrui tment drives, and proved to be 
an extremely popular and effective mohilisatioual tool (59). The 
SAJ also ht!ld many open debates with provocative titles like 
"Disuni ty to th .. Left, Destruction to the Right" and "Soviet 
Star' or Swastika the Solution?" designed to attract new 
members and retain the support of old ones by confronting and 
undermillins the arguJlI"nts of the local cOllllDunists and national 
socialists in open J"bate (60). 
The SAJ 
battleground 
defence of 
was 
to 
the 
also prepared 
take direct, 
organisations 
to forsake the 
sometimes physical 
and principles of 
intellectual 
action in 
the social 
delnocratic movement. A first indication of this was provided in 
late 1929/early 1930, when the youth led the way in defending 
the social democratic lnonopoly of the streets in Steyr against 
the incursions of the HeimweJJr. Aggression and violence were 
also part of the SAJ's anti-nazi activities in the early 1930's 
(61). J{ore fundamentally, the social delnocratic youth played an 
important and increasing role in the republican defence 
Dl'ganisations in Steyr. This was evidenced in the generally 
increased actillity of the youth-based Wehrtyrner organisation 
and also in the fact that many Schutzbund lDembers reappeared in 
th.. ranks of the SAJ after the dissolution of their own 
organisatioll in March 1933 (62). 
As noted above, the acti"isr. of the SAJ in the 1930's 
deri ved from an implicit rej ection of the essentially passive 
stance and inflexibility of the SDAP in Steyr. The SDAP, like 
the rest of the social democratic movement, was convinced that 
the republican state form was the forum within which the 
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movement's aims could be achieved. Its commitment to the 
republic is beyond doubt. However, it refused, or was unable to 
attempt positive action in defending the republican constitution 
against the Austrian Right - either by, for example, seeking the 
support of the (admittedly few) other pro-republican forces in 
Austria, or, ultimately, by physically defending the republic. 
This was an inconsistency which led to opposi ti on within the 
movement, of whicb the SAJ was an integral part. The SAJ had 
long been conceived as the cultural avant-garde of the social 
democratic movement, seeking to develop the cultural values 
which would dominate future socialist SOCiety. This socialist 
society would supposedly be achieved from within the framework 
of the parlialnentary republic. Tl,e inability of the SDAP to 
defend the parliamentary republic, and by implication, the 
future socialist society, effectively robbed the SAJ of its 
raison d' etre. The youth movement was forced, in opposition to 
the passivity of the SDAP, to take the defence of the republic 
and all it had worked for into its own hands. The other 
oppositional element examined in this chapter, the SchlltzbllDd, 
deri ved its opposition from a similar process. It was prepared 
for years for a task (the physical defence of the republic) 
which it was never released to perform. Its opposition too was a 
logical consequence of the imnobili ty of the Social Democratic 
Party in Steyr, and, in wider terms, in Austria as a whale in 
the 1930' s. 
5.3; The Sub-Culture as a Selbstzweck. 
The social democratic sub-culture in Steyr was, with its 
aggregate (overlapping) membership of over 20,000, evidently a 
highly important sector of social democratic acti vi ty. It was, 
in terms of input of time and energy, a massive investment by 
the social democrats. This section examines the "returns" 
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positive and negative - received from this investment, both by 
the individuals involved and by the social democratic movement 
as a whole. 
Pfoser suggests that the cultural activity of the Austrian 
social democrats served to counter the often ana mic experiences 
faced by the social democral;ic membership in the First Republic. 
The primarily manual working class social democrats, 
underpri veleged and disadvantaged in society, could compensate 
for their .individual probleros through their collective 
experiences in social delllocratic organisations. A collectivist 
s"cial deJnocrdtic consciousness was built up, which contributed 
to a process of self-realisation, eroded inferiority complexes 
and raised .self-esteem (63). This view is verified by 
Buttinger's personal recollections of the myriad acti vi ties of 
the social democrats in the First RepubliC: 
They felt illlportant selling badges, performing gylllllastic 
displays, reciting poetry, embroidering flags, pasting 
posters in display cabinets. In the choral rehearsals, in 
decorating their windows for Mayday, wearing party and club 
insignia, stewarding the Kinderfreunde open air party, and 
even in applauding the 'appearance of the K. P. Dr. 
Ellenbogen' they had for years felt a worthiness and 
importance, which even the poorest are not denied when they 
place themselves in the service of a communi ty (64). 
In other words, the social democrats, from abstinent to 
zither player, from child to old age pensioner, benefitted from 
a consciousness of being part of a collective in their 
respective organisations, which relieved them from the burden of 
their day-to-day problems. This collective consciousness took on 
particular importallce in Steyr because of the town's social and 
poli tical isolation in a highly cOT,servati ve and strongly 
anti-social democratic region. In this situation, the 
sub-cuI ture could offer a solid emotional security to the social 
democrats. Collective experiences in the cultural organisations 
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could create a sense of self-assurance not necessarily open to 
the social democratic individual in such a hostile environment. 
Josef Mayrhofer provides evidence of how collective acti vi ty 
could compensate for the anomie of isolation and socio-economic 
disadvantage in his reminiscences of his experiences in the 
KjnderfrellUde, SAJ I gymnastics clubs and We]H~turnerISchtltzbund 
in steyr in the 1920' sand 1930' s (65). Mayrhofer is perhaps a 
somewhat untypical example because of the great intensity of bis 
commi tnent to the cultural organisations; he represented very 
strongly the culturally idealistic direction of the SAJ in the 
mid to late 1920' s. However, his recollections of the great joy, 
the sense of fulfilment and the 6trength of character derived 
from his "xperien""s give a valuable insight into the personal 
benefits derived frolD collective acti vi ty at a time of 
individual material hardship Olayrhofer was, like much of the 
Steyr youth, unemployed for several years from the late 1920' s 
onwards) . 
Of great importance in the development and maintenance of 
the emotional security provided in the sub-culture was the 
social democratic programme of festivals, the Festkultur. The 
festivals, especially the major ones with their mass 
attendances, were intended to "enthuse thousands of 
proletarians" and make them "confident of victory" (66). The 
traditional Mayday and the newer Republic Day festivals in 
particular were displays of strength, directed not only at the 
opponents of social democracy, as discussed in section 5.1, but 
also inwards, at the membership. The scale of participation in 
the great parad~s, the colourful festive decoration of the 
predominately social delDocratic housing estates and the 
self-assured speeches delivered to rapturous applause from the 
town hall balcony wel-e of great significance in establishing and 
maintaining self-confidence among the social democrats (67). 
Equally important was the need to "give the people a f';w hours 
of enjoyment" (68) away from the problems of everyday life. All 
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the festivals thus had a programme of entertainment - music, 
song, theatre, dance or sport supplementary to all the 
demont'ltrati ve parades a.nd speeches. As Weidenholzer notes, 
"just to enjoy oneself, to laugh" was a major priority of the 
social democratic Fest.klll tllr in Austria (69). 
Social deJUocratic festivals also provided, as shown in the 
previous section, a focus for social democratic 
anti -clerica1istn. In lIIany respects the catholic church provided 
a Felndbild for the social democrats in Steyr, a negative point 
of reference around which social democratic sentiment could 
organise and against which it could identify itself (70). 
Clericalist influence in Austria was a focal point for negative 
emotions of hatred and anger etc. which cemented the. positive 
emotional security deri ved frolll the social democratic 
sub-cuI hot'e. 
Tbe preceding discussion throws up the question whether the 
social democratic sub-culture, in prOViding a feeling of 
collect! ve emotional security which cOlllpensated for the problems 
of everyday life, distracted from the causes of these problellls 
and helped to dullen the poli tica 1 impetus of the social 
democratic movelllent. The answer remains uncertain. This was 
certainly a danger of which the cultural theoreticians and 
practioners in the Austrian social democratic movement were 
aware, and >lhich they sought to counter (71). There is evidence 
to suggest however, that this >las not necessarily, or at least 
not universally, the case in Steyr. For example, the SAJ was one 
of the focal points in the development of new political impetus 
in the social democratic lIIovelllent in the 1930' s, despite its 
past poH tica11y peripheral role and idealistic cultural 
orientation. There can therefore be no unequivocal conclusion in 
this context. 
Less lilnbiguous in its effect on the political impetus of the 
social democratic lnovement is the more tangible issue of the 
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tiJUe and energy expended in work for the various cultural 
organisations. Weidenholzer writes of the conflicts of interest 
and conscience which could arise, especially for the JUOre active 
social democrats, who wert! prevailed upon from all quarters to 
in several join the diver,;e organisations. 
organisations then inevitably led to 
Membership 
"a shallow level of 
organisational life and to a superficial political cOllilui tment" 
(72). It must be assumed that a considerablt! number of social 
deJUocrats in Steyr were sil nrul taneously members of several 
organisations if the aggregate membership in all the cultural 
organisations was over 20,000 in a town with only around 8,000 
social democratic voters. There were certainly complaints that 
there were often several meetings or events taking place at the 
"aJUe time (73) and that the movement in Steyr was afflicted by a 
superfluous VerejlltllDe"i..,rei (74). Inevitably, the supply of 
energy and commitment available for the pressing political 
problems facing the social democratic movement was reduced in 
propodion to that expended in the cultural organisations. 
A further problem, like that which prevailed among the party 
activists (see Chapter FOUl', section 4.3), was the sense of 
personal satisfaction the activist menbel's of the various 
organisations derived frOlQ their functions and duties. Like the 
party activists, the cultural activists developed deep and 
strong attachments to their respective organisations. In each 
organisation there developed an introspective conservatism 
directed towards organisational self-maintenance and extension 
(75). There was a danger that activity in the cultural 
organisations would become a Selbstzweck, an end in itself, 
which demoted poH tics to a peripheral role. Guttsman talks in 
the German context of the "centrifugal tendencies" of the 
cultural organisations, and of the 
growing danger that these organisations might become 
entirely self-absorbed so that the one will seek to solve 
the social question with song, the second through gymnastics 
and the third with music and the performance of plays. And 
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if the unions or the party do not fully support such a 
drive, they are regarded as ignorant bureaucrats (76). 
This was true for e"ample of the social democratic 
gynnast1cB clubs in Steyr. These treated the plans JDade in 1928 
to incorporate all the local sports clubs into an overarching 
federation with a distinct lack of enthusiasm (77). Thoir 
"organisational patriotisn" in this r<:sp"ct was later subject to 
a pubUc r<!buke by the SDAP, which ;;mphasised that a proletarian 
cannut be a sports,""n alone, that htl cannot regard the sport 
movellll",t 'la a "universal panacea", but that he must be first and 
foremost a socialist (78). Nevertheless, some years later, the 
gylnnastics clubs were still involved in "territorial disputes", 
this time with the Scblltzbund, over the question of which 
organisation should have responsi bili ty for the Yehrturner (79). 
Thus, it can be seen that while the returns from the 
cuI tural investment of the social democrats were, at an 
individual, psychological level, generally positive, at the 
broader level of the lnovement as a whole there was a potentially 
negative effect. For many of those who were actively involved in 
the cultural organisatiolls, the 11Iaintenance of their own 
organisational fief was the primary goal. The cu 1 tural 
organisatiuns developed their own individual momenta, which were 
self-centred and conservative. Energies were distracted from the 
poli tical arena by a series of organisational fetishisms. As 
KuleJDann notes, cultural activity, theoretically regarded as a 
means in the development towards socialist society, became an 
end in itself, with serious implications for the political 
struggle of the SDAP: 
The question of how reforms in the conduct of life and club 
acti vi ties could be built into a strategy of class 
struggle was replaced by the question of how the system of 
the sub-culture could be further extended. It thus took on, 
in part, the character of a surrogate strategy for the 
economic and political struggle (80). 
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The above examination of the social democratic sub-culture 
in Steyr has served to illuminate four themes. Firstly, the 
character of Steyr as an isolated enclave of social democracy 
has been reemphasised. The commitment to cultural Abgrenzung in 
Steyr, though a common element throughout Austrian social 
democracy, was intensified by this isolation. Abgrenzung in 
Steyr derived from two stimul i: on the one hand, it reflected 
the attempt to create, in advance, the bases of future socialist 
society. On the other, it was the defensive reflex of a movement 
which dominated its own "ghetto", but whose values, and 
ul timately whose dOlnination were threatened by a capitalist, 
clericalist, anti-republican culture "hich dominated elsewhere, 
particularly in the rural region surrounding Steyr. The 
Abgrenzung of as many acti vi ties as possible within an 
exclusively social democratic context provided a feeling of 
coll.;,ctlve security against the threat from outside. The drive 
towards cultural demarcation in Steyr was, in this respect, part 
of the social democratic ethos in Steyr; it was part of the 
insular mental! ty which SOUgllt to deflect outside influence and 
build up Stey" as Hpchburg of social democracy. 
Secondly, th" assessment of social delnocratic Abgrenzung, of 
the relationship between sub-culture and dOlninant culture, has 
provided an insight into the gradualist, reformist strategy of 
the social democratic movement in Steyr (see Chapter Six). This 
was illustrated in the strength of attachment to the 
constitution of the First Republic; social democratic aims were 
most definitely to be achieved on the basis of electoral advance 
and the control of the Austrian parliament. In this conception, 
the children's and youth organisations had a central role: the 
younger generation was to be prepared now for its future task of 
Ynllendyng, of completing the transition to social democratic 
SOCiety once the decisive electoral victory had been won. 
However, the relationship of social democracy to the existing 
order was, in the meantime, thoroughly ambivalent. Only the 
youth organisations and social democratic anti-clericalism 
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remained cOI1sistently ar.d unequivocally opposed to existing 
norms. In other respects the social democrats were willing to 
take over some of the "worthy" aspects of the existing order, or 
even, in the case of the co-operatives, to use its methods. A 
simllar orientation can be seen in the following chapter in the 
lIlunicipal economic and social policies of the SDAP in Steyr. 
lIhile the party rejected certain outputs of the capitalist 
economic systelu - unemployment, the 
60ci,;,1 w"lfare et<l. - it ,-esponded not 
inadequate provision of 
by seeking the abolition 
of capitalism as a whole, but by attempting to reform and manage 
it according to different social priorities, even if that 
incorporated the use of capitalist lnethods. 
A third feature of the sub-culture in Steyr was the 
orga nisa ti ana 1 conservati SlU 
complemented similar tendencies 
it encouraged. It hereby 
which existed in the Social 
Democratic Party (as seen iI1 Chapter Four). The various cuI tural 
organisatiuns became, for some of their members at least, ends 
in themselves. Energies were diverted away froln the broader 
poli tical arena and towards narrow o"ganisational 
6elf-naintenance. The denial of poU tical input inevitably 
<lontributed to the political passivity and tactical 
inflexi bili ty of the social deJJocratic movelllent in the 1930' s. 
This, paradoxically, was partially responsible fa,' the fourth 
theme revealed in the examination of the sub-cuI ture - the 
development of inner-movement opposition in the 1930' s. The 
inflexibility and passivity of social deluocracy in the face of 
unfavourable new background conditions after the turn of the 
decade pushed both Scblltzbllud and youth move lue nt towards 
opposition. Both were effectively robbed of their raisons d'~tre 
by the passivity of the SOAP. In the 1930's, the increasing 
ascendancy of the Austrian Right constantly jeopardised the 
constitution of the First Republic; the SchutzbuDd was, however, 
not allowed to perform its primary task, the protection of that 
cODsti tution. In response, it moved gradually to a position 
independent of and opposed to the passivity of the SDAP. The 
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strength of the Right also made the prospects for a social 
democratic conquest of power. Moreover, the social democratic 
leadership was apparently doing little to stem the rise of the 
Right. This made the activities of the SAJ, which were directed 
at that poInt when the social democrats were to take power, more 
and mOI"e unrealistic alld futile. The development of political 
acti vistll and militancy in the SAJ, increasingly opposed to the 
passivity of the SDAP, was a logical consequence. The inability 
of the SDAP t.o respond to the ascendancy of the Right and 
attempt to defend. the republic was inconsistent with the values 
of Schutzbllud and SAJ and i nevi tably aroused opposi tiOll. The 
development of this initially sporadic apposition to become the 
driving force in the social democratic movement after 1932 is 
analysed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOCIAl. DEHOCRATIC REFORHISM: IN SIEYR. 
The SDAP in Steyr was deeply committed to the procedures of 
parliamentary democracy as enshrined in the republican 
constitution, and was deeply opposed to any form of government 
which rejected democratic freedoms. Its whole outlook was geared 
to a politics based in the competition for the political 
allegiance of the electorate. Elections had a prime place in 
SOAP politics; the party had an explicitly evolutionary strategy 
for power based on gradual electoral advance and eventual 
victory at the polls. In the social and economic fields, the 
party aimed to reform what it saw as the negative aspects and 
implications of capitalism. It sought to introduce elements of 
social justice which capitalist society neglected. In 
particular, the SDAP held that if capitalism could not guarantee 
the absence of social problems like poverty and unemployment, 
then capitalist society should exercise a collective social 
responsi bility towards those afflicted by such problems. The 
SOAP in Steyr thus displayed typical characteristics of 
moderate, reformist social 
this chapter to examine 
democracy (1). It is the purpose of 
the derivation of this reformist 
strategy, in particular to show that this strategy was 
conditioned by the practical local experience and activities of 
the social democrats. 
The chapter begins with an assessment of the ideological 
bases of the SOAP at the national level in Austria. This 
provides a basis of comparison which serves to highlight the 
unique characteristics of social democratic reformism in steyr. 
Both the national and the local party were essentially reformist 
-169-
organisations in the sense that they were connni tted to the 
attainment of partial and incremental reforms of the capitalist 
socio-economic system on the basis of the competition for 
electoral support within the the framework of parliamentary 
democracy. However, the national SDAP derived its reformist 
strategy from a systematic ideology, a coherent body of theory 
which offered a considered critique of the nature of Austrian 
state and society. Social democratic reformism in Steyr on the 
other hand had no ideological foundation. The social democrats 
in Steyr were in no sense theorists; their politics was based 
above all else on the insights and orientation derived from 
practical work in the MAV, the municipality and the party 
organisation and from the experience of local economic 
instability. 
This chapter is, in :many respects, an extension of the 
arguments proposed throughout this study concerning the social 
democratic ethos in Steyr. This ethos, i.e. the peculiar 
attitudes and mentality which derived from the local 
consciousness and experience of social and political isolation, 
underlay a tendency throughout the social democratic movement to 
stress the value of organisation. This resulted in the 
development of major local organisational power bases, 
particularly in the MAV and the town hall. Having established 
these power bases within the existing order of Austrian society, 
the social democrats had effectively acquired a vested interest 
in the existing order. In consequence, they logically held no 
anti-system aims; they accepted the basic parameters of Austrian 
capitalism and parliamentary democracy. 
The SOAP's strategy for power within the parliamentary 
system was also determined by the practical preoccupation with 
organisation which was central to the social democratic ethos in 
Steyr. It was shown in Chapter Four that the party leadership in 
Steyr had a particularly pronounced organisational mentality; it 
regarded the party organisation as the raison d'atre of 
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political life. Accordingly, the party's strategy for power was 
centred around organisational advance, i.e. the quest to recruit 
and organise a majority of the electorate. Each new recruit to 
the party would be one slll8.11 step closer to the "magic figure" 
of 51% support in the electorate, which, it was thought, would 
guarantee state power. The SDAP's commitment to the reform of 
certain aspects of the capitalist socio-economic system was 
similarly formed by practical local experience. It sought to 
respond to and ameliorate what it saw as the negative aspects of 
the capitalist system on the basis of the experience of the 
local problems which ensued from the instability of the 
Steyr-Werke. This highly practical orientation contrasted very 
strongly to the ideological foundations of reformism in the SDAP 
at national level. 
6.1: Ideology and Reformism at the National Leyel, 
After the First World War and the split in the international 
labour movement, the SDAP in Austria attempted to assume for 
itself a special role within the international spectrum of 
left-wing politics. It sought to establish a conciliatory and 
mediative "1!arxist Centre" between the two ideological extremes 
of the international Left. One extreme was represented by the 
Soviet bolsheviks, who, inspired by Leninist theory, rejected 
the pursuit of reform within the state. For them, the state was 
an instrument of bourgeois class power and exploitation which 
had to be opposed and destroyed. Participation in the bourgeois 
state only helped to cover over the contradictions of a 
capitalist system which was heading ineVitably towards its own 
collapse. However, the workers were unable to recognise the true 
nature of the state; they were inherently "economist", concerned 
only with short-term, ameliorative improvements in their wages 
and working conditions. In view of this, the workers had to be 
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educated to the re'luisi te level of ideological consciousness 
necessary for the destruction of the bourgeois state and 
socialist revolution by a tightly organised, ideologically pure 
vanguard party (2). The other extreme, that of reformism, was 
epitomised in the German SPD. The SPD, under the theoretical 
influence of Karl Kautsky, maintained a deterministic belief in 
the inevitability of socialism: with an ever-increasing 
concentration of capital and the concomitant proletarianisation 
of the middle classes, capitalist development inevitably created 
a majority in favour of socialism and thus the prerequisite for 
(non-insurrectionary) revolution. While the socialist party 
waited patiently until the "time was ripe", it could participate 
constructively within the state in pursuit of reforms which 
would accelerate the inevitable path of capitalism towards 
socialism (3). 
According to Friedrich Adler, one of the foremost SOAP 
leaders, the SOAP rejected both the "naive impatience" of the 
bolsheviks and the "sceptical unbelief" of the reformists. The 
bolsheviks were thought generally to overestimate the prospects 
for social revolution and showed little concern for the violence 
and suffering involved in revolutionary upheaval. The rigidly 
deterministic reformists, by asserting the impossibility of 
revolution in specific historical situations, tended in practice 
to draw the conclusion that revolution was impossible under all 
circumstances. Their belief in the necessity of social 
revolution was replaced by a belief in the absolute efficacy of 
partial reform (4). The SDAP sought to synthesize the two 
positions. On the one hand, in sharing the reformist assessment 
of the present historical situation, it limited its aims for the 
time being to the attainment of incremental reform. This did 
not, however, preclude it from retaining the revolutionary 
perspective of the bolshevists by adhering to the ultimate aim 
of social revolution (5). It attempted, according to the later 
formulation of Otto Bauer, to combine the "sober realism" of the 
reformists with the "revolutionary enthusiasm" of the bolsheviks 
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(6). The nature of this Austrian social democratic conception of 
·revolution" is examined below. 
The impetus behind the development of the centrist position 
derives from a dogmatic fixation with party unity which 
dominated the party in Austria. Before 1889, the Austrian Left 
was riven by a fractional strife which was much more complicated 
than, for example, the cleft in Germany between Lassaleans and 
Eisenachers. In addition to the disunity between Radical and 
lIoderate wings, the various national labour movements in the 
multi-national Habsburg Empire contributed their divergent 
outlooks based on particular national grievances and conditions 
(7). Against this background, the eventual unification of the 
various national and fractional strands into a single, 
supra-national Social Democratic Party at the Hainfeld Congress 
of 1888-1889 took on the character of a highly sacred 
achievement. Thereafter, unity became the most important value 
of the SOAP and a factor which maintained a constant influence 
on party ideology and practice under both Empire and First 
Republic. 
The centrist position of the SDAP in the First Republic, 
conditioned by the fetish for unity, was represented and 
developed by a series of eminent political theorists (8) in the 
SDAP. Foremost among these was Otto Bauer, whose ideas largely 
defined the theoretical and practical stance of the SOAP 
throughout the First RepUblic. Bauer's centrism combined a 
progra:mmatical radicalism based in neo-Karxist theory with a 
moderate, reformist practical strategy in the highly successful 
effort to maintain the allegiance of both the left and right 
wings of the party. In this respect it is important to note that 
the radicalism of the SDAP was largely rhetorical, a 
·phraseology of integration" (9), which was directed more 
towards the satisfaction of left wing ideological purity in the 
party than to the speedy overthrow of the economic and political 
system in Austria. The most prominent example of this 
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integrative rad1kale Phrase was undoubtedly the reference in the 
1926 Linz Programme of the SDAP to "dictatorship". This was 
inserted into the programme at the behest of the Karxist 
philosopher and representative of the SDAP Left, Hax Adler, and 
concerned the possibility of unconstitutional bourgeOiS 
resistance against a hypothetical, democratically elected SDAP 
government of the future: 
If however the bourgeoisie should resist the social 
transformation which will be the task of the state under the 
working class, through a deliberate and planned disruption 
of economic life, by violent rebellion, or by conspiring 
with foreign counter-revolutionary powers, then the working 
class will be forced to break the resistance of the 
bourgeoisie by the means of a dictatorship (10). 
Two features of this social democratic "dictatorship" are 
worth noting. In the first place, it was based on a chain of 
hypothetical preconditions; their realisation was, at best, 
highly unlikely. "Dictatorship· was almost certainly destined to 
remain a nebulous theoretical issue unlikely ever to be seen in 
practice. Kore importantly though, dictatorship was conceived in 
the Linz Programme as a means, in a particular situation, for 
upbolding parliamentary democracy, which had nothing whatsoever 
in common with Leninist conceptions of a "dictatorship of the 
proletariat". 
State Power" 
parliamentary 
The whole programme section on the "Struggle for 
reveals a strong and unbending commitment to 
democracy in Austria. The SDAP committed itself to 
a "class struggle" based in the struggle for the support of the 
majority of the people. On the assumption of power, the SDAP 
would exercise state power "in tbe form of democracy and under 
all guarantees of democracy' (11). Dictatorship was an explicit 
last resort, intended to defend and realise the will of the 
people as expressed through the democratic electoral process. 
The strength of the SDAP's commitment· to parliamentary 
democracy indicates the nature of its conception of the state. 
The state was seen by Otto Bauer as a structure which was 
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essentially autonomous or "class-neutral", and which could be 
filled with capitalist, or peasant, or proletarian content, 
depending on which "social factors of power" were prevalent 
(12). Social democratic activity was thus consumed in the 
struggle to :maximise its "proletarian social factors of power", 
and thus gain influence over the state. These factors included 
social democratic influence in the economic arena, but meant 
above all the struggle for predominance in parliament. Either in 
coalition - which always remained a tactical possibility for the 
SDAP or as a :majority government, "pieces of genuine 
socialism", could be attained which would ensure the transition 
from capitalist to socialist society (13). 
In the Linz Programme,. the "pieces of genuine socialism" 
already achieved by the SDAP were listed: political equali ty, 
which gave the working class influence on legislation and 
adninistration at all levels of the 
achievements" of the post-war coalition 
state; the "social 
- workplace rights, 
social insurance and social welfare provision; the role of the 
trade unions in improving working conditions and the development 
of co-operative infl uence in the capitalist economy (14). The 
policy proposals listed for the future sought to expand, in 
logical procession, upon those achivements already made. Hence 
the social democrats would extend and safeguard democracy in the 
republic, improve working conditions and social insurance and 
extend the "collective economy" (co-operative, socialised and 
municipal undertakings) (15). 
It is evident that the Austrian social democrats had a 
thoroughly gradualist outlook in their perceived route towards 
socialism. Indeed, a gradual transition in the economic sphere 
was, for Otto Bauer, a necessary precondition for successful 
socialism. There had to be continui ty; the capitalist 
organisation of the economy could not be destroyed before the 
socialist replacement stood ready to take its place (16). This 
concept was refined in the Linz Programme, where it was held 
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that capitalism produced the preconditions for its own gradual 
downfall. As the means of production and exchange became ever 
more concentrated, they became ever riper for socialisation. All 
the SDAP had to do to create significant collective economc 
power was to socialise the institutions of capitalist 
concentration. Furthermore, capitalism had led to the rise of 
the labour movement. This then developed its own types of 
economic organisation, like co-operatives and municipal 
enterprises, which were under collective control. As the 
strength of the labour movement grew, so did the collective 
economy. The labour movement was also gaining, throuBh its trade 
unions, more and more of an insight intu management teChniques. 
This made it possible to replace capitalist with collective, 
socialist control without prejudicing the productive process. As 
capitalism developed, the opportunities for the .evolution of a 
socialist economic organisation therefore developed with it. 
This meant that there would be a probably lengthy period of 
transi tion where capitalist and socialist firms existed 
alongside each other before a completely socialist economy could 
be established (17). 
This gradual, protracted transition based on the incremental 
reform of the existing system was the basis of the "social 
revolution" enVisaged by the SDAP (18). This was the 
"revolutionary perspective" the Austrian Marxist centrists 
supposedly shared with the bolsheviks. It had little to do with 
the violent and abrupt destruction of the capitalist system 
envisaged by the bolsheviks. The term "revolution" symbolised 
the aspiration towards a socialist economic and social order 
which would be achieved in a painstaking process of reform (19). 
Beneath the surface of Marxist-revolutionary rhetoric, the SDAP 
had an outlook firmly based in reformist orthodoxy. 
However, with its exit from coalition in 1920, this scenario 
for gradualist reform lost its immediate relevance. Thereafter, 
the SDAP was confined at national level to the role of 
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opposi tion. This opposition was never fundamental; the social 
democrats remained committed to the realisation of their aims 
within the system and were even ready to give their support, 
from the opposition benches, to certain initiatives of the 
bourgeois governments. These concerned primarily the external 
security and the economic well-being of the republic and reflect 
the commitment of the social democrats to the democratic 
republic as a forum within which the development towards 
socialism could be ensured (20). Yet the SDAP was never able 
after 1920 to translate its republican commitment and its 
reformist strategy into positive participation in the 
administration of the republic. It was trapped in a politics of 
"neither-nor"; neither could it fully participate, nor could its 
opposition be fundamental. Norbert Leser attributes this to the 
social democratic fixation with party unity. In the attempt to 
avoid the splits which had weakened the labour movement 
elsewhere, the SDAP always chose the middle way, the "11ne of 
least resistance" (21), whether this was between reformism and 
bolshevism or between participation and opposition. In choosing 
nei ther one definite, perhaps controversial direction, nor the 
other, the SDAP drifted into a political inertia, reflected in 
theoretical terms by Otto Bauer's increasingly pessimistic and 
deterministic, neo-Kautskyan preoccupation with the "primacy of 
immutable historical forces" (22) . The obsession with party 
uni ty and the ensuing "theory and practice of non-commitment" 
(23) condemned the SDAP to political impotence at national level 
and left it open to the gradual erosion of its power bases under 
the Dollfu~ dictatorship and to destruction in the civil war of 
1934. 
The SDAP at national level was thus able to draw on a body 
of doctrine as a guide for its approach to politics; it was very 
much an ideological party whose strategies and actions were 
based on a systematic theoretical conception of Austrian state 
and society. On the other hand, the social democrats in Steyr in 
no sense had a systematic, codified ideology as a basis for 
-177-
their politics. Whereas the national party was able to call upon 
the ideas and writings of eminent political theorists like 
]auer, Karl Renner, Kax Adler and so on for ideological 
guidance, the SDAP in Steyr was quite bereft of theorists. Its 
outlook, its reformist strategy and policies were based firmly 
in practical local experience. 
6.2; The Practical BaBes Of Reformism in Steyr. 
The fundamental pOlitical orientation of the social 
democrats in Steyr was conditioned by their ethos. It has been a 
constant theme throughout this study that this ethos 
incorporated a predisposition to emphasise the value of 
organisation. Organisation was the means by which the social 
democratic stronghold in Steyr could be consolidated and 
insulated from a hostile external environment. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the major 
stronghold were the MAV 
organisational power bases of the 
and the municipal administration. 
Together these represented the mainstays of the social 
democratic network in Steyr, which harnessed and concentrated 
the movement's organisational powers to form the basis of social 
denocratic hegemony in the late 1920' s. The social democrats 
thus enthusiastically embraced the potential of trade unionism 
and local government to secure their domination of the 
stronghold. The nature of their activity and experience as trade 
unionists and local councillors was crucial in determining the 
fundamental orientation of the movement in its relationship to 
the existing order of Austrian state and society. 
In general terms, social democratic trade unions, especially 
in Central Europe, assumed for themselves a special role within 
the capitalist system by taking on the function of representing 
the interests of workers vis-a-vis the representatives and 
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interests of business. Their role was to protect, within the 
framework of the capitalist system, the interests of their 
membership. The more they became attached to this role, the more 
they attached themselves to the system and society within which 
they worked. They developed a socially conservative mentality 
which rejected the idea of revolution and pushed them towards a 
practical policy of reform within the framework of existing 
society. This social conservatism was enhanced in Austria by the 
various statutory functions assigned to the trade unions in 
works councils, Chambers of Labour, conciliation offices and so 
on. The social democratic trade unions had a large functional 
domain which they were concerned to conserve and extend within 
existing society (24). 
The MAV in Steyr conformed very strongly to this model. It 
was seen in Chapter Two that the MAV had a particularly 
significant functional domain in the Steyr-Werke (at least until 
1930). It had enthusiastically embraced the potential of the 
post-war works council legislation and exploited its strength in 
industrial relations in the immediate post-war era to establish 
for itself a dominant and privileged position on the shopfloor 
of the car works. And, as shown during the 1925 lockout at the 
works and again in the conflict with management in 1930, the MAV 
was determined to hold on to its functional domain (see Chapter 
Two). Similarly, social democratic councillors carried out 
functions assigned to them by the constitution of the republic. 
They too performed a role intrinsically tied to the existing 
system, and, as argued below, they were committed to retaining 
this role at all costs. Thus, both the MAV and the local 
municipal administration were deeply attached to performing 
roles which derived from the existing socio-economic and 
constitutional order. They had made a considerable investment in 
the capitalist socio-economic system and the political system of 
parliamentary democracy. As a result, they were thoroughly 
committed to those systems. This commitment was based on their 
practical experience as trade unionists and local councillors; 
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it had no foundation in any theoretical/ideological analysis of 
Austrian politics and society. 
This non-theoretical outlook, based in practical local 
experience, is further illustrated in the social democratic 
strategy for power. The social democrats were committed to the 
potential of parliamentary democracy, as enshrined in the 
constitution of the First Republic, to achieve their ends. 
Democracy was the arena in which social democratic obj ecti ves 
would be achieved in an explicitly evolutionary process of 
undefined duration (25). Crucial to this classically reformist, 
gradualist strategy was the electoral processj the improving 
electoral performance of the SDAP was apparent evidence that it 
was ever nearer, no matter how slow the progress, to achieving 
power (1. e. 51% of the vote) in the state (26). However, this 
strategy was not based on any ideological conception of 
democracy and the statej as seen in Chapter Four, it derived 
rather from the extreme organisational mentali ty of the party 
leadership in Steyr. The party leadership valued the size and 
welfare of the party organisation as their primary poH tical 
concern. Organisational advance was equated fully with global 
political advance. Social democratic activity was thus dedicated 
to increasing the size of the party organisation, towards 
winning new members and voters, new councillors and M.P.'s. Each 
of these incremental organisational advances was seen as a 
further step nearer state power. Social democratic commitment to 
the democratic process was thus based in the practical 
experience of the party leadership at the centre of the party 
organisation. 
The commitment to the democratic process also reflected the 
fact that the transition to a democratic form of government had 
been made only recently, in the aftermath of the First World 
War. For social democrats in particular, the establishment of a 
form of electorally accountable, democratic government, 
constrained by the rule of law, was a vast improvement over the 
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previous autocratic and repressive imperial regime. Hence, many 
thousands of social democrats in Steyr were willing each year to 
join in the celebrations of the anniversary of the founding of 
the democratic republic. Moreover, many others were prepared to 
participate in the physical defence of the republic, whether 
against external threat, or internal anti-democratic'forces (see 
Chapter Five, section 5.1). Democracy in the Austrian republic 
was therefore not only worth defending in its perceived function 
as a forum where social democratic objectives could be achieved 
on the basis of organisational advance, but also on its own 
merits (27). In contrast, all forms of dictatorship were 
rejected. This applied equally to monarchist restoration, 
Heimwehr aspirations to a dictatorship on the model of fascist 
Italy, clericalist yearnings for an authoritarian corporate 
state and to dictatorships of the communist left (28). The SDAP 
in Steyr had a genuine abhorrence of communist methods and 
goals. When challenged in the early 1930' s by concerted local 
communist attempts to recruit from social democratic ranks, the 
SOAP sought to assert itself by emphasising its democratic 
commi tment against the "revolutionary romanticism" of the 
communists. The SOAP contrasted its constitutionalism with the 
illegal, anti-system aims pursued by the communists. Rather than 
overthrow the existing system, the party strove to rally social 
democratic opinion around the defence of those advances already 
made in the democratic republic and ultimately around the 
defence of democracy itself (29). 
The adherence to the democratic process was Vigorous and 
strong. Evidence of this is provided in both the municipal 
politics of the SOAP in Steyr, and in the party's reaction to 
developing repression at the hands of bourgeois national 
governments. The social democratic municipal administration 
faced a permanent local financial crisis, so that especially in 
the 1930' s, it became virtually impossible even to fulfil the 
basic statutory requirements of local government. This crisis 
was caused partly by irreversible local factors (30) and partly 
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by the policies of successive christian social Federal Finance 
Xinisters. In particular, the redistribution of federal tax 
income to the municipalities favoured rural communities over 
urban ones with far greater municipal obligations. In this 
situation, the social democrats were forced to apply regularly 
for emergency aid from the federal government. Their persistence 
was doggedi between 1926 and 1931, some thirty-four municipal 
delegations made unsuccessful pleas for aid from the federation 
(31). Despite the fruitlessness and apparent pointlessness of 
their efforts, the social democrats never lost the belief that 
the system would come to Steyr's aid. Only once did they 
consider laying down their mandates in protest at the reticence 
of federal authorities, but this course of action was rejected 
(32). Ultimately, the social democrats' commitment to the system 
and procedures of the First Republic precluded them from 
relinquishing their municipal responsibilities. Their sense of 
constitutional responsibility to the population of the town 
which elected them into office was paramount. 
The persistence with which the social democrats applied for 
federal financial aid reveals a belief in what might be called a 
'sense of fair plaY"i the social democrats were convinced of the 
merits of their case and continued to believe that it could be 
won by force of persuasion. A similar attitude was displayed on 
several occasions in the 1930's when it seemed that Austria was 
operating a system of "class-justice" which penalised social 
democrats for the same things the Heimwehr could do with 
complete impunity. A case in mind would be the massive arms 
searches ordered by the then Minister for Internal Affairs, the 
HeilDwebr leader Starhemberg, in Steyr and other social 
democratic strongholds throughout Austria on 4th November 1930. 
The searches were blatantly one-sided and were presumably 
ordered to provoke social delDOcratic retaliation and provide a 
pretext for suspending the federal elections due to take place 
five days later (33). The social democratic leadership in Steyr 
appealed for disCipline and the avoidance of confrontation, and 
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that Starhemberg be answered in "correct" manner on election 
day. The final few days of the election campaign thus evolved 
into a protest based on the themes of impartial justice and 
equality before the law (34). The social democrats were 
convinced of their ability to use the democratic process to 
bring about a balanced and just solution. 
This basic faith in the potential of the democratic process 
remained a key theme for the social democratic leadership in 
Steyr in the early 1930's despite the increasingly and, openly 
partisan application of the law by the federal government and 
its security forces. The activities of the party remained firmly 
attached to democratic norms: recruitment drives, electoral 
agitation, the crganisation of petitions and so on. Similarly, 
the protests of the local leadership against the attempted 
Heimwehr putsch of September 1931, against local anti-social 
democratic police brutality, and even against the elimination of 
parliament by Dollfu~ in March 1933 all retained a basic 
optll .. j sm about the efficacy of the democratic process (35). 
However, the democratic faith of the social democrats 
grossly overestimated the democratic potential of the system 
when it was under the control of semi and later fully 
authoritarian, anti-democratic 
inabili ty of the SDAP to respond 
forces. This reflects the 
to the new problems posed by 
clericalist authoritarianism. It was a large, unwieldy mass 
party, whose strategies were developed for and attuned to use in 
an open, democratic system. At national level, its inability to 
respond was, according to Norbert Leser, conditioned both by the 
immobilising fixation with party unity, and by the inflexibility 
of a hierarchical, conservative and strictly disciplined party 
organisation (36). This latter factor was especially pertinent 
in Steyr. It was seen in Chapter Four that the organisational 
structure of the SDAP was highly bureaucratised and that the 
leadership both completely dominated the local party and that it 
was ossified in its position. Its strategy had been established 
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decisively in the late 1920' s. Furthermore, in the insulated 
setting of the local milieu, which shielded the social democrats 
in Steyr from the implications of the growing strength of the 
anti-democratic Right, this strategy seemed an eminently 
feasible basis for the attainment of political power. This 
apparent feasibility ensured that that the social democratic 
strategy, centred in organisational advance, became just as 
ossified and unalterable as the leadership itself. Moreover, as 
was noted in Chapter Four, the personal interests of the 
leadership elite were bound up and identified with the scale and 
well-being of the party organisation. The elite was therefore 
inherently unwilling to endanger the organisation it had so 
painstakingly bull t up, and with which its own interests were 
associated, by changing course and embarking on a different, 
perhaps more confrontational strategy. The elite thus retained a 
faith in the potential of organisational advance within the 
parliamentary system even after the redefinition of the local 
milieu in the late 1920' s had exposed the social democratic 
movement in Steyr to the fact that the institutions of democracy 
in Austria were under anti-democratic and anti-social democratic 
control, and thus that a parliamentary strategy was increasingly 
unrealistic. The implications of this inflexibility are examined 
further below and in the following chapter. 
6.3: Tbe Polit1cs ot Amelioratiye Reform. 
It has been established that the social democrats in Steyr 
were firmly committed to working within the existing social and 
constitutional order and had a typically reformist, majoritarian 
strategy for power. This section assesses precisely what the 
social democrats sought to reform in the existing order. This 
revolved primarily around the reform of certain limited aspects 
of the capitalist socio-economic system. The social democrats 
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ai:med to introduce a progressive and redistributive tax and 
benefi t system, 
explicit right 
whereby all citizens in need would have an 
to adequate social welfare facilities and 
benefits. They were also committed to a mixed economy, directed 
by an active, interventionist econonic pOlicy whose aim was the 
elimination of unemployment. Once again, these policy aims were 
not based in any sense on a theory of capitalism, on a rigorous 
and rational critique of the bases of the capitalist system, but 
rather on a further dimension of practical local experience. 
This stemmed from the economic dependence of Steyr, for over 
half a century, on the often wildly fluctuating commercial 
fortunes of the stel'r-'ierke (37). Local economic instability 
apparently condemned the working class to a life interspersed 
with unemployment, poverty and suffering. It was this local 
economic instability which the social democrats in steyr sought 
to relieve. They lacked a wider perspective on the capitalist 
system as a whole, developing rather, as can be seen in the 
following examination of their municipal policies, a reactive, 
"fire-brigade" approach to economic and social policy: wherever 
the local economy failed, the social democrats immediately 
rushed to the scene to patch it up. 
Steyr was afflicted by some of the worst social deprivation 
and poverty in Central and Western Europe (38). This reflected, 
in the eyes of the social democrats, failings whose roots ran 
deep into a (local) capi tal1st economic system whose primary 
concern was profit and not social welfare. The municipal 
"fire-brigade" was thus forced to assume the social 
responsibilities which the capitalist economy neglected (39). In 
doing so, the social democrats rejected the notion of private 
charity as a remedy for social problems. The provision of social 
welfare was regarded as the duty of the whole population, and 
anyone who was poor, unemployed, homeless etc. was entitled to 
adequate aid as an explicit social right rather than as some 
paternalistic act of grace .. ' The social democrats promoted the 
idea of collective social responsibility as the duty of a 
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society whose economic failings were seen as the root cause of 
the various social problems (40). 
The commitment to provide relief for the disadvantaged in 
Steyr was balanced by the attempt to raise income via the 
principles of progressive taxation. While the municipal1 ty had 
relatively little financial autonomy, the only locally raised 
tax of any real note and financial significance was highly 
progressive. It was based on property values, split into twelve 
groups, each of which was taxed at a higher rate than the 
previous one. In addition, a 50% surcharge was added from the 
eighth group upwards. In these higher brackets, the property tax 
was up to eight times greater than its highly controversial 
equivalent in Vienna and was the highest such tax in Austria. On 
the other hand, in the lower brackets, representing cheap, 
predominantly working class housing, Steyr's residents paid less 
than was charged in towns of similar size (41). Seen in tandem 
with the sums raised by the progressive property tax, the sums 
spent on the provision of welfare (cash benefits, medical aid, 
the provision of accommodation for the homeless) represent a 
significant, if, in absolute terms, small redistribution of 
income in Steyr. Those who were affluent enough to afford more 
valuable property in the town largely paid for the welfare of 
the socially disadvantaged (42). This redistributive effect is 
amplified when other municipal policies are taken into account. 
The social democrats were keen, for example, to provide 
incenti ves and subsidies for local building co-operatives to 
build low-cost local (working class) housing (43) and also ran a 
subsidised local bus service between 1927 and 1930 (44). Their 
overall strategy was to provide an improved standard of living 
for the town's poor, the costs of which were charged as much as 
possible to those who were more affluent. In effect, they sought 
to impose on the more affluent classes, which, on the whole, 
benefitted from local capitalism, the sense of collective social 
responsibility that capitalist SOCiety otherwise lacked. 
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The social democratic attitude to unemploYlllent was derived 
on a similar basis. Unemployment was seen as a basic 
characteristic of a local capitalist system which was inherently 
susceptible to periodic crisis. Since, however, capitalist 
society assumed little responsibility for the social 
consequences of unemployment apart from limited unemployment 
benefits, the social democratic municipality was forced to react 
and assume the responsi bili ty itself. This took the form of 
general welfare provision as discussed above as well as various 
measures designed explicitly to combat local unemployment. These 
included the takeover of local "lame duck" enterprises, which 
would otherwise have folded (45), and the (unsuccessful) 
campaign to enlist federal aid in major local public works 
schemes (46). 
These policies indicate a commitment to the idea of active 
state intervention in the economy to meet certain social 
objectives, like the reduction of unemployment, which would 
otherwise have remained unfulfilled. However, the outlook of the 
social democrats regarding the conbatting of unemployment was 
highly pragmatic. They were willing to use a variety of methods 
to realise their emploYlllent objectives. The commitment to state 
intervention certainly did not rule out the utilisation of 
private enterprise to meet the same objectives. The main reason 
for the susceptibility of Steyr to large-scale unemployment was 
the town's dependence on one major employer, the Steyr-Werke. If 
employment levels fell at the works, unemployment levels were 
increased not only directly by unemployed car workers but also 
indirectly as the general reduction in local purchasing power 
"knocked-on" and plunged the whole local economy into recession. 
The social democratic municipal administration therefore sought 
to support and build up alternative local industries which could 
provide an economic counterbalance to the Steyr-Werke. This led 
it, for example, to invest several hundred thousand shillings in 
shares in local firms in 1925 and 1926 (47). The municipality 
was also involved after 1926 in a long-term campaign to develop 
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the local tourist industry as a counterpoint to the economc 
influence of the car works (48). In other words, the stimulation 
of successful capitalist private enterprise was just as 
legitimate a weapon against unemployment and/or the threat of 
unemployment as state economic intervention. Both were 
potentially fruitful means to ensure the achievement of an 
important end. The social democrats thus embraced - on the basis 
of local experience and without theoretical foundation - the 
concept of a mixed economy. This emphasises that while the 
social democrats rejected the negative outputs of the system 
<unemployment etc.), they did not fundamentally reject the 
system as a whole. In more contemporary terminology, they sought 
to manage the existing system in a different, better way, 
according to objectives alternative to those otherwise employed. 
The social democrats thus followed a practical reform 
programme, based on local experience and conditions, which 
strove for the ameliorative reform of certain outputs of the 
capitalist system. It is important to note that the efficacy of 
this programme was heavily dependent on local economic 
circumstances. In particular, the financial means for local 
reform was largely derived from local tax income, in particular 
the income tax levied on a local workforce whose size, and 
therefore financial product! vi ty was defined above all else by 
the current level of employment at the Steyr-Werke. The 
implications of this dependence are indicated below. 
It has been shown that the social democrats in Steyr were 
fully committed to the procedures of compet! ti ve parliamentary 
denocracy and to the realisation of a limited, pragmatically 
oriented reform strategy which remained within the parameters of 
the existing Austrian social and economic order. This reformist 
strategy had, apparently, good prospects for realisation in the 
local milieu of the late 1920' s. The local economy entered a 
boom period after 192'7, which fed tax income into the 
redistri but! ve and employment policies of the munic!pali ty. In 
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addition, the insulated nature of the local milieu shielded the 
social democrats from the implications 01 broader political 
trends in Austria, enabling them to maintain unimpaired 
confidence in the feasibility of a parliamentary strategy for 
power. Reformism was thus an eminently feasible and realistic 
strategy. However, the local preconditions for reformism 
vanished after 1929-1930. The local milieu was redefined in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Steyr-Werke. Economic collapse 
eliminated the financial basis of the municipal social and 
economic reform programme and exposed the dependence of 
municipal reformism on the economic success of the capitalist 
economy in the local form of the Steyr-Werke. Furthermore, 
Steyr's insulated development was undermined as factors in 
national politics increasingly impInged on the local context. 
Steyr became exposed to the progressive subversion of the bases 
of competitive, parliamentary politics by the Austrian Right, 
which culminated in the establIshment of dictatorship in 
1932-1933. The social democratic confidence in the efficacy of a 
parliamentary strategy for power was thus revealed to be 
illusory. 
After 1929, the reformism of the SDAP in Steyr was no longer 
a realistic political strategy. It had becomeme outdated and 
anachronistic, increasingly inconsistent with the realities of 
local and national political circumstances. On the whole, 
though, the party leadership adhered to its established 
positions and policies. The all-consuming preoccupation of the 
leadership with the consolidation and preservation of the party 
organisation was reflected in a tactical inflexibility and 
political passivity which proved wholly inadequate in defending 
the party and its preferred poli tical arena of parliamentary 
democracy against Austrian authoritarianism. The failure of 
social democratic reformism in Steyr in the new circumstances of 
the 1930's and the inability of the established leadership to 
adapt stimulated the search for a different political approach. 
This culminated in the emergence of a left-wing opposition 
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within the local social democratic movement which rejected the 
passive acquiescence of the established leadership and sought to 
mount an activist and offensive resistance to dictatorship. The 
emergence of opposition and of its radical, anti -dictatorial 
strategy are discussed in the following chapter. 
It is clear in the above discussion that the character of 
social democratic reformism in Steyr was distinctive in sever~l 
respects. Xost fundamentally, the social democrats had a 
pragmatic approach which contrasted strongly with the 
ideological foundations of reformism at the national level. The 
SDAP in Steyr was profoundly non-ideological. Its reformism was 
based in practical acti vJ.t.y and experience at the 10=1 level. A 
key featUl-e o! this practical ol'jeniai:Jon ,·:as the preoccllpoU.OIl 
wi th organIsation "hI ch "as CEntral to the sod a] democratIc 
ethos in Steyr. On the basis o! their practical experience in 
building up local organisational power bases in the }oIAV and tbe 
municipality, the social democrats developed deep-seated 
attachments to the existing order. Their political activities 
were therefore oriented towards the existing framework of 
Austrian state and society. In addition, the extreme 
organisational mentality of the party leadership conditioned an 
obdurate adherence to a parliamentary strategy for power based 
in gradual organisational advance. And finally, the experience 
of local economic instability inspired a commitment to modify 
and relieve certain locally perceived failings of the capitalist 
economy. 
In comparison with the SDAP at national level, the party in 
Steyr was decidedly moderate. Although it shared with its mother 
party a deep attachment to the democratic process and to 
competitive party politics, it diverged significantly in other 
respects. Unlike the national party, for example, the local SDAP 
had no conception of a fundamental reorganisation of the 
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economy. The national party aimed (albeit very gradually) to 
replace the capitalist system with a socialist-collectivist 
alternative. In Steyr, the emphasis was placed on the 
improvement of the existing system - either by reacting to and 
ameliorating the social implications of local economic 
instability, or by attempting to manage the capitalist economy 
with a greater conern for social welfare. Furthermore, the 
national party remained something of a "closet" reformist 
organisation, following a reformist practice, but forced to 
maintain a radical phraseology for fear of alienating its 
sporadically influential left wing. There was no influential 
left wing in Steyr until the early 1930's; the local SDAP was an 
unambiguously reformist party. 
However, just as the SDAP's reformism in Steyr was based in 
practical local experience, the potential for the realisation of 
its reformist goals was also rooted in local conditions. It was 
geared to the unique local milieu for politics which existed in 
the late 1920' s and was singularly inappropriate to the new 
political framework which existed after the redefinition of the 
local milieu in 1929-1930. The preconditions for the SDAP's 
reformism disappeared after 1929. However, a bureaucratically 
entrenched and self-interested party elite was unable to adapt 
to the new circumstances of the 1930's. As a result, the SDAP in 
Steyr disintegrated as a credible political force and stimulated 
the oppositional tendencies which are the focus of the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION IN THE SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC HQVEHENT 1929-1934. 
By late 1933, the only significant political force in the 
social democratic movement in Steyr was a strong left wing, 
based in the Schutzbund, the SAJ and the MAV, which was 
fundamentally opposed to the reformist strategy previously 
pursued by the SDAP. The elected leadership of the party, both 
local and national, had lost its credibility, legitimacy and 
authority among important sections of the movement. This chapter 
examines the reasons for the eclipse of the established 
leadership and analyses the background to the development of the 
inner-movement opposition of 1933, its strategical conception 
and its participation in the active resistance to dictatorship 
in the civil war of February 1934. 
As established in the previous chapter, social democratic 
reformism in Steyr was intimately bound to certain 
preconditions. It was dependent on both an expanding capitalist 
economy and on a system of open and competi ti ve parliamentary 
politics. These preconditions were fulfilled in the unique local 
context of the local milieu which existed in the late 1920's. In 
the early 1930' s however, Steyr was afflicted by deep local 
economic crisis and was exposed to the anti-democratic 
tendencies of an increasingly dominant Right. The redefinition 
of the local milieu after 1929 produced a new economic and 
political background which was inappropriate for the successful 
implementation of the reformist· strategy discussed in the 
previous chapter. Section 7.1 examines the failure of reformism 
in the context of the 1930's. 
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The snAP in Steyr was unable to adapt to this new context. 
The bureaucratic structure of the party and the extreme and 
self-interested organisational mentality of its leadership 
inhibited effective reponse. The party thus adhered to a 
poli tical strategy which was anachronistic and ineffectual in 
the face of mass local unemployment and political repression. 
This was reflected in the disintegration of the social 
democratic movement. Many members were lost as long-term 
unemployment eroded their political commitment, while others 
transferred their. allegiance to the communists, attracted by 
their more innovative and effective agitation among the 
unemployed. Other members left the movement in protest at the 
acquiescent attitude of both local and national party 
leaderships to state repression. Both advocated the avoidance of 
provocation and the passive acceptance of partisan arms 
confiscations, restrictions on political acti vi ties etc. This 
passivity was justified at the national level by Otto Bauer in 
an elaborate theoretical determinism which looked only to the 
future and prescribed a "wait-and-see" attitude for the present. 
Locally, it reflected the intense organisational preoccupation 
of a bureaucratic party leadership, which, under no 
circumstances would risk jeopardising the existence of the 
organisation by sanctioning protest against repression. 
The SAJ and, in particular, the Schutzbund were unwilling to 
accept domination and repression by the Austrian Right without 
some kind of resistance. They became increasingly opposed to the 
passivity and acquiescence of the established leadership of the 
party, and many left to join the more activist and resolute 
communists or national socialists. Others displayed their 
opposition in a semi-independent political activism within the 
social democratic movement but directed against the tactics of 
the leadership. SAJ and Schytzmlnd thus formed two aspects of a 
strong opposi tional potential in Steyr. They were complemented 
by a developing opposition in the MAV. This was centred around 
two Works Councillors at the Steyr-Werke, August Koser and Franz 
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Schrangl. Moser and Schrangl were linked to a nascent national 
left-opposition in the SDAP, which sought to impose a more 
activist and confrontational strategy on the party. They were 
able to use the respect and authority they commanded in the 
workforce at the car works to exert a political influence which 
ensured that the MAV became a third centre of opposi tional 
potential (see section 7.2). 
The disillusionment with the tactics and leadership of the 
SDAP intensified after March 1933, when the party evaded a 
decisive confrontation after Chancellor Dollfu,13 had circumvented 
parliamentary politics. Over the following months Maser and 
Schrangl developed an unsophisticated, but distinctive 
apposition strategy. This rejected the basic principles upon 
which the poH tics of the SDAP in Steyr had been founded: the 
partial reform of the existing system on the basis of a 
parliamentary strategy for power centred in organisational 
advance. However, the opposition strategy went even further than 
rej ecting the particular nature of the local Social Democratic 
Party. It also incorporated a rejection of the broader 
characteristics of social democracy in general. The new strategy 
abandoned the whole concept of participating in the state in the 
pursuit of reforms which would gradually modify and/or replace 
the capi tal1st organisation of society. Instead it proposed an 
activist, extra-parliamentary politics, whose aim was the abrupt 
and violent overthrow of the existing order, and its replacement 
by a revolutionary, quasi-bolshevik regime (section 7.3) 
Late in 1933, the opposi tional potential of SAJ, Schutzbund 
and MAV coalesced under the leadership of Moser and Schrangl to 
form a broad local opposition movement which proved to be a 
decisive influence in the decision to mount active resistance to 
dictatorship in the civil war of February 1934. It is the 
contention of this chapter that the participation of some 600 
social democrats in the civil war in Steyr was the culmination 
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of a process of alienation and emancipation from reformist 
social democracy and all the assumptions which went with it. 
7.1; The Failure Of Refgrmism and the DisintegratiOD of the 
Social Pemgcrat1c Movement. 
The membership of the SDAP grew steadily after 1926 and 
reached a highpoint of around 5,000 in 1929. The growth in 
membership coincided with the growth of the local economy after 
1926, and the peak membership with the height of the false boom 
at the Steyr-Werke in 1928-1929. The general surge in memberShip 
levels is partly ascribable to a rise in instrumentalist support 
for the party. As employment at the Steyr-Werke increased, so 
did the influence of social democratic patronage in the local 
labour market. This encouraged the proliferation of "fair-
weather" social democrats, who joined the party only for the 
potential material benefits available from memberShip (see 
Chapter Three). The rise in membership also reflects, however, a 
more genuine and deep-seated increase in social democratic 
populari ty in the town. Electoral support for the SDAP was 
firmly on an upward gradient (1), and the many social democratic 
auxiliary organisations, most of which did not offer any 
instrumentalist incentives, were flourishing (see Table 8). This 
more genuine popularity was indicative of the apparent success 
of social democratic reformism in Steyr in the period 1927-1929. 
This apparent success reflected the peculiar conditions which 
existed in the local milieu in the late 1920's, The local 
insularity which derived from Steyr's social and political 
isolation enabled the social democrats to maintain their 
confidence in the efficacy of a parliamentary strategy for power 
based on the gradual expansion of the size of the party 
organisation and electorate. In addition, economic boom at the 
-195-
Steyr-Werke boosted municipal tax income and provided the funds 
for local welfare reforms. 
The period between 1927 and 1929 was therefore both a 
highpoint of social democratic popularity and of social 
democratic reformism in Steyr. After 1929, however, the party 
began to diSintegrate. By 1931 it had lost around a quarter of 
its 1929 membership; the losses in its women's organisation and 
some of its sections were even greater (see Table 10). The loss 
of previous instrumentalist support after the collapse of social 
democratic patronage in the local labour market in the aftermath 
of the shutdown of the Steyr-Werke accounted for an initial, 
one-off fall in membership levels. The decline continued 
however, excepting a temporary upswing late in 1932 due to a 
intensive recruitment drive, right through to the official 
dissolution of the party in February 1934 (2). This continued 
decline reflected the failure of social democratic reformism in 
Steyr in the 1930's. The SDAP's reformist strategy was suited 
to, and was relatively successful in, the late 1920' s. At the 
turn of the decade a massive Change in local circumstances set 
in. The collapse of the Steyr-Werke in 1929 led to a sudden and 
radical redefinition of the local milieu. The resultant local 
economic crisis and mass unemployment undermined local welfare 
reforms, while at the same time, Steyr's insularity was pierced 
and eroded as factors in national politics encroached on the 
local context. In particular, the social democrats were forced 
to accept that successive federal governments were beginning to 
abandon and subvert the principles and institutions of Austrian 
democracy, and therefore that their parliamentary strategy for 
power was becoming increasingly unrealistic. 
The SDAP in Steyr was unable to respond effectively to these 
new circumstances. It was an unwieldy, bureaucratic party with 
an ossified internal structure, whose leadership elite was tied 
to a self-serving organisational strategy for power. It was 
unable to take account of new conditions and mobilise around new 
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issues. It thus remained fettered to the politics of the 1920's. 
This section assesses the negative effects of social democratic 
inflexibility on the cohesion of the social democratic movement 
in the early 1930's. 
A fundamental problem of the 1930's with which the SDAP in 
Steyr was unable to come to terms with any measure of success 
was :mass unemployment. Keasured against the size of the 
workforce in the town as cited in the census of 1920, 
unemployment rose from a lowpoint of just over 5% in June 1929, 
to 21% by the end of that year, and continued to rise until its 
peak of 33% at the end of 1932. The decline in unemployment 
levels thereafter was slow and had reached only 28% by the start 
of 1934 (3). Major first-hand studies of inter-war unemployment 
have generally come to similar conclusions as to its effects on 
the unemployed (4). These were invariably ruinous for the social 
democratic movement. Long-term unemployment ushered in a process 
of gradual personal and social disintegration, which progressed 
through several stages of deterioration to leave the subjects in 
a state of resigned apathy. The long-term unemployed lost all 
self-confidence and progressively withdrew themselves from all 
extra-familial social relationships. This naturally affected the 
level of political activity. Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel's 
stUdy of near-100% unemployment in the Lower Austrian village of 
Marienthal revealed a steady withdrawal of the unemployed from 
poli tical acti vi ty over the whole poH tical spectrum. This did 
not, however, reflect any changes in political allegiance; 
electoral results remained remarkably constant before and during 
the period of mass unemployment. Politics lost only its power to 
shape the content and relationships of everyday life (5). 
The findings in Steyr corroborate those of the Karienthal 
study. There is evidence of a high degree of hopelessness and 
resignation among the unemployed in the town (6). That this led 
to a decline in political commitment is indicated by the steady 
decline in the membership of the SDAP throughout the period of 
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high unemployment. On the other hand, the voting strength of the 
party, allowing for the effects of emigration, remained 
relatively stable, except for sone small losses to the 
conmunists (7). Unenployment gradually eroded the propensity of 
social denocratic supporters to participate with commitment and 
enthusiasm in the day-to-day life of the party. 
The decline in social denocratic political p",·t1cipation in 
Steyr was exacerbat"d by a wave of emigration fron the town. The 
t i nderfrellnde in Steyr had lost around a thousand members due to 
emigration by the end of 1930, and the party alnost five hundred 
in 1931 (8). The loss was not just quantitative; the quality of 
the social denocratic membership was also affected. In an 
earlier wave of emigration fron Steyr in 1925, the bulk of the 
emigrants had been skilled and qualified workers, traditionally 
the most able representatives of the working class. Despite the 
absence of an occupational breakdown of post-1929 emigrants, it 
can be assumed that the same type of workers were again involved 
in the emigration movement. Rationalisation at the Stel'r-Werke 
had created a surplus of skilled labour, and workers with skills 
and qualifications were IIDre likely to get jobs elsewhere (9). 
)!oreover, in Marienthal it was found that younger people were 
over-represented among those who emigrated. The village lost 
some of its most energetic and vital forces (10). Again, 
al though there is no direct evidence, it is probable that the 
same applied in Steyr. Emigration inevitably involved 
considerable material and psychOlogical rigours; younger people 
were far more likely to undergo such rigours than their older 
colleagues. Steyr and the social democratic movement in 
particular were thus drained of the vi tal! ty of young, skilled 
workers by the upsurge in emigration. 
The effects of unemployment - political apathy and a high 
emigration rate presented disadvantages for the social 
denocratic movement inherent in the local economic situation of 
the early 1930's. These were compounded by the inability of the 
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social democrats to adapt their tactical outlook to the needs of 
the unemployed. At the end of 1932, over 70% 
of the District SDAP were unemployed (11). 
of the membership 
But although the 
party leadership realised that many of its supporters had become 
• weary" in the economic crisis (1. e. presumably had withdrawn 
from active party life) (12), it was unable to devise a coherent 
and attractive strategy to articulate and represent the 
particular problems facing the unemployed, and thereby maintain 
their political interest and ccmmitment. It adhered to its 
established parliamentary orientation. Social democrats from 
Steyr helped, for example, to formulate a series of eloquent 
resolutions in the Upper Austrian Landtag which condemned cuts 
in state unemployment support (13). They also collected 
signatures with great enthusiasm for a popular initiative law 
designed to improve social insurance (14). Such tactics had no 
immediate relevance to the day-to-day concerns of the average 
unemployed person, and once again they tended to over-estimate 
the potential of democratic methods when the federal government 
of the democratic republic was in increasingly anti-democratic 
hands. The SOAP was adhering to its established reformist 
methods, which were relevant in the insulated local milieu of 
the 1920's, but which had ncw become increasingly unrealistic. 
The Communist Party in Steyr sought to address the needs of 
the unemployed directly rather than indirectly through the 
democratic process. The communists carried out campaigns for the 
unemployed on the streets, in close contact with those who were 
out of work. This contrasted with the detached and remote 
parliamentary tactics of the SOAP. The Communist Party was able 
to draw on guidelines issued by its national executive for 
agitation among the unemployed. These recognised the danger that 
the unemployed were likely to withdraw over time into a 
self-imposed social isolation and emphasised that the unemployed 
must be integrated into "normal" party organisations (15). The 
attempt to integrate the jobless aimed to create the sense of 
purpose in life which tended to evaporate in long-term 
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unemployment. This was complemented by the provision of material 
relief, which, albeit modest, proved to be an important 
mobilisational tool. Between 1930 and 1932, the communist 
movement enjoyed several surges in support which were due, 
according to police reports, to 
agitation among the unemployed 
the effectiveness of its 
(16) • Social democratic 
activities among and for the unemployed were never integrated 
into the mainstream of party activity; the potential of up to 
70% of the party membership and many more who had already 
withdrawn from political life ,was not exploited. The social 
democrats remained very much behind the communists in both the 
scale' and the impact of their work with and on behalf of the 
unemployed. The SDAP was not a party of mobilisation like the 
KPo; it was a bureaucratic organisation, 
quickly or adequately to new challenges. 
political inertia, using methods which 
unable to respond 
It lapsed into a 
were relevant to 
different circumstances, and which were ineffectual in 'coping 
with contemporary problems. 
The SOAP also lost a considerable number of younger members 
to the communist and national socialist movements in the early 
1930's. The attractiveness of extremist political movements to 
youth in the inter-war era has been interpreted as a consequence 
of youth unemployment (17), Young people tended to be less 
easily "broken" by unemployment and are less likely than older 
colleagues to fall into a state of resigned apathy. Then, "as 
poverty at home drove unemployed youth on to the streets, devoid 
of either money or self-respect, they became ready recruits for 
street gangs which, in turn, were manipulated by extremist 
political parties· (18). These parties, and especially their 
paramilitary wings, provided meaningful structure for the daily 
life of their youthful recruits, a sense of cOlllI'adeship and 
belonging and, perhaps most importantly, a sense of mission 
directed against the system which had, so far, failed them (19). 
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The radicalisation of younger social democrats in Steyr and 
their defections to the KP6 and the NSOAP were also related to 
the attitude of the SOAP leadership, both local and national, to 
the onset of state anti-social democratic repression. The 
reaction of the SOAP to the various arms searches, bans on 
meetings and marches, increasingly partisan and violent 
treatment by the police and Dollfu~' dictatorial rule by 
emergency decree was essentially passive. The party continued to 
hope for an improvement in its treatment either from the results 
of the electoral process or from some compromise formula which 
could be worked out with the government. The commitment to a 
democratic solution was increasingly illusory and only served to 
legitinate a passivity, which, in the eyes of disaffected 
elements, amounted to a progressive surrender of social 
democratic strength. That the social democratic youth in Steyr 
should number strongly among such disaffected elements was 
explained in Chapter Five, section 5.2. The social democratic 
youth movement, the SAJ, had been educated for a function which 
would only be activated when the SOAP had conquered power in the 
state. It was, however, forced to sit and watch as the party 
seemed, through its passivity, to be slipping further and 
further away from state power. Its planned future function 
seemed more and more distant and unrealistic. This provoked a 
disaffection with party passivity which culminated in defection 
to movements which were more ready to take action in support of 
their aims. 
A similar argument explains the regular defections of 
SchutzbUndler, at first to the communist Arbeiterwehr, and later 
to the national socialist SA and SS. The SchutzbuDd existed 
primarily to ensure the physical defence of the constitution of 
the republic. The passive responses of the SDAP meant, however, 
that it had to stand by and watch as its raison d'~tre, the 
constitution, was progressively dismantled by the Austrian 
Right. Waves of protest and defections were a logical result of 
the passivity of the leadership and its continued reliance on an 
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expiring democratic system to act as saviour to the movement 
(see Chapter Five, section 5.1). 
After 1930, the social democratic movement in Steyr was 
gradually being weakened both by the erosive effect of 
long-term, mass unemployment and by initially sporadic, but 
later consistently applied government repression. The party 
leadership proved unable to respond, remaining unadaptable in 
its outlook, unable to recognise that its established 
parliamentary tactics were less and less relevant as successive 
federal governments gradually subverted the bases of 
parliamentary democracy. It had long been established as an 
unChallenged elite which presided over a party devoid of 
constructi ve input from its lower levels. It had thus become 
remote from the concerns of many of its followers and was unable 
to respond to their calls for the pursuit of a different, more 
activist strategy. Those who demanded a change in strategy began 
to turn away from the leadership. This was expressed not only in 
defections to other political movements, but also in a 
developing opposition within the social democratic movement. The 
following section analyses the development and the concerns of 
inner-movement opposition in Steyr between 1929 and 1933. 
7.2: The Oppositipn Pptential After 1929. 
The development of opposition in the social democratic 
movement between 1929 and 1933 is illustrated in Table 10. The 
incidence of opposi tional trends after 1930 increasingly 
reflects disaffection over national rather than local issues and 
events; in other words, the attitude and policies of the 
national social democratic leadership gradually overtook those 
of the local leadership as the primary focus of appositional 
sentiment (although both had the same reputation for 
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inflexibility and passivity). This indicates two things. Firstly 
it stresses that the local context for politics was increasingly 
"nationalised" after 1929. Steyr no longer experienced an 
insulated political development after the redefinition of the 
local milieu in 1929-1930. The local milieu was now realigned 
with national political developments. For example, referring to 
Table 10, there was now a new framework for industrial relations 
at the Steyr-Werke resulting from the installation of the 
Credit-Anstalt management at the works and the application of 
new national industrial relations legislation (see Chapter Two). 
Similarly, state repression (arms searches), the rise of the 
Rej mwehr and the national socialists to pol! tical prominence 
(the Pfrimer Putsch and the threat of nazi putsches) and the 
partisan application of justice (the acquittal of the Pfrimer 
putschists) increasingly dominated the local political scene. 
Secondly, the growth of local disaffection over essentially 
national issues and developments also denotes that the social 
democratic opposition in Steyr was developing a wider 
perspecti ve on politics than had hi therto been the case. The 
emergence of opposition after 1929 represents in this respect 
the emancipation of at least parts of the movement from the 
insular, localised consciousness and ethos which had previously 
dominated the social democrats. This theme is explored further 
below. 
The loci of opposition after 1929 were the SAJ, the 
Scbutzbund and the MAV in the Steyr-Werke. That the SAJ figures 
only once in Table 10 as an independent source of opposition 
reflects its increasing role in the social democratic 
paramilitary organisations. SAJ opposition was often identical 
to and subsumed in the opposition displayed by the ScblltzbllDd 
(20). The youth movement was also the proponent of a new, 
aggressive activism after 1931. This was a more implicit 
criticism of previous tactics which did not directly challenge 
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the party, but which did coalesce with the more offensive 
strategy demanded by other oppositional elements. 
The waves of opposition emanating from the ranks of 
ScbutzbiindJ er were virtually all directed at what they saw as 
the excessive moderation of their local and national party 
leaderships in the face of provocation by the Heimwebr and 
central government. This tended to CUlminate in weak and 
humiliating capitulation. The starting point here was the 
surrender by Mayor Sichlrader of the local social democratic 
monopoly of the streets in February 1930 (see Chapter Three, 
section 3.3). In doing so, Sichlrader overrode the determination 
of the Schytzbund (and the social democratic youth) to uphold 
the monopoly by force against Heimwehr incursions. According to 
the police reports, this caused such dissent that 130 men had 
left the Schlltzbund by the end of February and had, temporarily 
at least, joined the communist's paramilitary Arbeiterwehr (21). 
The dissenters were unwilling to see a position of strength, 
such as the monopOly of the streets represented, to be 
surrendered without a struggle. In broader terms they demanded 
an active, confrontational resistance against the anti-social 
democratic actions and plans of Heimwebr and, increasingly, the 
dominant force in the federal government, the Christian Social 
Party. 
For a brief period in the autumn of 1930, when the Heimwehr 
was brought in to prop up a weak christian social government, 
and more or less continuously from the beginning of 1932, the 
Austrian social democrats were subject to official, state 
repression. After March 1933 they faced the "salami-tactic· of 
Chancellor Dollfu~, which gradually eliminated social democratic 
pOSitions of strength in the state apparatus, muzzled the party 
press and progressively restricted the range of permiSSible 
party acti vi ties (22). The response of the SDAP at national 
level to state repression was conditioned by the increasingly 
fatalistic and pessimistic outlook of Otto Bauer. In a series of 
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theoretical articles grounded in deterministic Marxism, Bauer 
developed the thesis that Austria had entered a "pause" between 
the revolutionary developments of 1918-1919 and a future 
revolutionary crisis. The revolution of 1918-1919 had been a 
"bourgeois revolution" in that it had not changed the pattern of 
ownership of the means of production. This meant that the role 
of the SOAP in government in 1918-1920 and its strong political 
influence in the republic, at least up to 1927, were temporary 
phenomena. These necessarily gave way to the restoration of 
bourgeois power in what Bauer termed the "bourgeois republic", 
as the Austrian "political superstructure became adjusted to the 
economic basis" (23). This resigned and deterministic analysis 
allowed no scope for an offensive strategy for the SDAP; that 
would logically have to wait for the next revolutionary crisis. 
The SOAP was left with a defensive strategy whose top priority 
was the maintenance of the democratic constitution, and which 
had, for the time being, abandoned the goal of socialism. It 
sought only 1.0 arnel i orate the anti-democratic tendencies of the 
bourgeois parties through creat! ve compromise and to appease 
them as a "lesser evil" than the strengthening national 
socialist movement (24). 
Creative compromise and appeasement amounted, in real terms, 
to passive acquiescence to repression. The social democratic 
movement was gradually robbed, without resistance, of its 
positions of strength. The acquiescent and submissive attitude 
of the party leadership was a twofold stimulant to opposition in 
the Schutzbund throughout Austria. In the first place it allowed 
the bourgeois parties and the security forces to subvert the 
democratic constitution the Schutzbund was supposed to protect. 
Secondly, it allowed them to strip the Schytzbund of the means 
to protect the constitution: weapons. The passive surrender of 
their weapons in the increasingly frequent arms searches carried 
out by the security forces was particularly humiliating to the 
Schutzbyndler. As Ilona Duczynska argues, it caused a festering 
resentment in their ranks: 
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With every search for weapons, with every confiscation grew 
the rancour, the suppressed anger with a government infested 
with Helmwehr influence and with a party and Schlltzbllnd 
leadership which silently put up with every provocation. 
)lany Schlltzbiindler entered a state of dangerous instability 
which swung between not wanting to bother any IDore and 
wanting to take to arms immediately (25). 
Between NoveIDber 1930 and February 1932 the waves of 
opposition in the Schlltzbllnd in Steyr were all concerned with 
the question of weapons: either the confiscation of their own, 
or the ability of the Heimwehr to use theirs, even to putsch 
wi th the ID with apparent iIDpuni ty (see Table 10). The 
Schutzbi;ndler condeInned the IDoderation of the social delDOcratic 
leaders and their inaction over arms searches, and even called 
for the deposition. of the national party leaderShip. They were 
deeply embittered by the preferential treatment accorded to the 
Heimwehr and demanded offensive action against the governIDent 
and violent resistance to future searches (26). 
In practical terms, the response of disaffected 
Schutzbi;ndler to the inaction of the SOAP leadership took on a 
new forID after 1930. Instead of displaying their opposition by 
defecting to the cOInmunists, they increasingly tended towards 
cooperation with the communists in a united front of Schutzbund 
and cOInmunist Arbelterwehr (see Table 10) (27). The IDost 
dramatic product of this cooperation was a detailed battle plan 
(see Figure 6) for the occupation of Steyr which was drawn up in 
July 1932 to be put into effect in the event of a national 
socialist putsch in Austria (28) . Even though 
SchytzbIlDd-Arbe1terwehr co-operation ceased after In1d-1932 (due 
to internal problems 
of the Schytzbund 
in the cOInmunist IDovement), the willingness 
to ally with the communists gives an 
indication of the direction its opposition was taking. The 
flirtation with the cOInmunists indicates a rejection not just of 
the passivity and acquiescence of the social democratic 
leadership, but also, lDOre fundaInentally, a rejection of the 
nature of social democracy in general. In cooperating with the 
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conmunists, the dissident SchutzbUndler effectively rejeoted the 
concept of the democratic mass party and its commitment to a 
parliamentary stage. This type of party, as discussed in Chapter 
Four of this thesis, tended towards the tactical unwieldiness 
and inagility born of a cumbersome and bureaucratic 
organisational apparatus. The SchytzbUndler were demanding a 
less complex, tactically more mobile and responsive political 
organisation. They were edging instinctively, without 
theoretical underpinning - towards the model of a Leninist 
vanguard party, with a small, highly, active, cadre-based 
membership, which was able to act quickly and decisively at an 
appropriate time to mobilise the masses in support of 
revolutionary actions (29). In doing so, they were heading in 
the same direction as (while remaining, separate from) the 
developing opposition in the MAV, 
The opposition in the NAV centred around the Chairman of the 
Works Council at the Steyr-Werke, August Koser, and his fellow 
Works Councillor Franz Schrangl. Moser and Schrangl became 
leaders of a militant and organised left-oppOSition within the 
social democratic movement in Steyr in 1933-1934. The roots of 
the Hoser-Schrangl opposition lay in the negotiations between 
)[AV and Steyr-Werke management on the new wages and working 
conditions which would apply at the works on the resumption of 
production in July 1930. The newly-installed management was 
determined to eliminate the privileged position the HAV had 
established for itself in the works after the First World War. 
The MAV was equally determined to defend its privileges, but was 
preempted by the intervention of the national executive of the 
union, which accepted the terms laid down by the Steyr-Werke 
management without involving the local NAV in the decision (see 
Chapter Two). 
Xoser and Schrangl reacted with anger at the 1930 MAV 
iational Congress. They accused the union of not fulfilling its 
dutiesj it seemed to be cowering irresponsibly and 
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over-pessimistically before the apparitions of "crisis" and 
"rationalisation" (SO)' According to Moser, it was sad "that 
whenever a member turns to me in desperation, I have to explain 
again and again: • I can·t help, the crisis is too great·, or: 
'That's the result of rationalisation· ... He saw no reason why 
the union could not still :mount an aggressive wages policy. 
Although the chances for success may have been limited. the 
membership needed to see that the union was working on their 
behalf (Sl). Moser resented the fatalistic intervention of the 
national MAV executive in the recent negotiations in Steyr, 
where, when it came to the critical "moment when the cause 
should be decisively defended, someone brings up the catchword 
of 'crisis', and the battle is given up without a determined 
struggle" (S2). Schrangl considered the constant evocation of 
the image of crisis as a feeble excuse; the union was evading 
its responsibility for defending the interests of its members 
(SS). Both he and Koser denanded a more active and offensive 
approach to industrial relations, whatever the economic 
situation. Furthermore, they demanded a greater adaptability in 
union tactics. In this sense, for example, rationalisation and 
its effects were seen as a potentially fruitful challenge to the 
union, not a presage of shopfloor impotence. Rationalisation 
meant, among other things. that more unskilled workers, above 
all women and younger workers, would be employed. The MAV would 
have to take account of this. It would have to move with the 
times and abandon its traditional preoccupation with the 
situation of adult. male. skilled workers and begin to address 
the concern of women and young workers, who faced a far greater 
danger of exploitation (S4). 
Moser and Schrangl thus rejected the pessimistic and 
fatalistic attitude which had begun to afflict their national 
union executive, and which was to grip the local and national 
SDAP to an increasing extent in .the 19S0' s. While the social 
democratic movement lapsed into inflexibility and passivity. 
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Xoser and Schrangl retained an innovative, activist and 
offensive stance. 
The thoughts and acti vi ties of Moser and Scbrangl between 
the MAV Congress in September 1930 and the autumn of 1932 are 
unknown. By autumn 1932, however, they were identified as 
lIlembers of a nascent left-opposition in the SDAP at national 
level (35). This emerging faction, whose leading personality was 
the Arbeiter-Zeitung editor Ernst Fischer, then consisted only 
of a loose network of social democratic activists spread 
already throughout Austria. 
planning to build up 
It is known that Fischer was 
an oppositional force within the SDAP as 
early 
that 
as 1931, but not if Moser and Schrangl were involved at 
stage (36). The left-opposition of autumn 1932 had 
developed a position which rejected the assumptions upon which 
social democracy (not just in Austria, but in general terms) was 
based. It was opposed to the traditional, "petrified, archaic 
and conservative" organisational structure of the Social 
Democratic Party (37), and favoured communist/Leninist 
organisational principles. It conceived of itself as a vanguard 
of capable and committed poU tical "shock troops" within the 
SDAP, which would mount an active battle against "reaction and 
fascism" (38). It also held "an ideological opposition to 
reformism" (39) , whose Umi tations resul ted in the 
"capitulationism" (40) which dominated the SDAP in the 1930' s. 
The left-opposition was thus effectively an anti-social 
democratic, quasi-communist faction within the social democratic 
lIlovelllent. 
The left-opposition was organised throughout Austria on an 
uncoordinated, local basis whereby individual activists were to 
take on a "revolutionising role" in their area of activity (41). 
It can be assumed that Moser and Schrangl sought to use their 
local influence to gain support for left-opposition ideas within 
the Works Council at the Steyr-Werke and in at least parts of 
the workforce. They and the other Works Councillors were held in 
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very high esteem in the works in view of the consistency and 
determination with which they had sought to uphold the interests 
of the workforce. The respect which they thus enjoyed enabled 
them, as one ex-Works Councillor recalls, to exert a decisive 
political influence over the workforce (42). There is certainly 
strong evidence to support this view in the increasing militancy 
of the workforce in the last few weeks before the Austrian Civil 
Var (see section 7.4), and some indication of a radical 
potential in the workforce before 1933 (43). The developing 
opposi tion of Moser and Schrangl was thus reflected in the 
emergence of the manual workforce at the Steyr-Verke as a locus 
of opposition to the passivity and "capitulationism" of the 
social democratic leadership. 
The third "ingredient" of the developing opposition within 
the social democratic movement in Steyr was the SAJ. This 
reflected a nationwide trend of militancy in the social 
democratic youth movement in 1931 and 1932. In Vienna and Styria 
in particular, a new, semi-autonomous organisation of social 
democratic youths and young adults, the Jyngfront, sprang up. 
The Jungfront emerged as a focus for a militant anti-fascist 
activism and for dissatisfaction with the leadership of the 
SDAP. In many respects it was a forerunner of the Fischer 
left-opposition of 1932, and indeed provided much of the support 
for it (44). Although there was no Jyngfront organisation in 
Steyr, the SAJ developed a similar militancy. It is possible 
that Franz Schrangl played a Significant role here. He was a 
recent Chairman of the local SAJ and still eKerted a strong 
influence over the youth organisation (45). His influence may 
have been a driving force behind the adoption by the SAJ of new 
and innovative methods and a highly confrontational attitude 
towards the Austrian Right from 1932 onwards. The SAJ introduced 
poli tical satire, wi th considerable success, into social 
democratio agitation and sought an intense political debate with 
the local communists and national socialists. It also embraced 
the use of physical force as a political tactic, both in its 
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confrontations with the Heimwebr and the nazis, and in its 
increasingly significant role in the social democratic 
paramilitary organisations (see Chapter Five, section 5.2). The 
newly found political activism of the SAJ, which contrasted 
strongly with its previous preoccupation with politically 
detached cultural Abgrenz!lng, represented an implicit rejection 
of the SDAP's passivity and capitulation in the face of 
continued repression. Tbe SAJ thus joined the Sch!ltzbund and the 
XAV as a third oppositional force. 
7.3; The Opposition Strategy 1n Steyr. 
The opposition potential in the social democratic movement 
in Steyr, as assessed in the previous section, remained sporadic 
and isolated in its impact before 1933. However, the events 
surrounding the parliamentary crisis of March 1933 signalled a 
turning point. The parliamentary crisis proved for many to be 
the final straw of disillusionment with the SDAP and ushered in 
a period in which an oppositional left wing became the dominant 
force in the social democratic movement in Steyr. 
On 4th March the Austrian parliament had become deadlocked 
on a procedural technicality. 
Engel bert Dollfu,6 exploited 
The christian social Chancellor, 
the situation of procedural 
confusion as a pretext for abandoning "unworkable" parliamentary 
government and commencing government by emergency decree. 
Intitially the SOAP National Executive displayed a determination 
to mobilise the masses and take up battle in defence of 
parliament and the constitution (46). The "showdown" would be on 
the 15th March, when a parliamentary sitting, which Dollfu,6 
promised to prevent forcibly, was to take place. However, the 
uncharacteristic commitment to face the full consequences of a 
confrontation soon weakened. On 13th March the party executive 
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began to prevaricate, alleging the unreadiness of the masses for 
battle. The showdown on the 15th then became a "great evasion", 
as the social democratic and pan-German K.P. 's crept into 
parliament before the allotted time, thus avoiding the pOlice 
who were to have prevented the sitting. The sitting was formally 
opened, immediately closed and it was then loudly and 
triumphantly proclaimed that a genuine parliamentary sitting had 
taken place (47). 
The events of 15th March 1933 were, in the words of one 
party executive member, tragicomical (48). After preparing its 
followers for a decisive confrontation, the SDAP executive 
contented itself with a farcical evasion of conflict and even 
claimed "victory" for ensuring that parliament did indeed "sit". 
This resulted in a wave of disappointment and disillusionment 
throughout the Austrian labour movement. The majority of the 
movement had been ready, both psychologically and in terms of 
concrete preparations, to fight. The Schutzbynd in Steyr and in 
Upper Austria in general was mustered, weapons at hand, ready to 
act. "The working class waited for the signal which would 
announce the general strike. The SchytzbiindJer for the call to 
support the general strike with armed force" (49). The news that 
the party leadership had, at the last minute, eVilded t.he 
confrontation was received with ang .. ,,', ind i gnation and derision. 
There was great disappointment in Steyr, especially in the 
Schutzbund, that the national leadership of the party lacked the 
consistency and conviction to take the final step towards 
confrontation after concentrating its forces, apparently so 
decisively, for action on 15th March (50). This was the point at 
which the national party leadership lost all respect and 
authority, all legitimacy alDClng oppositional circles in Steyr. 
It had for so long held up parliamentary democracy as the remedy 
for all ills, but, at the decisive moment, proved to be 
incapable of defending it. In the eyes of the opposition it was 
now a discredited and spent force. Kuch the same applied to the 
local leadership, which was also associated with a politics of 
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passivi ty and acquiescence. Even after March 1933, the local 
leadership remained committed to a parliamentary style of 
politics and strove to avoid confrontation at all costs (51). 
The farcical events of 15th March gave a decisive impetus to 
the inner-movement opposition in Steyr by revealing 
unequivocally that the party leadership was a "paper tiger", 
whose predominant instinct was prevarication and not action. 
Although the opposition did not yet take on a definable 
organisational form, 
leadership in the 
it effectively usurped the authority of 
local social democratic movement i its 
adherents now represented the only significant and credible 
political influence, the only driving force in the movement in 
Steyr. In the following months, inspired by the events of 15th 
Xarch, the two leading oppositional figures in Steyr, Moser and 
Schrangl, elaborated a new and distinctive, albeit 
unsophisticated, political strategy. This strategy encompassed a 
fundamental rejection of the democratic reformism which had 
hitherto held sway in the SDAP, and which had patently failed in 
the 1930's to be a vehicle for the achievement of social 
democratic goals or for the conquest of power in the state. 
Instead, Moser and Schrangl developed a militant, activist 
strategy for power, pursued by a more dynamic organisational 
apparatus, which would culminate in a "social revolution". 
The Koser-Schrangl strategy was based on an analysis not 
only of the failings of Austrian social democracy at local and 
national level, but also compared these with the fate of social 
democracy in Germany in the early 1930's. This demonstrated the 
emancipation of Koser and Schrangl, and more broadly the 
emerging opposition in Steyr, from the narrow, localised 
mental1 ty which had previously been the foundation of social 
democratic pol1 tics in the town. It was also indicative of a 
fundamentally new approach to politics, based not in practical, 
local experience, but in a rUdimentary theory drawn from the 
comparison of the broadly similar experiences of Austrian and 
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German social democracy. The implications they drew did not 
therefore concern just their attitude towards the nature of 
Austrian social democracy, but related to the character of 
social democracy as a broader political tradition. 
Xoser was deeply critical cf the determinism of the SDAP 
leadership, its insistence that the party should sit tight in 
the expectation that a policy of negotiation, or perhaps even 
the intervention of foreign powers would solve the political 
crisis in Austria. He dismissed this argumentation as "just a 
hope, and even a very vague hope" and referred to the fate of 
the German labour movement under Hitler as a logical consequence 
of such a "wait and see" attitude (52). The situation in Germany 
had a profound influence on the oppositional social. democrats in 
Steyr. They read and heard of nazi crimes, especially against 
the labour movement, and determined to avoid the same fate (53). 
Schrangl emphasised the need to avoid the mistakes that had been 
made in Germany, and which the SDAP seemed now to be repeating 
in Austria. The social democrats had to learn that a politics of 
tolerating the "lesser evil" (1. e. appeasing the Dollfu.B regime 
in the hope of preventing a nazi takeover in Austria) was 
fundamentally wrong: seeking compromises with the "lesser evil" 
was one of the reasons for the current predicament of the German 
working class. Schrang1 then widened his attack to reject the 
basic principles of social democratic reformism. Reformism had 
become patently impracticable i it was because of its adherence 
to a philosophy which professed that sccia1ism could be achieved 
by "occupying legislative and administrative pOSitions", that 
German social democracy had "fallen into the abyss" (54). 
Xoser's and Schrangl's ideas thus incorporated the 
repudiation of a reformist strategy for power. Parliamentary 
methods were emphatically rejected (55). Moser and Schrang1 
subscribed to the view that only a broad front of 
extra-parliamentary actions - protests, demonstrations, strikes 
and so on - could provide the basis from which to end the 
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dictatorship. These were gradually to be escalated, with the 
mobilisation of the whole working class, into a general strike 
which would signal the battle for power in the state (56). This 
was complemented by a vision of "social revolution", which 
remained theoretically undefined, but whose practical model was 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. Schrangl attacked the restraint 
the SOAP had exerted on the working class in the revolutionary 
upheaval of 1918 to prevent the establishment of an Austrian 
Soviet Republic. If the "methods of the Russian proletariat" had 
been used throughout Central Europe after the First World War, 
there could never have been such a brutal fascist regime as now 
existed in Germany, and which threatened to take hold in 
Austria. Austrian social democracy therefore now had to embrace 
these "Russian methods", the violent and total overthrow of the 
existing system, to ensure the "social revolution" in Austria 
(57) . 
However unsophisticated the terminology of Moser and 
Schrangl may have been, it is clear that they had decisively 
rejected the principles on which social democracy as whole was 
based - in Steyr, Austria, Germany and elsewhere. They had 
abandoned the concept of reforming the existing system from 
wi thin and now sought its complete abolition and substitution 
with a revolutionary order based on Soviet-style communism. 
The existing type of party organisation, the classical mass 
party, could not be the instrument of such violent, 
revolutionary 
oppositional 
change. Its 
social democrats 
leadership 
as far 
was seen 
too remote 
by 
from 
the 
the 
concerns of the average member and its internal machinery as far 
too cumbersome to be able to reach and take responsi bili ty for 
speedy, possibly momentous decisions. This latter point was 
regarded as partly responsible for the prevarication of the 
party leadership on 15th Karch 1933 (58). Moser and Schrangl 
suggested the party could become leas remote and more agile if 
its leadership was not so materially dependent on the party 
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organisation (59). The implication was that the existing 
leadership was unwilling to order decisive action against the 
Dollfu~ dictatorship in case its material existence (as M.P.'s, 
full-time party and trade union functionaries etc.) was lost if 
the action was defeated. This also implied a fundamental 
criticism of the particular nature of the leadership of the 
party in Steyr, the majority of which was, in some form, 
materially dependent on the social democratic movement (see 
Chapter Four, section 4.2). 
It was also suggested that the party leadership had become 
unrepresentatively over-aged and needed an infusion of younger 
ideas to help overcome its tactical inflexibility (60). Further 
than this, however, the Moser-Schrangl opposition did not 
suggest new organisational principles. This reflected a wider, 
national ambiguity within the left-opposition over its 
organisational self-conception. While it tended towards, and 
professed the necessity of a tightly organised Leninist vanguard 
organisation, it also sought to remain within, and even "under 
the strict proletarian discipline" of the existing SDAP. This 
was partly a tactical consideration. Even though the 
left-opposition had, by mid-1933, effectively declared itself 
"for communist principles", it had to stay within the social 
democratic movement to have any chance of mass support; the KP6 
had long been lambasted as the pernicious destroyer of a sacred 
"proletarian unity". Not surprisingly therefore, it "did not 
enjoy a great reputation" among the social democratic masses 
(61) . 
However, the desire to remain inside the social democratic 
movement also derived from the belief that the party held within 
it a latent potential for the violent and revolutionary tactics 
demanded by the opposition. As noted in Chapter Six, section 
6.1, the Austrian SDAP combined a moderate reformist practice 
with a radical programmatical rhetoric. This was reflected in 
the SDAP's Linz Programme of 1926, which set out party tactics 
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in case of a bourgeois counter-revolution which destroyed 
democracy:" then 
through a civil war" 
demanding active, 
the working class could only win power 
(59). The left-opposition held that, in 
and ultimately violent resistance to 
dictatorship, they were upholding the party programme. This was 
certainly the case in Steyr. Alois Zehetner, a close colleague 
of August Koser and a prominent member of the inner-movement 
opposition in Steyr, vehemently rejects the characterisation of 
opposi tional elements in any way as "radical": "These people 
were merely adhering consistently to the party programme and its 
decisions" (63). The opposition in Steyr felt that its strategy 
was fully consistent with the established aims of the movementi 
the leadership of the movement was out of step in the particular 
circumstances of the early 1930's, not the opposition. 
7,4: The Opposition and the Austrian Ciyil War, 
Although the events of 15th March 1933 stripped the 
established local and national leadership of the SDAP of its 
legi timacy and authority, and thus gave a decisi ve impetus to 
appositional tendencies, these did not coalesce into a coherent 
opposition movement in Steyr until the autumn of 1933. Until the 
last quarter of 1933, the opposi tiOD "ingredients" discussed in 
section 7.2 remained largely uncoordinated. Three factors served 
to bring together the opposition potential of Moser and 
Schrangl, their supporters in the MAV and the discontented 
within the ranks of the Schutzbund and SAJ: the fate of the 
labour movement in nazi GermanYi the gradual, "salami-tactic" 
erosion of social democratic strength in Austria by DollfuPi and 
the accelerated disintegration of the social democratic movement 
in late 1933, as more and more social democrats defected to the 
NSDAP. 
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The repression of the labour movement in Germany since 
Hitler came to power in January 1933 acted as a constant 
reminder to the social democrats in Steyr of its possible fate 
if the Austrian dictatorship was not resisted. Dollful3' 
aalami-tactic repression, especially the regular searches for 
Schutzb!lnd arms (64), was also gradually reducing the ability of 
the social democrats to resist such a fate: 
Ve can no longer "wait and see" any more, otherwise we will 
be unarmed and at the mercy of the enemy. Vithout weapons we 
are helpless, and then the same will happen to us as 
happened to the workers in Germany (65). 
The inaction of the SDAP, its continued passivity in the 
face of Dollfu~' decrees, provoked continued dissatisfaction 
among the social democrats in Steyr. Scbytzbiindler and younger 
social democrats in particular demanded some kind of offensive 
action by their national leadership. The failure of such action 
to materialise resulted increasingly in defections to the 
national socialists, whose dynamism, radical policies and 
willingness to undertake military-style actions were attractive 
compared to the constant prevarication and passivity of the SDAP 
(66). In the last year of its existence, the SDAP in Steyr faced 
a steep decline in support; although no exact figures are 
available, police reports indicate that a "quite considerable" 
proportion of its membership shifted its allegiance to the 
national socialists (67). 
In this situation, there was a widespread feeling that if 
the remaining social democrats did not undertake decisive action 
soon to resist further decline and repression, there would be, 
in simple terms, no social democratic organisation left to fight 
back with: "Don't you [the national party executive] see the 
dangers as they smash our great movement to pieces? There is no 
longer much left, just like it happened in Germany" (68). This 
thoroughly realistic appraisal of the parlous state of social 
democracy promoted a unity of purpose among the oppositional 
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tendencies still loyal to the JlX)vement. The cOlllmi tment of 
Schutzbund and SAJ to mount active, physical resistance against 
the Austrian Right thus coalesced with the local left-opposition 
strategy of Roser and Schrangl. The special influence of Koser 
and Schrangl among the workforce at the Steyr-Werke also ensured 
that the MAV constituted an important element in a now broadly 
based opposition movement in Steyr (69). In late September 1933, 
the local police noted that the "greatest part of the [social 
democratic] activists is very radically minded and is 
dissatisfied with its highest leaders" (70). Schutzbjjnd1er, 
social democratic youth and metalworkers at the Steyr-Werke 
combined in a movement, led by Moser and Schrangl, which was no 
longer prepared to accept repression submissively, and which 
demanded that the social democrats move onto an offensive 
footing (71). 
The opposition did not, however, move towards concrete 
actions against the dictatorship until January 1934. Between 1st 
December 1933 and mid-January 1934 there was an official 
'Christmas peace", which was modelled on the "civil peace" 
(Burgfrieden) of the First World War: all parties were, at least 
temporarily, to suspend their partisan interests (72). While the 
ChristJnas peace was largely observed by the acquiescent social 
democratic leadership, the Dollfujl government issued a further 
series of emergency decrees directed against remaining remnants 
of social democratic influence in state and society. Social 
insurance programmes were cut, the finances of Red Vienna were 
curtailed and the government made decisive moves to eliminate 
social democratic influence in the Chambers of Labour and Works 
Councils (73). The decrees issued during the Christmas peace 
were evidently very much the last straw for Koser, Schrangl and 
their colleagues on the Works Council at the Steyr-Werke. MAV 
dominance of the Works Council and its closed organisation on 
the shopfloor of the car works were effectively the last bastion 
of social democratic strength in Steyr. The latest decrees 
threatened even that. The Works Councillors became determined 
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not to accept this final humiliation in the style which had 
become usual since March 1933: 
We asked ourselves, how much longer are we going to sit by 
and watch this situation? There was one day [around 20th 
January 1934J when we distributed twenty-five rounds of 
ammunition to the leading committee members of the Works 
Council ... and to reliable Schlltzbundler who were still 
employed at the works ... We also told them, that if the 
party ... does not make a response to all the events of the 
past weeks, then we will attack ourselves, and hope for 
solidarity and support (74). 
The determination to fight, possibly to spark civil war 
rather than relinquish the 
illustrated a few days 
final position of strength, was again 
later. Encouraged by the latest 
anti-labour decrees, the management at the car works sought to 
ignore the KAV in negotiating a new collective agreement, and 
instead opened negotiations with the Viennese Christian 
Jletalworkers' Union. The Works Councillors responded, with the 
full, passionate support of the workforce, with the threat of a 
strike. This threat was made in full recognition of the fact 
that violent clashes with the security forces and the Heimwehr 
could easily occur on the picket lines, and that this could well 
escalate into serious hostilities. In this case, the KAV 
expected, somewhat optimistically given the demoralised and 
weakened state of the social democratic lDovement, the support {f[ 
the whole Austrian working class in an armed, nationwide 
strusgle (,.(~). 
Th" confrontational attitude of Maser and his COlleagues was 
a genuine reflection of the feeling which prevailed within the 
remaining social democratic rank and file: there was a 
widespread mood 
passi vi t y of the 
of desperation and indignation about the 
party. Many called for violent action to be 
taken (76). The confrontational atmosphere was deepened further 
by extensive arms searches in Steyr on 8th and 10th February, 
which were accompanied 
pedestrians and vehicles 
Heimwehr in the same 
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by on-the-spot searches of passing 
(77), and the denands made by the 
week for the installation of a 
Heimwehr-nominated government commissioner to take over 
municipal administration in the town (78). The tense mood which 
existed among the social democrats in Steyr provides an 
important background to the meeting called by Richard Bernasek, 
the Upper Austrian Schutzbund leader, on 11th February 1934 in 
Linz. Bernasek summoned Maser, Schrangl, Kayor Sichlrader and 
the military leader of the Steyr Schutzbund, Ferdinand 
Xayrhofer, as well as social democratic activists from elsewhere 
in Upper Austria, to discuss the threat posed in the statement 
made on 11th February by the Heirnwehr Vice-Chancellor, Ernil Fey, 
that: "I have seen DollfuJ3 and I can tell you quite definitely 
that he is now our man. Tomorrow we shall go to work and we 
shall make a thorough job of it" (79). 
Bernasek wanted to discuss Fey's statement, assess the mood 
of the social democrats in Upper Austria and plan a response in 
case Fey carried out his scarcely veiled threat. Bernasek 
himself felt that any provocation on the following day - arrests 
of social democrats, arms searches and the like - should be 
resisted and that social democratic forces should be mobilised 
to develop this active resistance into an offensive against the 
dictatorship (80). Bernasek's proposal received unanimous 
support, and a letter was drafted to be sent to the party 
executive in Vienna, informing it of the Upper Austrian 
decision. It was then discussed what would happen if the party 
.executive rejected and tried to put off the course of action 
chosen by the Upper Austrians. August Koser believed this was 
definitely what the executive would do, but proposed that the 
Upper Austrian social democrats should nevertheless ignore the 
executive and still resist any future provocations. This 
proposal was also unanimously accepted and the decision was sent 
by courier to Vienna (81). Subsequently, Otto Bauer did indeed 
try to get the Upper Austrians to postpone their initiative; his 
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plea was ignored, and civil war was sparked on 12th February 
when Schutzbiindler in Linz resisted the attempt by the police to 
enter the local SDAP headquarters by force. 
It is not the intention here to discuss the course of events 
in the civil war, which broke out in the late morning of 12th 
February in Steyr. The two days of battle fought by heavily 
outnumbered and underarmed social democrats have been adequately 
discussed and analysed elsewhere (82). To be assessed here is 
the significance of the willingness of the social democrats to 
take to arms. This was much more than a protest against 
repression and dictatorship, it was also the climax of the 
inner-movement opposition which flared sporadically in the KAV, 
the Schutzbllnd and the SAJ between 1930 and 1933, and which 
developed after March 1933 towards a tangible opposition 
movement within social democracy in Steyr. The military actions 
of the social democrats in February 1934 were largely led by 
August Koser (83), and the participants in battle were largely 
based in the three areas noted above for their opposi tional 
potential. Police reports and the records of court proceedings 
show that of 174 people arrested for participation in the civil 
war, over 40% were under thirty years of age, 70% were 
Schutzbiindler, and around 60% were metalworkers (84). SAJ, 
Schutzbund and MAV brought their opposition to a logical 
conclusion in the civil war of February 1934. This opposition 
had a dual focus: it was not just a reaction against the nature 
of social democracy in the Austrian context, it also rejected 
social democracy as a broader political tradition. 
On one level the armed resistance of the social democrats 
represented the culmination of a progressive process of 
alienation of parts of the social democratic movement in Steyr 
from what was seen as a weak, acquiescent local and national 
party leadership unable to adjust itself to the new political 
"rules" laid down by a resurgent Austrian Right. The SDAP, 
attuned to a gradual evolution into power on the basis of 
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attracting more members snd voters than its competitors was 
quite unsuited to the conditions of restricted legality under 
authori tarian government. But it was also too cumbersome, too 
bureaucratic to be able to change significantly. August Moser's 
recollected reaction to a report of a meeting of the national 
SDAP Executive late in January 1934, at a critical time, when 
civil war could have broken out at any moment, illustrates very 
aptly the inagility of the SDAP: 
I could only shake my head. The party executive 
had ... nothing nothing else to do in a meeting held at a 
very serious point in time, than to occupy itself with the 
question whether new membership stamps should be issued and 
a few other administrative items. I said 'haven't you read 
what is going on out there, did nobody talk about the mood 
in the party? The people are already running away from us. 
The party does nothing, it is not even alive any more. When 
will the party finally issue a call for resistance!' (85). 
The role of Moser, Schrangl and the others at the meeting 
with Bernasek on 11th February, and the participation of around 
600 men on the side of the social democrats in the civil war in 
Steyr also represented a final, definitive rejection of the 
broader characteristics of social democracy as a whole. The 
armed social democratic resistance on 12th and 13th February was 
effecti vely the opposition strategy, as discussed in section 
7.3, put into practice by the opposition movement. It embodied 
the final rejection of the constitutionalist, parliamentary 
orientation and mass party organisation of reformist social 
democracy and its replacement by the use of violent, 
extra-parliamentary tactics, carried out by a dedicated 
vanguard, in a decisive battle for power in the state which, if 
successful, would usher in a process of social revolution. 
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The participation of social democrats from steyr clearly 
played an important role in reaching the decision in Linz on 
11th February 1934 to end the practice of acquiescence to state 
repression. August Moser may even have made the decisive 
intervention by proposing that the Upper Austrians ignore any 
official party exhortations to abandon their plans. This was the 
culmination of a process which had begun in the social 
democratic movement in Steyr at the turn of the decade. It was 
increasingly clear to certain elements in the movement that the 
established strategy of the party in Steyr had become 
anachronistic and irrelevant under the political condiions of 
the early 1930's. An approach which aimed for the partial reform 
of the capitalist system on the basis of a parliamentary 
strategy centred around organisational advance was inadequate to 
meet the challenges posed by economic decline and political 
authoritarianism. Moreover, as national political circumstances 
increasingly came to dominate the local milieu after 1929, the 
emerging opposition in the local movement was "liberated" from 
the localised consciousness and frame of reference which had 
hi therto dominated the movement. To an increasing extent it 
began to direct its criticism towards the perSistence of the 
national party in adhering to its traditional, but largely 
ineffective parliamentary orientation in responding to the 
authoritarian challenge. 
Both locally and nationally the SDAP was inherently 
inflexible and proved wholly 
outlook in the light of the 
unable to reconsider and adapt its 
particular political conditions of 
the party lapsed into a rigid 
which condemned it to political 
the 1930' s. 
ideological 
passivity. In 
the extreme 
Nationally, 
determinism 
Steyr, the bureaucratic structure of the party and 
and unbending organisational mentality of its 
leadership elite prevented effective adaptation and response. As 
a result the movement in Steyr gradually disintegrated after 
1930; members were lost both as a result of economic crisis and 
of the passive, and, for many, humiliating and infuriating 
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acquiescence of the party to state repression. Social democratic 
reformism and its commitment to parliamentary democracy was seen 
as a failure, a wholly inappropriate gUide to social democratic 
activity in the early 1930' s. Its final ignimony was the farce 
surrounding the parrliamentary crisis of March 1933. 
From the beginning of 1930 there arose a oppositional 
potential within the social democratic movement in Steyr which 
was based in its youth, paramlli tary and metal workers' wings. 
This potential was reflected only sporadically in tangible 
actions until 1933, but the concerns raised were all aimed in 
the same direction. A strategical renewal in the movement was 
de:manded, which would abandon the passivity and overcome the 
inflexibility which dominated in the SDAP in the 1930's, and 
which wou Id embark on an aggressi ve defence of the movement 
against the authoritarian Right. August Moser and Franz Schrangl 
played an important role in codifying this strategy after the 
final discrediting of the established party line in March 1933. 
The Moser-Schrangl strategy was inspired by the perceived need 
to overcome the inflexibility and immobilism of the local and 
national SDAP leaderships. More than this however, by drawing 
from the experiences of local, all-Austrian and Ger:man social 
democracy in the early 1930's, Koser and Schrangl established a 
rudimentary theory which suggested that social democracy in 
general was incapable of adequately representing and defending 
working class interests. The Moser-Schrangl strategy signalled a 
fundamental rejection of social democracy and all the 
assumptions associated with it. The notion of reform by the mass 
party within and through the parliamentary system was abandoned 
for a concentration on extra-parliamentary tactics, designed 
ultimately to introduce a process of social revolution on the 
communist model after a violent struggle for power in the state. 
The oppositional potential exhibited since 1930 by KAV, 
Schutzbllnd and SAJ finally coalesced behind this strategy late 
in 1933 and quite consciously opted for civil war in an attempt 
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to resist and overcome the Austrian dictatorship. The 
determination to resist was, however, not directed towards the 
restoration of parliamentary democracy or the reassertion of the 
past principles of the SDAP. It was conceived as a tactical 
prerequisi te for the achievement of a social revolution. The 
armed resistance in Steyr in February 1934 was the climax of 
inner-movement opposition, the cUlmination of the process of 
alienation, both from the SDAP and from social democracy as a 
whole, which had begun in Steyr in 1930. The decision to take to 
arms on 12th February was "like being freed" (86) from the 
social democratic past. It represented the definitive 
emancipation of the opposition from social democracy, and, for 
many of the participants, the beginning of a new politics in the 
Communist Party (87). 
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CONCLUSION 
This study is based on four propositions. The first of these 
suggested that the social democrats in Steyr had a distinctive 
ethos which was conditioned by the peculiarities of the local 
milieu. It has been shown that this ethos was shaped by the 
nature cf Steyr as an isolated, working class, social democratic 
stronghold located within a socially and poH tically opposite 
region. It comprised a narrow and insular "stronghold" mentality 
whose central feature was a preoccupation with organisation. The 
social democrats were concerned to consolidate their hegemony 
within the stronghold by building up and extending their 
organisational apparatus within the town. This preoccupation was 
reflected in one respect in the network, the organisational 
"machine" which harnessed and exploited the powers of patronage 
the MAV derived from its domination of industrial relations at 
the Steyr-Werke and manipulated local government to secure 
social democratic domination of the stronghold. Moreover, it was 
shown in Chapter Four that this preoccupation also made the SDAP 
especially susceptible to the syndrome described by Michels in 
his observations on the oligarchical tendencies of large-scale 
organisation (1). The SDAP developed a hierarchical and 
bureaucratic organisational structure, dominated by a narrow 
leadership elite which increasingly identified its own personal 
interests with those of the party organisation. In this way, the 
party elite developed a narrow and conservative organisational 
outlook which held the size and health of the party organisation 
to be the uppermost concerns of social democratic politics. 
The social democratic preoccupation with organisation had a 
formative influence on the development of the moderate reformist 
strategy of the SDAP in Steyr. The SDAP was committed to the 
reform of certain limited aspects of the existing socio-economic 
order on the basis of the parliamentary-democratic process. The 
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aims of social democratic reformism were therefore highly 
limited and accepted the basic parameters of the existing order. 
This can be related to the practice of machine politics in the 
network and the organisational outlook of the party elite. 
Xachine politics was based in the exploitation and manipulation 
of the roles of trade unionist and local councillor - i.e. roles 
which derived from the existing economic and constitutional 
order. By embracing these roles, the social democrats acquired a 
vested interest in, and, by implication, a positive commitment 
to that existing order. Similarly, the party elite's narrow 
organisational outlook provided the rationale for an 
evolutionary strategy for power within the parliamentary system; 
the party strategy was based in the quest to organise enough of 
the electorate so that the party could form a majority in 
parliament. Social democratic reformism in Steyr was therefore 
rooted in the practical local experience of administering trade 
union, municipality and party organisation. In no sense was it 
ideologically based, unlike the reformism of the SDAP at 
national level. Dominated by their nElrrow and parochia I 
stronghold mental! ty, the loe"l SOlO i al democrats lacked any 
wider theor"tical conception of Austrian state and society. This 
practical, experience-based outlook was also central to the 
SDAP's commitment to the ameliorative reform of certain aspects 
of the capitalist system. This cOIll1lli tment had no grounding in 
any ideological critique of capitalism, but was based on the 
insights derived from the local experience of the unstable 
economic development of the Steyr-Werke. 
The social democratic ethos therefore encapsulated an 
approach to politics which was centred around organisation and 
machine politics and which, through these, conditioned a 
moderate and non-ideological reformist strategy. The second 
proposition upon which this stUdy is based suggested that this 
approach had a certain logic and internal consistency under the 
condi tions which existed wi thi n the local mi lieu between 1927 
and 1929, but that it lost this logic and became outdated and 
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inconsistent with the new and vastly different conditions which 
dominated the local milieu after 1929. The key here is the 
economic history of the Steyr-Werke. The sustained expansion of 
the car works from 1927-1929 generated the resources for local 
reform measures. It also fed into and boosted the machine 
politics of the network and thus underlined social democratic 
hegemony in Steyr. At the same time, the insular stronghold 
mentality of the social democrats denied the relevance of 
national political trends to the local context, in particular, 
the implications of the events of July 1927. Together, 
insularity and the experience of local hegemony bred an illusory 
local optimism qUite at odds with the political situation 
elsewhere in Austria, such that the social democrats in Steyr 
could maintain an unimpaired confidence in the parliamentary 
system and an evolutionary strategy for power. The conditions 
within the local milieu between 1927 and 1929 thus supported and 
promoted the reformist strategy and machine pol! tics of social 
democracy in steyr. 
However, the local milieu in Steyr was fundamentally 
redefined after 1929. The shutdown of the Steyr-Werke both 
slashed the resources available for local reform and decimated 
the network, thus undermining social democratic hegemony in 
Steyr. As a result, the movement now became exposed to the 
national political dominance of the bourgeois parties, which 
aimed and were increasingly able to subvert and debilitate the 
bases of parliamentary democracy in Austria. This revealed the 
illusory nature of local social democratic confidence in an 
evolutionary parliamentary strategy for power, and signalled the 
decisi ve collapse of the extraordinary local conditions which 
had hitherto supported the politics of the SDAP. Machine 
politics and reformism became unsustainable under conditions 
characterised by economic crisis and anti-democratic, 
authoritarian rule. 
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The third proposition suggested that the SDAP was unable to 
respond and adapt to the new political conditions which existed 
after 1929. It remained attached to the now anachronistic 
approach developed in the 1920's. This inflexibility reflected 
the nature of the party structure in Steyr and the mentality of 
its leadership. The structure of the SDAP conformed strongly to 
the model proposed by Kichels (2). As noted above, it was a 
bureaucratic and hierarchical organisation, dominated by a small 
leadership elite. There was no effective inner-party democracy, 
so that neither the leaders nor their policies were subject to 
scrutiny or challenge. Both elite and policies thus became 
entrenched and ossified, remote from and unresponsive to changes 
in political circumstances. 
The resultant inflexibility was intensified by the party 
elite's material and psychological dependence on the social 
democratic organisational apparatus. Some two-thirds of the 
elite were in a form of employment dependent on one or other of 
the social democratic organisations in the town. In addition, 
there is evidence to suggest that the members of the elite also 
derived considerable psychological benefit from the exercise of 
their organisational functions. 
party leaders thus became 
The personal interests of the 
intertwined with, and were 
increasingly perceived as 
organisation. Organisation 
itself. As noted above, 
identical to, the interests of the 
became self-justification, an end in 
the social democratic approach to 
politics was centred around the merits of organisation, both as 
an integral part of machine politics and as the basis of an 
evolutionary strategy for power within the parliamentary system. 
For the party elite, this approach was therefore self-serving; 
it would not change as long as the elite derived material and 
psychological benefit from its position at the head of the 
organisation. 
The party leadership in .Steyr thus continued to stress the 
value of organisation and of a parliamentary strategy, even as 
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that organisation and parliamentary democracy were gradually 
being destroyed by the increasingly repressive and authoritarian 
governments of the 1930's. This relates to the final proposition 
of this study, which suggested that the adherence of an 
inflexible party leadership to an anachronistic approach 
stimulated the emergence of an opposition faction within the 
movement after 1929. Certain parts of the movement were 
unwilling to accept the repressive and anti-constitutional 
measures of successive federal governments without effective 
resistance. They sought instead to mount an active and 
aggressive defence of the movement. The focus of opposition was 
not however restricted to the nature and policies of the local 
leadership. Following the redefinition of the local milieu and 
the increasing significance of national factors in local 
politics after 1929, the political perspective of the emerging 
opposition broadened; 
stronghold mentality 
it became 
which had 
emancipated from the narrow 
previously dominated social 
democratic politics in Steyr. This was reflected in a widening 
focus of opposition. Especially after the Austrian parliamentary 
crisis of March 1933 and the consolidation of national socialist 
rule in Germany throughout that year, leading opposition figures 
began to draw implications about the apparent failure of social 
democracy in general to defend the interests of its adherents. 
As a result, they evolved a new, and radically different 
political strategy which abandoned the central principles of the 
social democratic tradition for the methods and goals of 
inter-war communism. This strategy formed the basis of social 
democratic resistance to dictatorship in Steyr in the Civil War 
of February 1934. 
It is evident that the nature and experience of social 
democracy in Steyr between 1927 and 1934 was highly distinctive. 
In this respect, this study has a wider relevance. It offers a 
qualification and differentiation of the existing literature on 
Austrian social democracy. The need for such qualification and 
differentiation is particularly acute in the Austrian context in 
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view of the tendency in past scholarship to focus on social 
denocracy in the narrow context of Vienna, an inpressive 
showcase for municipal socialism and the arena where the, ideas 
and policies of the party leadership were formed. This narrow 
focus has 
depi cti on of 
this study 
contri buted to an overgeneralised, 
the social democratic movement. The 
offer a partial corrective 
monol1 thic 
findings of 
to this 
overgeneralisation. Indeed, Steyr presents an especially 
fruitful setting for a differentiative case stUdy. The extreme 
and exaggerated background conditions of the local milieu 
provided a unique framework which shaped the distinctive 
characteristics and experience of the local social democratic 
lIIovement. In certain key respects this distinctiveness raises 
questions about some of the assumptions which have hitherto held 
sway in the study of Austrian social democracy. 
The first of these is the widespread assumption that the 
events of 15th July 1927 in Vienna represented a general, 
al1-encolllpassing turning point for social democracy in Austria, 
after which the movement was increasingly subject to the 
domination of the bourgeoisie: "The 15th July was seen as a 
defeat for social democracy and as the first victory of the 
bourgeois counterthrust" (3). However, it was shown in Chapter 
Three that the impact of the events of July 1927 was negligible 
in Steyr. Events in Vienna held no significance for the 
stronghold mentality of the social democrats in the town. 
Moreover, there was no local "bourgeois counterthrust" after 
July 1927; on the contrary, local conditions enabled the social 
democrats to dOlllinate politics and society in Steyr without 
challenge until late 1929. There was thus no consciousness 
whatsoever in Steyr of having passed any "turning point". This, 
however, is not to suggest that July 1927 was not a critical 
point in the development of Austrian social democracy, but that 
its significance, when viewed from the perspective of social 
denocrats Dutside Vienna, has been overstated and 
overgeneralised. In a similar vein, the experience of industrial 
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relations in the Steyr-Werke does not conform to the "norm". It 
is generally held that the social democratic trade unions in 
Austria were forced onto the defensive from the mid-1920's, as 
slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment weakened 
the unions and strengthened the bargaining hand of the employers 
(4). As shown in Chapter Two, the balance of power between trade 
union and employers in the Steyr-werke was the exact opposite; a 
peculiar local framework for industrial relations enabled a 
dominant union to hold the upper hand over a weak management 
until the sudden onset of mass unemployment in 1929-1930. The 
point is, in other words, that it is both impossible and 
misleading to overgeneralise, and thus stereotype and homogenise 
the history of the social democratic movement. The experience of 
the movement inevitably varied according to the different 
background conditions, or milieux, which conditioned political 
development in each region and each town. 
The tendency towards overgeneralisation is perhaps most 
commonplace in ideological/organisational histories of the SDAP. 
Such studies (5) tend implicitly to assume that the theoretical 
preoccupations and controversies of the foremost national party 
leaders served as a guideline for social democratic acti vi ties 
and policies at all levels of the party. However, it seems 
unlikely that the average SDAP member sought his or her 
political inspiration in, say, Otto Bauer's theory of the 
"equilibrium of elass forces" (6). As Kulemann has argued, "the 
theoretical questions of social democracy never really 
reached the mass membership" (7). Indeed, it has been a constant 
theme of this study that the nature of social democracy in Steyr 
was conditioned by local factors. In particular, the reformist 
strategy of the local SDAP was derived from practical local 
experience and had no relation to the ideological considerations 
which formed the basis of reformism at the national level. This 
again underlines the fact that Austrian social democracy was a 
heterogenous movement; any stUdy which restricts its focus to 
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the deliberations and actions of the party executive in Vienna 
cannot hope to do take account of its full diversity. 
One of the major focal points of research into Austrian 
social democracy has been "Red Vienna". Vienna's status as a 
Land. gave the social democratic city administration sufficient 
political and financial autonomy to embark on the most ambitious 
and successful experiment in municipal socialism in inter-war 
Europe. A series of studies, written largely from a sympathetic 
viewpoint, has examined in considerable depth the creative 
fiscal policies of the city administration and the social 
welfare programmes which these funded (8). Insufficient 
attention however has been paid to a less savoury facet of 
municipal socialism: the extent to which patronage was used to 
favour card-carrying social democrats in the distri but10n of 
housing, muniCipal employment etc., and the extent to which such 
practices attracted the support of instrumentalist "free-riders" 
to the social democratic movement. As was shown in Chapter Three 
of this study, patronage and instrumenta11sm were important 
phenomena in municipal politics in steyr, a town with far less 
financial and po11 tical autonomy than Vienna. Their importance 
in the Viennese context remains to be determined. 
The wider value of a local stUdy need not however be 
restricted to the qualification of some of the assumptions which 
have dominated the literature in a certain field, or to pointing 
towards neglected areas of research. The local stUdy can also 
confirm and add fresh insights into existing trends in the 
relevant 11 terature. One such trend in the study of Austrian 
social democracy is to attribute the causes of social democratic 
inflexibility and immobilism at the national level in the early 
1930's to the excessively cumbersome and bureaucratic 
organisational structure of the SDAP (9). This study has shown 
quite conclusively that bureaucratisation was also a 
characteristic feature of the party structure in steyr, and that 
it similarly prejudIced the tactical flexibility of the local 
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SDAP. This study has also offered confirmation to the view that 
the inner-movement opposition which emerged throughout J\ustria 
after 1932 was nllt only directed agaimit the inflexibility and 
immob.llj <3m of ;, bureaucratic party leadership, but increasingly 
embraced a wholesale rejection of social democracy as a 
political tradition (10). However, this is not to suggest 
categorically that bureaucratisation was a feature at 
of the party structure throughout Austria, or 
all levels 
that the 
inner-movement opposition always and everywhere abandoned the 
social democratic tradition. This study may add weight. and fresh 
evidence to these arguments, but no definitive conclusion can be 
advanced until the full diversity of the Austrian social 
democratic movement has been adequately researched in further 
local and regional studies. 
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Jable I' Elections la Ihe Municipal Council In S\eyr In Ibe EI,,\ Republic 
Year Soc hi Oemomh Christian Socials Pan-Gmans Communists National Socialists 
~.-.--------------------------.--------------------------------------------------------------------
1919 
1923 
1927 
1931 
Notes: 
Sources: 
7096 2220 1067 
7699 4331'" 819 509 
7828 3405 1278'·' 406 
7229 2886 1073" , 731 622 
(a) "Elnbel15!!lle" - christian socials and pan-Germans, 
(b) 'YOlkjscber Wjrlscb,jlsblock' - pan-Germans and national socialists, 
(c) 'peu\5cbe Wablgemejn"b,fl' - pan-Smans and Hejro,Lblock (Hejm.ebr) 
STS 26"'1927, p,l: 4/511927, p,8: 21"'1931, pp,I1-12: 23/511931, p,a, 
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lable 21 prQdyrlign And EnpJoyment at tbe steyr-Uerke 1920-1933 
Year Total Vehicles Production EftploYMent'·' 
---------------------._------------------------------------------
1920-1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
Notes: 
Sources: 
1719 6436'0' 
1035 4520 
1492 4070 
2363 3408 
2524 4662 
4621 4332 
5555 6018 
6005 6648 
12 2626 
2988 2163 
1778 1363 
739 1287 
(a) The emploYMent figures for 1922-1926 refer to the average employment 
level over the year: those for 1927-1933 refer to the enployment level 
recorded at the end of June in each year, 
(b) 1922 figure only, 
Dr, Hans Sepe!, Wo .Iabu. Steyr-D'hJer-Pv,b nu. Werdegang ainu. 
;;'1. .... I,blscbeD Ind!!51.rie!!nterDebmens (Vienna, 1964), pp, 79-80, 
B.W.tll.I.. i1u. vmlind" i1u. Qsterrej ,bi 5tben Heh 11- IIlli 
eergarbejterverbande5 ii!ltt.!.We. Wigkejl in. iWJ..!ihw. ~ illl..ll3l 
iJl. iWJ. l.L verband5lig iu. Wl.en. iIll. Z2- L Evenlue!! ZL BIlill. ill1 
(Vienna, 1933), p,U, 
Kmer rar Arbeiter und Angestellh in Linz ., Donau, verzej,bnj' ilmu. 
Bdriebe ill. OberOderreicb w.w. D.b.u. EUnL Kammery·Jagepflicbtige 
Bwbi!\!gen, 1930-1933 editions (Linz, 1927-1933), 
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Table 31 Tbe FtnaDc'al PerfOrmaDCe Of the Sleyr~Uerke 1924-1929 
Year Net Profits Dividends Dividends as S DebLs 
(1,000 Sh,) (1,000 Sh,) of net proWs (1,000 Sh,) 
-----------------------------------------.--.--------------------------------------
1924 1,217 I,OOB B2,B 11,027 
1925 1,&85 1,512 B9,7 16,771 
1926 I,B50 1,512 81.7 29,338 
1927 1,914 1,512 79,0 35,228 
1928 824 75& 91,7 57,720 
1929 -2',160 0 93,30& 
----------------.----------------------------._------------------------------------
Sources: 6VW Bilanzen 4/8/1928, pp,S23-S24: 27/7/1929, pp ,489-490: 3/8/1930, p,7, 
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lable 4' The Expenditure Of the Steyr-Werke Works Council for the First Half Of 1929 
Item 
Income 
Expenditure: 
Reimbursement of wages of Works Councillors and 
functionaries 
Subsidy to the locial democratic housing co-operative 
Subsidy to the Klndorfrollndo 
SubSidy to the ~ Arboilerbol. 
Educational expenditure 
Uelfare expenditure 
Delegation costs 
Reimbursement of wages for magiltrates' and jury duty, 
rent tribunal attendance etc 
Stationery, telephone etc 
Other 
8alance 
Total 
Source: STZ 18/3/1930, p,l, 
In Shillings 
120,813,05 
35,454,03 
15,271,00 
18,993,00 
18,993,00 
3,172,00 
5,544,80 
',157,63 
1,590,23 
2,087,50 
394,74 
15,155,12 
120,813,05 
As a Percentage of 
of Total Income 
100 
29,3 
12,6 
15,7 
15,7 
2,7 
',7 
3,4 
1,3 
1,7 
0,3 
12,6 
100,0 
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TAble 5· Social Democratic Influence over the Shy, LabQur Market 1927-19331 Ca) 
Im 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
---.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approxilate Total 
Workloree'·) 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Sle¥t-Wetke Manual 
Workers" ) 3,757 5,316 5,891 2,198 1,734 1,057 1,056 
Municipal Workforce 105 171 212 131 ' 101 75 58 
Jobs in Social 
Democratic Organisations 94 103 98 92 88 64 50 
--------------------------------------.-------.--------------------------------------------
Total Social 
DeQocratic Jobs 3,956 5,590 6,201 2,421 . 1,923 1,196 1,164 
Total as Percentage 
of the Worklorce 39,56 55,9 62,01 24,21 19,23 11,96 11,64 
-------------------------.-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hotes: 
Sources: 
(a) All jobs figures Irt for 31st June in the relevant years, excepting 
the 1929 municipal work/oree, ~hith is the Decenber figure, All figures 
Ire for firls or institutions with five or nore employees: some municipal 
departnents and social duoeratic organisallons employed less than five, 
50 that these figures are slightly underestimated, 
(b) This is an estimated figure, At the end of June 1929, 8,516 people 
were elployed in firms eMploying live or nore elployees, At the same time 
there were 719 unemployed receiving relief in the town, This gives a total 
of 9,235, If the numbers of unemployed not receiving relief and workers in 
lins employing less Ihan five nployees are taken into accounl, a total 
of 10,000 seems a fair estimate, 
(c) Including apprentices empoyed at the works, 
KaMm far Arbeiter und Angestellle in Linz a, Donau, vemiebni, .!.enu. 
Belriebe in. Ober§sterreil'b e.Wlt. ~ EllnL KammerIJ1hgepflicbUge 
Be5ebifligen, 1927-1933 editions (Linz, 1927-1933), 
STB 9/711929, p ,11, 
LT? 25/11/1929, p,7, 
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Table 61 Tb. SlabiJ ity Of lbe SOAp District Committee 1928-1933 
Dtputy 
Year Chair~an Chairm 
1928 Schrangl Wltzany 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 • 
Year Ordinary !embers 
1928 Halner RuSnnn Oedic 
1929 Moser 
1930 
1931 
1932 Schopper 
1933 
Year Supervisory MeMbers 
1928 Dedic Drell HUller 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 Konrad 
1933 
Deputy 
Chai rnn Treasurer 
Schwitzer Tribrunner 
PURer 
Schwitzer 
PURer 
Fridrich SI chi rader 
Roilhner • 
• 
Sperl • 
• 
Sleberer Kohler 
Sippl 
Deputy 
Treasurer Secretary 
Klnent Ki rchberger 
Deputy 
Secretary 
Huber 
Roithner 
Mlhchko Phrr Hauslmayr Azwanger 
• • 
• Schoner 
Mellich • 
Mayrhofer • 
HubMlnn 
Paner 
Schwitzer 
Heunnn 
Sources: srs 121211928, p,lI; 101211929, p,lI; 16/211930, p,l4; 181211931, p,S; 
23/2/1932, p,IO; 28/2/1933, p,3, 
Table z. Tb. Qi,trict Committee in 1932 
Function 
ChailNan 
Deputy 
Chainan 
Deputy 
Chairman 
Treasurer 
Deputy 
Treasurer 
Secretary 
Deputy 
Secretary 
Ordinary 
Menbers: 
Supervisory 
Menbers: 
Nale 
Schrangl 
Pamner 
Witmy 
Tribrunner 
K1enent 
Kirehberger 
Roithner 
Moser 
Schopper 
Oedic 
Sperl 
Sichlrader 
Hayrhofer 
Aznnger 
Heunann 
Schoner 
Oedie 
OreSI 
Konrad 
Sieberer 
Sippl 
Hubnann 
Schwiher 
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Dc cupati on 
~ehhorker 
Public servant 
H,P, for Steyr 
SOAP heal th fund uployee 
SOAP district party secretary 
Steyrer Tagblatt editor 
Teacher 
Hetahorhr 
Hetalworker 
Shopkeeper 
Metahorker 
~ayor of Steyr 
Hanager of the Municipal enterprises 
Teacher 
HAV district secretary 
~ehhorker 
Shopkeeper 
~AV chanber of labour representative 
Hetahorhr 
H'hhorhr 
1 
Forestry Worker 
Teacher 
Sources: STB 291311931, p,16: 23/211932, p,10, 
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Table el Social DemgcraliC Cyltural Organisation, in Sleyr 
Organiulion MeMbership (Year) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Abstinenh 
Alpine Costume and Folk-Oance Preservation 
Animal Protection 
Artists and Sketchers 
Athletics 
Brass Band (Stadlkapelle) 
Canary Breeding (two clubs) 
Chess 
Choral (three clubs) 
Consul er Co-Operitive 
Crematorial 
Cyclists 
Educational Conlittee 
- Library 
- Arts Centre 
Esperantists 
Flying Sports 
Football (three clubs) 
Free-Thinkers 
GYMnasts (three clubs) 
High School Students 
House-Building Co-Operative 
Kinderfreunde - adults 
- children 
Mandolin Players 
Military Gynnasts (Wehrturner) 
Motorcyc lists 
Pensioners (Accident) 
Pensioners (Old Age) 
Philatelists 
Political Cabarel 
Radio Enlhusiasts 
Red Falcons 
Sanari hn! 
Savers and Annuilants 
Schutzbund 
Shooting and Hunting (two clubs) 
Shopkeepers and Small Businessnen 
Skiers 
Small Animal Breeders and Allotlent Gardeners 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
91 (1927) 
230 (1927) 
nla 
4 ,172 (1927) 
nla 
22 (1930) 
446 (1929) 
35 (1930) 
nla 
nla 
I ,042 (1927) 
1,403 (1928) 
72 (1930) 
I ,000 (1929) 
1,521 (1929) 
2,046 (1929) 
61 (192B) 
360 (1930) 
nla 
nla 
2B8 (1930) 
nla 
nla 
300 (1930) 
88 (1930) 
nla 
nla 
650 (1930) 
nla 
142 (1928) 
nla 
nla 
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Jable 6 cgntjnyed 
Tenants 
Tourists (Naturlreunde) 
Yatmporh 
I,m (\929) 
817 (\929) 
nla 
Yeightlllting, Wrestling and Tug-o-War 
Yomen 
nla 
1,582 (\93\) 
60S (1929) 
nla 
Youth 
Zither Players 
Aggregate Totai Membership 17,190 
Nott: 
Sources: 
The aggregate total Membership 01 17,190 must be treated ~ith caulion, 
lince the meMbership figures for the individual organisations - as lar as 
Ihey are accessible - do not all originate Iro. the SaNe point in ti.e, 
Ho~ever, it can be BSsu.ed that Ihe lohl aggregate .eMbership 01 the 
cultural organisations in the years 01 social denocratic expansion in the 
.id to late 1920's las around 20,000, The Consuler Co-Operative alone had 
a Ne~bership in the Steyr District 01 3,000 at the end 01 1928; al least 
half 01 these could be assuned to live in Steyr, In addition, there are 
also SOMe twenty-six organl5ltions Mentioned above lor which no exacl 
mbership Ilgures are available, At least Ihree 01 these (Abstinenh, 
Cyclists and Foolballers) had nenberships running inlo hundreds, 
STB 6/211927, pp,N; 5/211928, p,11; 251111929, p,S: 9/211929, p,10: 
9/211930, p,I!: 141211930, p,7; 16/211930, p,U; 11/611930, p,10; 
12/811930, p,S; 171211931, p, 11, 
om 1925, p,S7; 1929, pp,33, 56; 1930, pp,38, 51, 
8.gl£ sw. 1929, p,S8; 1930, p,88, 
Feuerbeslallungsverein 'Die Flanme' in Sleyr, E .. t5C br jfl w:. Wu. !1u. 
Er§ffnllng !1u. EWt.n. Qber§stmej[bj"hen Eeyerb.lle in. lliXL ill. .Iw!i. 
lm, pp,27-29, 
AVA BKA Inneres 22/Dberosterreich Karton 5100: 103,821-30; 108,893-30, 
VGA Parlelarchiv Mappe 67/2, 
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Table g, The p •• ljne in P,rl¥ Member5hlp 1928-1931 
Organisalion 1928-1929 Memberlhlp 1931 Membership 
Steyr SOAP ca, 5,000 (1929) 3.837 
Uomen's Organisation 1.582 (1929) 1.055 
SOAP Seclion 5 737 <1928l 596 
SOAP Se\ lion 6 393 <1928l 263 
SOAP Section 9 1.471 (1929) 1.157 
Sources: STS 2/211929. p,7: 221211929. p,9: 71211930. p,10: 16/211930. p,14: 
3/2/1932. p,10: 1312/1932. p,8: 13/2/1933. p,3, 
VGA Parteiarchiv Mappe 67/2, 
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Table 101 The InciDence Of Inner-MOVement opPo'ition 1929-1932 
Cause .nd dah Source of Cooperation with Oeltc \Ions to 
of Opposition Opposl lion the CO~Munlsts? the Comnunlsh 
-------------------------------------------------.------------------------------
Loss of nonopoly 
of the Slreets: Schuhbund No Ves 
Oec 1929-Jan 1930 SAJ Ves No 
MAV-Manlguent 
Negoliallons at 
the Steyr-Werke: HAV No No 
Oct 1930 
ArMS Search Schuhbund No Ves 
Nov 1930 
Helm~ehr Putsch Schutzbund Ves No 
Sept 1931 
Acquittal of 
Heim~ehr Putschlsts: Schutzbund Ves No 
Oec 1931 MY No Ves 
Fear of National 
Socialisl Put.ch: MAY Ves No 
June-July 1932 Schuhbund Ves No 
----------.---------------------------------.--------------------------.--------
Sourcn: AVA 8KA Inneres 13/6 Karlon 2382: 195,315-30: 238,347-31, 
AVA 8KA Inneres 22/genere Karton 4867: 214,060-30, 
AVA BKA Inneres 22/genere Karton 4868: 230,754-31, 
AYA 8KA Inneres 22/genere Karton 4873: 145,062-32, 
AVA BKA Inneres 2210berosterreich Ktrton 5100: 180,710-29: 110,119-30: 
110,946-30: 111,m-30: 111,427-30: 111,430-30: 121,881-30, 
AVA 8KA Inneres 22/0berosterrelch Ktrton 5101: 190,931-31: 199,871-31: 
220,723-31: 106,243-31, 
AVA BKA Inneres 22/0berosterreich Karton 5102: 190,484-32 
STB 18/12/1932, p,IO, 
See also Chapter Three, section 3,5, 
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Figure I' Th. Slruclure of Employmenl In Sleyr 1927-1933 
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KaMler far Arbeller und Angestellle In Linz I, Oonau, Y.rzeichnjq itDu. 
BelriebelD. OberQ,lerretch u.Wl.t. m E!l.nL Ka •• erutJagepfllchl1ge 
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Figyre 21 Unemployment Rates in Heyr BUd AudriJ 1927-1933 
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Nole: 
Sources: 
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YEAR 
Sleyr une~ploymenl rates are lhose recorded at the end 01 June in eath 
year: Austrian rates are the yearly average, 
STa 8/7/1927, p,10: 6/7/1928, p,10: 9/7/1929, p,ll; 8/7/1930, p,8; 
8/7/1931, p,8: 12/7/1932, p,8; 717/1933, p,', 
Hans Kernbauer, Eduard Narz, and Frilz Weber, 'Die WirtsthalUlthe 
Entwitklung', in Erika Weinzierl, Kurt Skalnik CEd.,), fi.lerr.leb 
mA-me embleM. w.Witn.Re~!Jbl!k CSm, 1983), pp,367, 369, 
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figure 3' Tbe Eun,liQ05 Held by Juliu' RuBmn spap Yice-"'ygr in 1930 
LEVEL 
NATIONAL 
UPPER 
AUSTRIAN 
STATE 
LOCAL Vice-n.yor 
I 
Municipal Portfolio: 
Municipal Enterprises, 
Unemployment Office 
presi~ ~,n of 
the Wel fare the Tourism 
Commi Uee 
chlJ.n of 
cenr
e 
Member of 
the MuseUM Municipal 
FUNCTIONS: 
PARTV UNION OTHER 
COMI.i2counciIOistrict ___ Leader of the---Chairman of 
Couiltee Union of Industrial football Club 
EMployees 'Vorwirts' 
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Figure 41 The Fynctjon, Held by Aygyst MQ,er Chairman of the York, Council Of the Sltyr-Verh. 
in..illl 
LEVEL 
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UPPER 
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LOCAL 
STATE 
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PART V 
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Provincial 
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UNION 
AusLrian Trade 
Union FederaLion 
ExecuLive 
NaLional 
HAV ExecuLive 
OelegaLe Lo 
HAV Congless 
Provincial 
HAV ExecuLive 
NAV ExecuLive 
Leader of Lhe 
Works Council 
OTHERS 
Plovincial 
HeaILh Fund 
Executive 
Counc!1lor ---DilLric L --- Yorkl--Schubbund~!lH Fund 
in SL, Ulrich Com.iLLee Counti 110r ExecuLive ExecuLive 
at SLevr-Werke 
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Figure 51 The Functign, Held b¥ fun Sithl~'der SOAP Maygr in 1932 
LEVEL 
NATIONAL 
UPPER 
AUSTRIA 
LOCAL 
STATE 
Pari iamenhry 
Candidate 
Menber of the 
Upper Austrian 
Parliament 
Mayor 
'~i<,p.l F'~"<. 
Por\folio 
FUNCTIONS: 
PARTY 
Provincial 
Executive 
Delegate to 
Provi nc lal 
Congress 
UNION 
National 
... &''j'" 
Oel~ga\e \0 
MAV Congress 
Provincial 
MAV Chaimn 
MAV Chairman 
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Figyre 61 Tbe ScbyhbundlArbeHerwebr httle phn for tbe Qunpation Of Shyr (Jyly 1932) 
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FOOTNOTES 
Abbrev1ations used 
AVA 
AVA BKA 
AZ 
DKAAW 
DoW 
IFZ 
LTP 
LVB 
LVS 
oMA 
OoAZ 
OoLA 
OoTB 
OoTZ 
OVW 
Rote 
SGUK 
SJ 
STB 
STZ 
VGA 
Saat 
Introduotion 
Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv 
Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Bundeskanzleramt 
Arbeiter-Zeitung 
Dokumentation der Kammer fur Arbeiter und 
Angestellte in Wien 
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